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Abstract 
 
Conflict of laws rules in Canada bias toward taking jurisdiction over matters involving human 
rights or environmental abuse inflicted abroad, particularly when inflicted by Canadian 
corporations. Contrary to enumerated tests for jurisdiction, many Canadian courts have instead 
preferred a regressive state-centric/hyper-comity anchor in applying such tests to putative foreign 
plaintiffs. This Thesis argues this preference can be effectively understood using the lens and 
language of Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory as representing a habitus of the Canadian judiciary. In 
light of the habitus of the Canadian judicial field, and in order to encourage an interpretation of 
conflict of laws rules in Canada that prefers an uptake of such claims, practitioners ought to 
introduce issues of jurisdiction to Canadian courts framed with respect to fairness, notably whether 
it is fair to provide Canadian corporations significant benefit when operating abroad and, through 
failure to take jurisdiction, allow such corporations to avoid civil prosecution.   
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Introduction 
The world’s climate is changing, likely in large part because of human/corporate 
behaviour.1 The impacts of such change, though largely still to come, are most endured by the 
world’s poorest citizens.2 In a growing trend, affected groups are turning to international and 
domestic law to assign blame to major players and to seek compensation in order to assist with 
the mitigation of the effects of climate change. As of March 2017, the United Nations (UN) 
Environment Programme had counted nearly 1000 civil cases related to climate change filed 
worldwide against governments, 654 of those cases being filed in the United States (US) alone.3 
Such cases seek to hold governments accountable for legislative and policy commitments, link 
government actions to greenhouse gas emissions, or establish liability for failures to adapt to 
climate change. In Canada, while there have been some domestic attempts at tying responsibility 
for climate change to the Canadian federal and provincial governments — through constitutional 
challenges and judicial reviews4 — there has yet to be a successful claim against any level of 
government, nor any of Canada’s multinational corporations, for their role in climate change.5   
Such challenges —whether against governments or corporations — bring with them a 
scale and complexity that dwarfs the average civil case given the myriad logistical, causational, 
and procedural difficulties.6 However, before having any case heard, putative plaintiffs will need 
to convince a Canadian court that it has jurisdiction over the matter. Where affected plaintiffs are 
foreign citizens, such jurisdiction to hear the case, let alone determine it on its merits, is far from 
 
1 IPCC, “2018: Summary for Policymakers. In: Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts 
of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the 
context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to 
eradicate poverty” World Meteorological Organization, Geneva, Switzerland. 
2 O Hoegh-Guldberg et al, “2018: Impacts of 1.5oC Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems. In: Global 
Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels 
and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the 
threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty” (2018) IPCC.  
3 UNEP, “The Status of Climate Change Litigation: A Global Review” (May 2017) at 10-11. 
4 See for example, the now abandoned judicial review by Ecojustice against the Province of Ontario with respect to 
a decision to approve additional air pollutant releases in Sarnia as impeding the applicants’ right to life, liberty, and 
security of the person per s 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Ronald Plain v Director, Ministry of 
the Environment, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, as represented by the Minister of the Environment, the 
Attorney General of Ontario and Suncor Energy Products Inc, Court File No. 528/10 (ON SCJ). 
5 Meinhard Doelle, Dennis Mahony & Alex Smith, “Canada” in Richard Lord et al, eds, Climate Change Liability: 
Transnational Law and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 525. 
6 Daniel Augenstein, “Torture as Tort? Transnational Tort Litigation for Corporate-Related Human Rights Violations 
and the Human Right to a Remedy” (2018) H R L Rev 593 [Augenstein 2018] at 595. 
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assured. Foreign plaintiffs in Canada are subject to Canadian conflict of laws/private 
international law rules and the application of such rules has failed to keep pace with the 
internationalization of the global marketplace and the reality of earth sciences.  
Though climate change litigation has been slow to develop in Canada (especially 
compared to the United States), we may look to project-specific transnational tort litigation 
outside the field of climate change dimensions – some for environment-related harms and some 
for harms associated with more classical human rights violations – to predict the role jurisdiction 
will play in such climate change cases and thus to minimize the risk of failure and subsequent 
determinations of res judicata. Such tort cases, already ongoing, are likely the best avenue with 
which to create precedent and pave the way for the larger climate change actions. There are 
several reasons for this. The defendants, though whose involvement is frequently complicated by 
veiled corporate relationships, are generally few and easy to identify; similarly, though plaintiffs 
may be numerous, they are often aligned in a representative or class action; last, the tortious 
conduct is generally tied to a single or ongoing identifiable event at a single location or project. 
In such cases, the parties and damages are much easier to identify, thus preventing any clouding 
of judicial judgment by novelty and scale and providing an observer with a cleaner test of 
jurisdiction.  
Unfortunately, Canadian extraction abroad provides a rich source for such cases. 
Between 2000 and 2015, at least 44 people died, and 403 people were injured as a result of 
violence surrounding Canadian-owned mines in Latin America alone.7 Those most heavily 
affected were those opposed to mining projects and their family members as well as women, 
children, and union and indigenous leaders. Such numbers were described by the Justice and 
Corporate Accountability Project (JCAP) as “the tip of the iceberg.”8 Indeed, the figures are 
limited to the Latin American region and reflect only data that was available. While many of the 
incidents JCAP outlined went unpunished, some plaintiffs have come forward to seek redress. In 
a (perhaps ironic) reflection of the tendency of the transnational corporation to seek financial 
gain through doing business in a developing country — and thus passing off environmental 
 
7 Duncan Hood, “Mining Disaster,” Globe and Mail Report on Business 35:6 (March 2019) citing Shin Imai, Leah 
Gardner & Sarah Weinberger, “The ‘Canada Brand:’ Violence and Canadian Mining Companies in Latin America,” 
Report (2016) Justice and Corporate Accountability Project online (pdf): <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2886584> [JCAP Report].  
8 JCAP Report, supra note 7 at 5. 
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burdens to those who cannot or will not resist by exporting waste and polluting enterprises9 — 
plaintiffs then, fairly, seek beneficial recourse in choosing the multinational corporation’s home 
country as a preferred forum for action.10 
But in analyzing judicial treatment of such cases we are presented with a complicated 
story. While the tests for asserting and keeping jurisdiction in Canadian fora vary, they favour 
the assertion of jurisdiction, particularly in cases involving human rights abuses. However, using 
the simultaneously ephemeral and historic notion of comity, Canadian courts have diverged in 
the application of the black letter law. Such divergence leads to unpredictability in access to 
justice (not to say, unfairness) for foreign plaintiffs and the source of such divergence will 
require attendance before any larger climate change-related litigation can expect success in 
Canada.  
Rather than taking a doctrinal view of Canadian transnational tort cases to try to make 
sense of and identify differences between such cases on technical rules, by pursuing an analysis 
of such decisions from a sociological or behavioural perspective — one that shifts focus from the 
decision itself to the decision-maker — we are able to make more sense of the judicial tendency 
to resort to traditional state-based analyses. This thesis argues, thus, that it is not the black letter 
law that is creating difficulty for foreign-based plaintiffs in transnational human rights and 
environmental tort litigation in Canada, but the tendencies of the Canadian judiciary to lean into 
traditional understandings of the international space as well as to draw on cautious dispositions 
related to the political economy of corporate accountability.  
These tendencies, comforting though they may be to some, lead to the inevitability that 
plaintiffs, particularly those from the developing world, may never see justice done. It is often 
difficult if not impossible for plaintiffs to seek redress from their home government institutions 
when the entity responsible for their misfortune provides significant economic incentive to a 
plaintiff’s national leaders and power elites. Beyond national governance, and as noted by Beth 
Stephens, corporations are multinational while the rules to govern them remain national, creating 
a disconnect between such international corporate structures and the law;11 this lack of 
 
9 Janet Dine, The Governance of Corporate Groups (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 161. 
10 Sarah Joseph, Corporations and Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) [Joseph 
2004] at 150. 
11 Beth Stephens, “The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights” (2002) 20 Berkeley J 
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supranational authority — grounded in international law — creates further regulatory gaps in 
which problems arise that are under-regulated.12 In many of these cases, a corporate entity’s 
home country becomes the sole option for seeking redress.  
In recognizing territorialist judicial tendencies and the reality of corporate/plaintiff power 
dynamics, the question remains: how then can plaintiffs advance modern approaches to private 
international law in project-specific transnational tort cases, which may pave the way for access 
to Canadian courts for future and larger more complicated – i.e. notably, climate change – files? 
One solution may be to encourage those in the Canadian judiciary, who already tend 
heavily towards traditional legal interpretations (notably, as will be detailed, classical 
territorialist understandings of both the world and law), to embrace other traditional concepts 
(namely, fairness and equality of treatment) rather than seeking to persuade judges to approach 
private international law from more modern frames of reference (such as ideas of membership in 
a global community or ideas of transnational law). In a more traditional judicial mindset, it may 
be possible to appeal to a sense of fairness that is willing to attach national responsibility to legal 
entities where such entities are provided extensive national benefit. The modern reality is that 
Canadian corporations are provided extensive benefit by virtue of being based in Canada; that 
benefit leads to a parallel responsibility in this country. Such an argument may find favour with 
even traditionally-minded judges. 
It is important to explain, before embarking on the above-noted argument in the main 
body of this thesis, that the question of transnational and global justice is a broad and widely 
studied topic. In order to narrow and focus the research contained herein, and to provide what is 
hoped to be a new frame of understanding, I have chosen and made a number of assumptions. 
Most notably, I assume, using a legalist frame,13 that civil litigation is a desirable and effective 
tool for individuals and communities impacted by harmful corporate conduct. Second, I have 
addressed only the application of current Canadian state law, rather than the existence and 
 
Int’l L 45 at 54. 
12 Craig Scott & Robert Wai, “Transnational Governance of Corporate Conduct through the Migration of Human 
Rights Norms: The Potential Contribution of Transnational ‘Private’ Litigation” in Christian Joerges et al, eds, 
Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2004) 287 [Scott & Wai 2004] at 288. 
13 Robert Wai, “The Commercial Activity Exception to Sovereign Immunity and the Boundaries of Contemporary 
International Legalism” in Craig Scott, ed, Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on the Development of 
Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) 213 [Wai 2001a] at 240. 
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possible application of Indigenous law to such questions.14 Third, unless otherwise specified, I 
have limited my analysis to the Canadian domestic (rather than international) legal context. This 
third assumption was made given the current Canadian judicial hesitance in engaging with 
customary or treaty-based international law. While many scholars have argued both for a liberal 
domestic application of customary international law and for a re-imagining of transnational law15 
— as a concept distinct from, while mutually imbricated with, international or domestic law — 
for the sake of and hope for immediate application I preferred in this thesis to present an analysis 
and future direction based in practices that are already palatable to the Canadian judiciary.   
Finally, few Canadian project-specific transnational cases involve environmental torts 
and most involve, instead, human rights abuses. However, for our purposes I will use both kinds 
of cases as examples of “bad behaviour.” I assume that both kinds of cases may serve equally 
well as test cases for the assumption of Canadian jurisdiction over foreign actions; whether 
human rights cases serve perfectly to predict the way in which a Canadian court may treat a 
climate change case where the damage is inherently more challenging to identify than physical 
damage is to a person, may be available for further inquiry.16 
The paper unfolds over three main chapters, apart from the present introduction and the 
conclusion. In the first chapter, I introduce private international law in Canada, and specifically 
the way in which courts assert and retain jurisdiction. Given the diversity in approaches taken by 
Canadian provincial fora, this analysis is done using representative provinces: British Columbia 
(BC), Ontario, and Québec. This section explains the tests for jurisdiction simpliciter, forum non 
conveniens, and forum of necessity before introducing and explaining the way in which the 
concept of comity of nations is applied by Canadian courts in the context of private international 
 
14 See for instance the discussion in Franzki, Hannah & Johan Horst, “On the Critical Potential of Law — and its 
limits” in Kerstin Blome et al, eds, Contested Regime Collisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 
347 [Franzki & Horst 2016] at 360. 
15 See for instance Craig Scott, “Translating Torture into Transnational Tort: Conceptual Divides in the Debate on 
Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Harms,” in Craig Scott, ed, Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives 
on the Development of Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) [Scott 2001a] at 45; 
Augenstein 2018, supra note 6. 
16 It may, in some cases, be easier for a Canadian court to ground their jurisdiction over climate change impacts 
caused by a Canadian corporation as the damage caused by climate change — its impact on the global commons — 
could be easily said to occur in Canada, the victims of such damage being Canadian citizens (along with others).  
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law. In this chapter I use several Canadian transnational tort cases as examples of how Canadian 
private international law has been successfully applied in a principled and modern manner.  
In the second chapter I analyze why, in the context of the black letter law, some courts 
have found it difficult to apply a modern lens to private international law, one that is based in the 
reality of globalism. To assist in this analysis, I use the conceptual framework introduced by 
French political philosopher Pierre Bourdieu. I use Bourdieu’s field theory to demonstrate how 
varied structural and historical norms have created a tendency within the judicial field towards a 
(highly) territorialist understanding of the state and the actions of its citizens. Equipped with 
Bourdieu’s field theory — as it relates to the Canadian judicial field — I then demonstrate how 
we may observe these tendencies at play through select Canadian legal actions. Such examples 
make clear that despite the forward-looking approach taken in some cases — reviewed in the 
second chapter — the tendencies of the courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada, toward 
territorialism remain strong.  
The third chapter seeks a way forward for private international law practitioners in 
Canada. Given the tendencies of the Canadian judiciary, I suggest using a conservative 
(conservative, synonymous to traditional or old-fashioned, rather than in its political meaning) 
and historical grounding in the concept of fairness to offset the conservative tendency of 
territorialism. For the purposes of establishing jurisdiction, by focusing instead on the concept of 
equal treatment (borrowing in part from political philosopher John Rawls) in both benefit and 
responsibility as it relates to the corporation itself, we are able to sidestep moral (and hotly 
debated) arguments of what duty may or may not be owed by the Canadian judiciary to the 
global public or the corporation to vastly unequal plaintiffs. Instead, the judiciary may focus 
instead only on the rights and responsibilities of the corporation within and to the Canadian 
system. And as it turns out, Canadian corporations operating abroad — notably those that 
actively avoid facing their accusers in Canadian courts — are provided significant financial, 
expert, regulatory, and reputational benefits by virtue of being Canadian. I argue that such 
entities cannot at once benefit from our legal system and also avoid being subject to it. 
The conclusion draws out certain implications of the analysis and argues that in 
highlighting a CanCorp’s exploitation of the Canadian system, litigators may be able to steer an 
 7 
 
otherwise traditionalist-minded judiciary towards the ultimate goal of a liberal and globalized 
interpretation of the tests for jurisdiction. 
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Chapter I: Canadian courts are legally entitled to take jurisdiction over 
transnational environmental and human rights tort litigation.  
In state-positivist thinking about public and private international law, the competence of a 
state to assert jurisdiction — to make, apply, and enforce laws — was based solely on the 
territorial jurisdiction of the state. Indeed, in the Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v United 
States of America), the arbiter Max Huber famously noted the “principle of the exclusive 
components of the state in regard to its own territory” is the “point of departure in settling most 
questions that concern international relations.”17 As states were forced to deal with increasing 
cross-border trade, relationships (business and familial), and criminal behaviour, the conception 
of the “state’s” legitimate reach has expanded somewhat such that various bodies of the state 
may take jurisdiction to make, apply, and enforce rules “extra-territorially.” For instance, a 
state’s legislative jurisdiction — to make laws that will bind those otherwise beyond the state’s 
territorial border — now reasonably extends beyond territoriality and may be anchored in: an 
accused’s or defendant’s nationality (nationality principle); in certain acts committed abroad that 
are prejudicial to a state’s security (protective principle); in certain criminal acts that are deemed 
so offensive to the international community at large that a state requires no connection to 
prosecute (universal principle); and perhaps, in some contexts, to acts that injure a state’s 
nationals regardless of where the harm occurred (passive personality principle).18  
The above noted principles related to legislative jurisdiction have been considered, at the 
international level, as instantiations of a more general “bona fide connection” test between the 
subject matter and the source of jurisdiction.19 That international test is, today, reflected in 
Canada’s approaches — in both codified and common law — to private international law 
(alternatively referred to as conflicts/conflict of laws) in both contract and tort matters. As will 
be demonstrated, where a defendant is a Canadian national in circumstances involving human 
rights abuses, the conflicts structure in Canada militates towards a Canadian court finding and 
 
17 Island of Palmas Case, United States v Netherlands, (1928) II RIAA 829 at 838. 
18 Steve Coughlan et al, Law Beyond Borders: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in an Age of Globalization (Toronto: 
Irwin Law Inc, 2014) [Coughlan 2014] at 37.  
19 Ibid at 39.  
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retaining jurisdiction to hear the case on both the inherent bases of the nationality and 
territoriality principles.  
In this section, I will first review the conflicts context in Canada, outlining how a 
transnational environmental/human rights tort claim is assessed at the jurisdiction stage and the 
various thresholds such a case encounters upon first being introduced to a Canadian court. Next, 
I will demonstrate that the traditional concept of “comity,” often raised by Canadian courts in 
such contexts, proves to be inapplicable or limited in such cases. Last, I will demonstrate how, in 
applying a thoughtful analysis of the jurisdictional legal framework, a modern interpretation of 
comity, and a “reality frame” with respect to context, some Canadian courts have managed to 
accept and retain jurisdiction over such claims.  
A: The conflicts context in Canada 
When plaintiffs try to bring transnational tort claims in Canada, they generally face 
immediate motions by the defending party/parties to dismiss the action on the basis of lack of 
jurisdiction, or motions to strike on the basis of no reasonable cause of action.20 It is this first 
barrier, the motion to stay, that must be overcome before a plaintiff may move to have his or her 
case heard on its merits. While the applicable law of tort claims may be (1) legislated rules, (2) 
the common law, (3) creative arguments involving the domestic application of customary 
international law, or a combination of all three, it is jurisdiction that acts as a threshold 
determinative issue, without which no claim proceeds. As a determinative factor, the way in 
which Canadian courts approach this test of private international law is key. 
Assuming a court has subject-matter jurisdiction, a question of transnational tort litigation 
necessarily begins with whether a chosen state will assert jurisdiction. In Canada, determining 
whether a superior court will assert jurisdiction is actually three questions: whether a forum can 
assert jurisdiction (jurisdiction simpliciter), whether it will keep jurisdiction in the event it is 
found, and where no jurisdiction is initially found, whether the court will take jurisdiction out of 
 
20 Defendants frequently argue a claim has no reasonable cause of action where the tort complained of was 
committed by a subsidiary or contracted corporation of the defending corporation to which the defending 
corporation alleges it is not the respondeat superior. Additionally, such defences are argued where the cause of 
action involves standards set by international law: See Araya v Nevsun Resources Ltd, 2017 BCCA 401 leave to 
appeal to SCC granted, 2018 CarswellBC 1552 [Nevsun]. 
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necessity.21 The particular approaches vary as between Québec and its Civil Code, jurisdictions 
that have implemented statutory schemes such as BC, and those that rely entirely on the common 
law, such as Ontario. As such, a review of the approaches taken by representative fora BC, 
Québec, and Ontario in this regard is useful.22 What follows does not purport to be a 
comprehensive review of the current state of conflict of laws in Canada, but merely a sufficiently 
thorough review to demonstrate that, rather than an impassible barrier, the legal constructs that 
inform the assertion of jurisdiction at the onset of litigation lean heavily, in cases of human rights 
abuses, towards Canadian courts doing so. 
Jurisdiction simpliciter 
At common law, jurisdiction simpliciter is traditionally established in personam23 
through presence or consent. The fundamental basis of jurisdiction through presence is territorial 
power. While it is easier to establish jurisdiction simpliciter through a defendant’s residence or 
domicile in the forum, it is not necessary. Historically, a defendant’s temporary presence was 
sufficient to establish jurisdiction.24 While scholars have generally considered the establishing of 
jurisdiction solely through presence to be fading in application — because it may be temporary 
— the recent SCC decision in Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje, confirmed its continued existence as a 
primary basis upon which to found jurisdiction.25 
In terms of presence, while corporations may be subjected to jurisdiction by virtue of 
having incorporated in a particular forum (reflective of “residency”), a corporation may also be 
subjected to that jurisdiction by “doing business” in a particular forum.26 A determination of 
whether a corporation is carrying on business requires “some form of actual, not only virtual, 
presence in the jurisdiction, such as maintaining an office there or regularly visiting the territory 
of the particular jurisdiction.”27 In provinces where it is required, the requirement of a foreign 
 
21 Jordan v Schatz (2000), 77 BCLR (3d) 134 at para 21; Club Resorts Ltd v Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 [Van Breda] at 
para 101; Tolofson v Jensen, [1994] 3 SCR 1022 [Tolofson] at 1049. 
22 Ontario, BC, and Québec are also Canada’s three largest jurisdictions, which also makes them useful 
representative fora.  
23 As opposed to in rem as is often seen in admiralty law. 
24 See Maharanee of Baroda v Wildenstein, [1972] 2 All ER 689 (HL). 
25 Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje, 2015 SCC 42 [Chevron] at paras 89-91. 
26 Ibid at para 85. 
27 Van Breda, supra note 21 at para 87. 
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corporation having to obtain a licence to do business will provide evidence to support a 
corporation’s presence.28 
In Québec, the Civil Code provides the court with jurisdiction where the defendant is 
“domiciled” in Québec.29 In Canada, while the term “domicile” is traditionally imbued with a 
19th century English interpretation allowing for inclusion of “domicile of origin” — in other 
words, the jurisdiction from which the defendant originally came — the Civil Code provides an 
interpretation of “domicile” more akin to “residence.”30 
A defendant may also consent to a court’s jurisdiction, either through attornment 
(participating in the legal process, other than to take steps to challenge jurisdiction),31 or by 
agreement (through contract). The various rules of civil procedure generally allow for a 
defendant to seek a stay of proceedings and/or an order setting aside service and not be deemed 
to have attorned to that jurisdiction.32 
Where a defendant is not present or has not consented to the jurisdiction, the court may 
nonetheless establish jurisdiction where there is a real and substantial connection between the 
forum and the dispute. This “real and substantial connection” test was adopted by the SCC in 
Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye33 with reference to an approach taken in England in 
Indyka v Indyka.34 Writing for the Court, La Forest J explained the real and substantial 
connection approach was born of the dual principles of order and fairness to support a modern 
system of private international law.35 Though La Forest J was interested in the broader 
constitutional issues associated with trans-provincial enforcement of judgments raised by 
scholars at the time, he was limited in his analysis by the facts and argument before him. 
However, three years later, the Morguard principle was transformed in Hunt v T & N Plc36 from 
 
28 For instance, corporations incorporated internationally must obtain a licence to operate in Ontario pursuant to the 
Extra-Provincial Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c E 27. Section 1(2) defines, for the purpose of the statute, what 
constitutes carrying on business in the province. 
29 CCQ at Art 3134. 
30 CCQ at Arts 75, 76, 307. 
31 Fraser v 4358376 Canada Inc (cob Itravel 2000 and Travelzest PLC), 2014 ONCA 553. 
32 Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009 [Supreme Court Civil Rules], R 21-8; Rules of Civil Procedure, 
RRO 1990, Reg 194 [Rules of Civil Procedure], R 17.06. 
33 Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye, [1990] 3 SCR 1077 [Morguard]. 
34 Indyka v Indyka, [1969] 1 AC 33. 
35 Morguard, supra note 33 at 1097. 
36 Hunt v T & N Plc, [1993] 4 SCR 289 [Hunt]. 
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a common law test to a constitutional principle meant to inform and protect against provincial 
overreach in the assertion of jurisdiction.37 Though responsible for penning the overarching test, 
and continuing to promote its relevance in the more recent case of Club Resorts Ltd v Van 
Breda,38 the SCC at the time did not outline any specific factors it deemed necessary to consult 
in applying it. That job was initially taken up by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Muscutt v 
Courcelles.39 
In Muscutt, the Court outlined eight factors to consider in the application of the real and 
substantial connection test. The factors, as explained by Sharpe JA, were to be considered 
together, no one factor to be determinative. This holistic approach allowed for jurisdiction to be 
made out on the basis of several more tenuous connections whose additive effect could result in a 
stronger link. It is important to note that, while some courts took up the eight Muscutt factors, 
other courts — including those of British Columbia — continued to apply the real and 
substantial connection test in a more general way.40 
In 2012, the SCC reconsidered the real and substantial connection test in the seminal case 
of Club Resorts Ltd v Van Breda. The Court noted that, while the Morguard test was a 
constitutional principle that operated to impose limits on provincial powers, the test of whether 
or not a forum may “assume jurisdiction” ought to involve a system of “connecting factors” 
informed by “principles for applying them.”41 This approach, wrote the Court, provided more 
certainty to parties in being able to predict whether a court would assume jurisdiction.42 Thus, 
the Van Breda test reformulated the Muscutt factors; where any one of the presumptive 
connecting factors applies, a court will assume jurisdiction unless the defendants can rebut by 
demonstrating the absence of a real and substantial connection.43 The defendant may rebut the 
presumption of jurisdiction by establishing facts that demonstrate the connecting factor does not 
 
37 Van Breda, supra note 21 at para 23. 
38 Van Breda, supra note 21 at para 29. 
39 Muscutt v Courcelles (2002), 60 OR (3d) 20 (CA) [Muscutt]. 
40 British Columbia v Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, 2006 BCCA 398. 
41 Van Breda, supra note 21 at para 35. 
42 The Court noted it had been “suggested” that the Muscutt factors gave trial judges too much latitude and that each 
case being decided on its facts provided for few reliable precedents: Van Breda, supra note 21 at paras 51, 75. 
43 Van Breda, supra note 21 at para 64. 
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actually point to “any real relationship between the subject matter of the litigation and the forum 
or points only to a weak relationship between them.”44 
 The short list of presumptive connecting factors provided by the Court — the defendant 
being domiciled in the forum, the defendant carrying on business in the forum, the tort being 
committed in the forum, and a contract connected with the dispute being made in the forum45 — 
applied only to tort cases. The Court expected lower courts to define new factors over time, with 
the guidance that those new factors should be similar to the enumerated factors and should be 
considered in light of that factor’s treatment in the case law, treatment by statute, and treatment 
in the private international law of other legal systems.46 In a major shift from the Muscutt 
approach, where no connecting factors (new or previously enumerated) were found that could 
stand alone, a court should not assume jurisdiction – i.e. the holistic approach was terminated. 47 
Most recently, in Chevron, the SCC reaffirmed the Morguard principle and underlined 
the structural rationales regarding how and, notably, why courts in Canada take jurisdiction. In 
that case, the court differentiated the recognition and enforcement of judgments from asserting 
jurisdiction in the first place. Both mechanisms look to the real and substantial connection test in 
reference to courts of the first instance, whether it be ensuring a foreign court had jurisdiction 
when it decided on an outcome now sought to be enforced in Canada, or whether it be a 
Canadian court taking jurisdiction over a claim not yet adjudicated. However, the Court noted, 
the locus of the real and substantial connection results in a much lower standard for a Canadian 
court to take jurisdiction over enforcement in that a real and substantial connection is not 
required between the defendant and a Canadian jurisdiction. 
 
44 Van Breda, supra note 21 at para 95; Note also that the Court held that, where a factual connection exists between 
the jurisdiction and only one of several torts, the principles of fairness and efficiency prescribe that the court take 
jurisdiction over the entire action: para 99. 
45 In 2005 the Hague Conference on Private International Law opened for signatures the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements, 44 ILM 1294 (2005), which seeks to standardize and make more predictable where 
contracts between companies would be adjudicated if the need arises. While Canada is a member of the Hague 
Conference and assisted with the drafting of the Convention, it is not yet a signatory to the Convention. In any event, 
in 2017, Ontario, anticipating Canada’s ratification of the Convention, passed the International Choice of Court 
Agreements Convention Act, 2017, SO 2017, c 2, s 4, which will come into force when Canada ratifies the 
Convention.  
46 Van Breda, supra note 21 at para 91. 
47 Van Breda, supra note 21 at para 93. 
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There was some debate as to whether the real and substantial connection test overrides 
the traditional presence and consent-based jurisdiction. However, in Chevron, the SCC suggested 
that where jurisdiction is established based on presence — in that case, having a place of 
business in the jurisdiction — there is no need to also apply the real and substantial connection 
test.48 The same has been found in respect of consent in Ontario.49 
In rejecting Chevron’s claim, the Court explained the differences in policy and 
international relations rationales for its approach to different jurisdiction-finding mechanisms. A 
Canadian court enforcing an order is acting as a “facilitator”50 limited by its territorial 
jurisdiction; in other words, in enforcement actions, a court only has power where the 
defendant’s assets are in Canada. A court’s enforcement power has “no coercive force outside its 
jurisdiction.”51 This, explained the Court, supports Canada’s commitment to international comity 
in assisting other states in upholding their laws.52 Throughout the judgment the Court 
consistently referred to the “modern” approach to conflict of laws based on the principle of 
comity, which “calls for the promotion of order and fairness, an attitude of respect and deference 
to other states, and a degree of stability and predictability in order to facilitate reciprocity.”53 
This, remarked Gascon J, is true “of all areas of private international law.”54 Inherent in this 
analysis are perhaps competing themes: on one hand, traditional themes of deference and 
stability of international order, but, on another, the Court’s emphasis on fairness (although it is 
not clear to whom fairness is due) and modernization. The Morguard/Van Breda test remains the 
leading common law. 
Today, following the 1994 recommendation of the Uniform Law Conference of 
Canada,55 three provinces have diverged slightly from the common law and enacted legislation 
designed to set standards related to determining jurisdiction.56 Such standards, for the most part 
 
48 Chevron, supra note 25 at paras 87, 89. 
49 Shekhdar v K & M Engineering & Consulting Corp, [2006] OJ No 2120 (CA). 
50 Chevron, supra note 25 at para 44. 
51 Ibid at para 46. 
52 Ibid at paras 51-52. 
53 Ibid at para 52. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Proceedings of the 1994 Charlottetown PE Annual Meeting: Court 
Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (Charlottetown, 1994). 
56 British Columbia: Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SBC 2003, c 28 [CJPTA]; Saskatchewan: The 
Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SS 1997, c C-411; Nova Scotia: Court Jurisdiction and 
Proceedings Transfer Act, SNS 2003 (2nd Sess), c 2. 
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but not entirely, are consistent with the principles underlying the common law rules regarding 
presence, consent, and the Morguard-Van Breda real and substantial connection test. For 
instance, provisions of the British Columbia Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act 
(CJPTA), incorporate presence and consent-based jurisdiction in sections 3, 7, 8, and 9. Notably, 
presence is determined by “ordinary residence,” thereby rejecting any common law “transitory” 
presence exception, most recently upheld in the common law context in Chevron. Additionally, 
whether a corporation is carrying on business in a province is incorporated in the CJPTA at 
section 7, which defines presence only in enumerated scenarios, thereby ousting the flexibility of 
the common law. 
The real and substantial connection test is adopted in the CJPTA at section 10. The test 
outlines a number of “connecting factors” similar to those enumerated by the SCC in Van Breda. 
However, contrary to Van Breda, the CJPTA does allow a court to take jurisdiction under the 
real and substantial connection test even where no single section 10 connecting factor is made 
out, which thus allows the kind of cumulative holistic approach to the connecting factors last 
seen in Muscutt. 
While there is movement towards codifying the CJPTA in other provinces, for the time 
being, in common law provinces that have not yet adopted similar legislation – such as Ontario – 
the traditional common law test remains active. 
While litigation regarding the real and substantial connection test is ongoing, for the 
purposes of this analysis, we are concerned with corporations incorporated and/or headquartered 
in Canada, particularly in Québec, BC, and Ontario. Pursuant to Québec’s Civil Code, BC’s 
CJPTA, and the common law in Ontario, a corporation headquartered or constituted in Canada 
(CanCorp) would be hard pressed to argue the superior courts of their incorporating jurisdictions 
do not have jurisdiction simpliciter. How jurisdiction simpliciter is applied to internationally-
incorporated companies is beyond the focus of this thesis, but its continued research is an 
important related analysis to be undertaken in the future. As provincial or national incorporation 
paired with local offices provides prima facie jurisdiction simpliciter, I will proceed on the 
assumption that jurisdiction simpliciter is made out. I, therefore, turn to the test employed to 
determine whether a court should retain jurisdiction of a matter: forum non conveniens. 
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Forum non conveniens 
As to whether a court will decide not to retain jurisdiction, notwithstanding its right to do 
so, the Canadian approaches evolved from the Scottish and, then later, English approaches to 
jurisdiction.57 The principle was referred to as forum non conveniens, literally “not the 
convenient forum,”58 but understood to mean “not the appropriate forum.” The adoption of 
forum non conveniens was confirmed by the SCC in Amchem Products Inc v British Columbia 
(Workers’ Compensation Board).59 Unlike the British test that divided the analysis into two 
“limbs,”60 the SCC rejected this analytical approach and held the test was simply a single 
question: whether another identified forum is clearly the more appropriate forum for resolution 
of the dispute. In doing so, the Canadian approach identified an onerous standard (“clearly” more 
appropriate) and shifted the burden of proof entirely to the defendant. In Amchem, the Court held 
that, where there is no one forum that is clearly the most appropriate, the domestic forum 
prevails by default and the Canadian court will not grant a stay.61 
The CJPTA adopted, in part, the test in Amchem, but notably dropped the requirement 
that another forum is “clearly” the more appropriate one, simply asking whether the court of 
another state “is a more appropriate forum.”62 In contrast, in Van Breda, released after the 
CJPTA received royal assent, the SCC retained the qualifier “clearly” from Amchem, thus further 
reaffirming this difference between provincial statutory and common law. That said, the qualifier 
“clearly” was relied on extensively by the BC Court of Appeal in determining the forum 
 
57 MacShannon v Rockware Glass Ltd, [1978] AC 795 (HL). 
58 While the literal translation is “not convenient forum” it is clear courts have found the better interpretation is 
whether the court at issue is the more “suitable” or “appropriate” of the relevant jurisdictions, rather than 
approaching the issue as a matter of  “mere practical convenience”: Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex, [1987] AC 
460 (HL) [Spiliada]. 
59 Amchem Products Incorporated v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board), [1993] 1 SCR 897 
[Amchem]. 
60 Under the first “limb” the defendant bears the burden to demonstrate there is another forum of competent 
jurisdiction. Only if this is made out, may the court turn to the second “limb,” under which the court must determine 
whether circumstances exist that require a stay not be granted and the court to take jurisdiction. The second limb 
requires a balancing of factors, including whether the plaintiff will obtain justice in the other jurisdiction, although 
this is not decisive: Spiliada, supra note 58. 
61 Amchem, supra note 59 at 931. Note: this approach also differs from those of the United States and Australia. The 
United States example of Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert, 330 US 501 (1947), which is described by Wyatt Pickett as 
“inward looking,” asks whether the forum chosen by the plaintiff is convenient for the defendant: Wyatt Pickett, 
Cross-Border Torts: Canadian-US Litigation Strategies (Markham, Ontario: LexisNexis Canada Inc, 2013) at 4.404. 
In Australia, the court asks whether the Australian court is “clearly inappropriate” focusing more on the action’s 
connection to Australia as appropriate rather than engaging in a comparative exercise with other courts.  
62 CJPTA, supra note 56 at s 11. 
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conveniens under the CJPTA in the recent case of Garcia v Tahoe Resources Inc,63 discussed 
below. Thus, although the qualifier is not explicitly present in the statute,64 the BC Court of 
Appeal appears to be reading it into the test. Similarly, the CJPTA is unhelpfully silent with 
respect to which party bears the burden to prove another forum is clearly more appropriate.65 
However, as with the qualifier “clearly” the Court of Appeal in Tahoe, with reference to Van 
Breda, upheld the trial judge’s finding that the onus fell to Tahoe (the defendant) on the forum 
non conveniens motion.66 This suggests, despite the wording of the statute, that the common law 
and CJPTA approaches have re-converged with respect to both the standard and burden of proof. 
While, unlike the British two-pronged test, common law courts, in applying the Van 
Breda test, take into consideration a range of factors, sometimes with reference to the legislated 
CJPTA framework or the model as it was first presented by the Uniform Law Conference of 
Canada. In both the common law test and the CJPTA, the list of enumerated factors is open-
ended; a court may consider factors not yet listed that suit the particular facts before it. The SCC-
enumerated common law factors include: physical connection to the forum, the applicable law,67 
a forum’s specialized expertise,68 jurisdiction clauses,69 conflicts with proceedings elsewhere,70 
and juridical advantage.71 
While the CJPTA was designed as a comprehensive regime,72 section 11 of the statute 
lists criteria courts must consider but includes no language suggesting the list is exhaustive.73 
Such framing left open the possibility of courts adding further similar factors. Indeed, the BC 
Court of Appeal has since expanded the list of criteria under the CJPTA available for analysis. In 
 
63 Garcia v Tahoe Resources Inc, 2017 BCCA 39 [Tahoe]. 
64 The qualifier doesn’t appear in the BC CPJTA, nor that enacted by Saskatchewan or Nova Scotia.  
65 Stephen GA Pitel, “The Canadian Codification of Forum Non Conveniens” (2015) 7:2 J P Int’l L 251 at 255. 
66 Tahoe, supra note 63 at para 54. 
67 Molson Coors Brewing Co v Miller Brewing Co (2006), 83 OR (3d) 331. 
68 See for example, Spiliada, supra note 58. 
69 ZI Pompey Industrie v ECU-Line NV, 2003 SCC 27 [ZI Pompey]. 
70 Westec Aerospace Inc v Raytheon Aircraft Co (1999), 67 BCLR (3d) 278 (CA) [Westec Aerospace]; Teck Cominco 
Metals Ltd v Lloyd’s Underwriters, 2009 SCC 11 [Teck]. 
71 Connelly v RTZ Corp Plc (No 2), [1997] ILPr 643 (HL) [Connelly CA]. 
72 Teck, supra note 70 at para 21. 
73 Per section 11 of the CJPTA, supra note 56, the court must consider: (a) the comparative convenience and 
expense for the parties to the proceeding and for their witnesses, in litigating in the court or in any alternative forum, 
(b) the law to be applied to issues in the proceeding, (c) the desirability of avoiding multiplicity of legal proceedings, 
(d) the desirability of avoiding conflicting decisions in different courts, (e) the enforcement of an eventual judgment, 
and (f) the fair and efficient working of the Canadian legal system as a whole. 
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2015, the Court of Appeal confirmed courts in BC may now consider (in addition to the 
mandatory section 11 factors): 
a) where each party resides; 
b) where each party carries on business; 
c) where the cause of action arose; 
d) where the loss or damage occurred; 
e) any juridical advantage to the plaintiff in this jurisdiction; 
f) any juridical disadvantage to the defendant in this jurisdiction; 
g) the convenience or inconvenience to potential witnesses; 
h) the cost of conducting the proceeding in this jurisdiction; 
i) the applicable substantive law;  
j) the difficulty and cost of providing foreign law, if necessary; and 
k) whether there are parallel proceedings in any other jurisdiction.74 
 
Québec is the only civil jurisdiction that has codified the forum non conveniens test;75 to 
my knowledge, all other civil jurisdictions other than civil/common hybrids like Scotland and 
Louisiana, once assuming jurisdiction simpliciter, have no option but to keep it. While the Civil 
Code notes that jurisdiction should be declined only in “exceptional circumstances,” Justice 
LeBel in Van Breda equated this use of “exceptional” with the common law requirement that 
another jurisdiction must “clearly” be the more appropriate. In doing so, it appears he was 
bringing the Canadian common and civil law systems in line,76 likely in an attempt to force 
consistency among the provinces. 
Arguably, the availability of forum non conveniens provides courts with a number of 
advantages. Its availability discourages plaintiff “forum shopping” to choose courts likely more 
favourable to them; it encourages international (or inter-provincial) comity by respecting another 
forum’s territorial jurisdiction;77 it holds parties to contractual agreements by, among other 
 
74 JTG Management Services Ltd v Bank of Nanjing Co Ltd, 2015 BCCA 200. 
75 CCQ at Art 3135. 
76 Vaughan Black, “Simplifying Court Jurisdiction in Canada” (2012) 8:3 J P Int’l L 411 [Black 2012] at 433; 
whether Justice LeBel was lowering the standard enumerated in the Civil Code “exceptional” to that of “clearly” or 
whether he interpreted the words to be effectively synonymous is mostly irrelevant for our purposes as what remains 
is a test that burdens the defendant with proving more than simply the fact there is another adequate or equally 
positioned forum. It could also be argued that the fact Québec is the only civil law jurisdiction – or, if not the only, 
one of the very few – to allow for forum non conveniens, a contextual reading in line with Québec’s civil law 
compatriots (which must keep jurisdiction once it is found they have jurisdiction simpliciter) may suggest the 
“exceptional” standard is even higher than in Québec’s sister provinces.  
77 I will return to this idea of comity below.  
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things, making damages for breach of contract predictable;78 and it prevents the “rush to 
judgment” that may come where parallel proceedings have commenced in multiple 
jurisdictions.79 Such factors also informed the policy considerations regarding the inclusion of 
forum non conveniens in the CJPTA. 
When the CJPTA was introduced by the BC legislature in 2003, then Attorney General, 
the Honourable Geoff Plant, made clear the new Act was born of both the Uniform Law 
Conference CJPTA and the decisions of the SCC in Morguard and Amchem.80 In doing so, 
however, he emphasized only one kind of litigation. The Attorney General noted the purpose of 
the new Act was to increase harmonization of commercial law across Canada and with Canada’s 
international partners, and provide consistency such that disputes (referred to as “commercial 
disputes”) could be dealt with efficiently, fairly, and effectively.81 Following BC’s adoption of 
the CJPTA, there is general movement to codify the test;82 it appears here to stay. 
However, despite its lofty goals of modernizing commercial litigation and improving 
comity across fora, the forum non conveniens test remains somewhat vague and open ended, still 
not having been endowed with clear judicial guidance either by or for the judiciary. Further 
challenges come with the timing of its application. Applications to stay proceedings on the basis 
of forum non conveniens are generally made at the onset of litigation which can make responding 
to arguments regarding forum appropriateness, challenging for the plaintiffs where the necessary 
evidence tying a defendant or its actions to a desired forum has not yet come to light. Thus, in 
cases of human rights and environmental torts, a conservative application of the test for forum 
non conveniens can end in unjust results. For instance, despite being the only civil law system to 
adopt the provision (all the while using the language “exceptionally” to describe the situation in 
 
78 Where courts are, for instance, more likely to uphold a forum selection clause in a contract as part of the forum 
non conveniens analysis, there is more predictability for the parties to the contract regarding where any issues may 
be adjudicated.  
79 Where parties have an opportunity to commence legal proceedings in multiple fora, none of which will abandon 
jurisdiction once it is found, there may be wasted resources spent on rushing through proceedings in one forum — 
thereby conducting a sloppy action — in order that one judgment may be released before another. This haste may 
not benefit parties whose interests lie in a thoughtful and careful engagement with the litigation process.  
80 British Columbia, Official Report of Debates of the Legislative Assembly (Hansard), 37th Parl, 4th Sess, Vol 14, 
No 4 (8 April 2003) at 6446-7 (Hon Geoff Plant) [Plant, April 2003]. 
81 Ibid at 6447. 
82 At the time of writing five Canadian jurisdictions had passed a version of the CJPTA, with some variations: 
Saskatchewan, Prince Edward Island, Yukon, British Columbia, and Nova Scotia, although it has only come into 
force in three jurisdictions. 
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which it may apply), the Québec courts have not been shy in exercising forum non conveniens 
and extricating themselves from especially challenging transnational human rights tort claims in 
a way that has not been faithful to the idea of an “exceptional” declining of jurisdiction.83 
The test for forum non conveniens ought to attract a purposive reading given both the 
exceptional nature of the test (a challenging onus to be met by the defendant)84 and the fact-
specific and discretionary approach mandated by the common law and CJPTA. Indeed, recall the 
CJPTA in British Columbia was affirmed on the basis of that government’s pursuit of 
standardizing commercial law. In introducing then-Bill 31, Attorney General Plant also noted the 
new Act would contribute to the modernization of British Columbia law in a way “consistent 
with access to justice and building a strong economy.”85 While the CJPTA is applied to all 
manner of actions, I suggest the initial purpose of the CJPTA, being aimed at the commercial 
context, may leave open a modified reading in the human rights or environmental contexts — 
both necessarily extra-commercial in nature (even as commercial imperatives may be causally 
connected to why violations occur) — particularly where the Act comes into conflict with access 
to justice issues. Certainly, access to justice formed the heart of the recent decision in Chevron in 
which the SCC found that the international context of digitalized currency meant access to a 
defendant’s assets may be very difficult for a successful plaintiff. There, it is notable how the 
Court fused a traditional conflicts analysis with a justice/equity analysis in the context of 
collection of damages. The Court ruled for the first time that it would take jurisdiction even if a 
defendant’s assets were not already in the jurisdiction; to not do so, they said, “would be to turn a 
blind eye to the current economic reality.”86 
 
83 Discussed in Chapter 2: Recherches internationales Québec v Cambior inc, 1998 CarswellQue 4511 (SC) 
[Cambior]; Bil’In (Village Council) v Green Park International Inc, 2010 QCCA 1455 leave to appeal to SCC 
refused, 2011 CarswellQue 1082 [Green Park CA]; Anvil Mining Ltd c Association canadienne contre l’impunité, 
2012 QCCA 117 [Anvil Mining]. 
84 See use of “clearly” and the court’s reference to “exceptional,” above. As well, while an argument on forum non 
conveniens is generally available to a defendant, once a defendant has attorned to a jurisdiction, at common law they 
are barred from making such an argument. In BC, the courts have found, pursuant to the CJPTA, a defendant may 
not seek to limit a court’s jurisdiction where they have attorned to it. Such an approach recognizes the logical 
inconsistency of a defendant, at once demonstrating it believes the court has jurisdiction and will act accordingly, 
and a suggestion from the same defendant that the court ought not to proceed: O’Brian v Simard, 2006 BCCA 410 at 
para 9; Nordmark v Frykman, 2018 BCSC 2219 at para 40; Andrew Peller Ltd v Mori Essex Nurseries Inc, 2017 
BCSC 203 at paras 11-28. 
85 Plant, April 2003, supra note 80 at 6124 [Emphasis added]. 
86 Chevron, supra note 25 at para 57. 
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Such attention to economic reality is echoed in the exceptional allowance of jurisdiction 
granted in the notion of a forum of necessity, the third question a court may ask in assessing 
whether to take jurisdiction of a matter. While I do not purport to analyze in great detail this 
fledgling concept, the coming into being of forum of necessity in Canada offers both support for 
the purposive interpretation of forum non conveniens and a useful contrast in defining the latter’s 
threshold.   
Forum of necessity 
Acting as an exception to jurisdiction simpliciter is the forum of necessity doctrine. This 
doctrine was derived from Art 3 of the Swiss Federal Code on Private international Law87 and 
first incorporated in Art 3136 of the Civil Code of Québec (coming into force in 1994). The 
Québec provision states: 
3136. Even though a Québec authority has no jurisdiction to hear a dispute, it may 
nevertheless hear it provided the dispute has a sufficient connection with Québec, if 
proceedings abroad prove impossible or the institution of proceedings abroad cannot 
reasonably be required. 
 
The necessity doctrine was later incorporated into section 6 of the CJPTA upon its 
enactment. Section 6 provides that a court that lacks territorial competence may take jurisdiction 
where: 
a) there is no court outside British Columbia in which the plaintiff can commence the 
proceeding; or 
b) the commencement of the proceeding in a court outside British Columbia cannot 
reasonably be required. 
Unlike Art 3136 of the Civil Code, section 6 of the CJPTA does not require the dispute 
have a “sufficient connection” to the jurisdiction before the doctrine can be invoked.88 
 
87 Federal Code on Private International Law (Switzerland) at Art 3; Also found at Council of Europe, European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos 11 and 14, ETS 5, 1950 at 
Art 6. 
88 As contrasted with a “real and substantial connection” it would otherwise need to exceed the threshold for 
jurisdiction simpliciter. 
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With respect to common law jurisdictions, for the first time, in Van Breda, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal suggested in obiter that the elements of forum of necessity should be read into 
the common law in order to meet access to justice needs.89 In that case, in response to arguments 
related to whether “fairness to the plaintiff ” ought to be an independent factor capable of 
determining the real and substantial connection test, the Court referred to the emergence of the 
forum of necessity doctrine which it said “recognizes that there will be exceptional cases where, 
despite the absence of a real and substantial connection, the need to ensure access to justice will 
justify the assumption of jurisdiction.” Justice Sharpe for the Court of Appeal clarified that 
forum of necessity did not modify the real and substantial test but operated as an exception to it; 
a court reserves residual discretion to assume jurisdiction. While the forum of necessity doctrine 
was not applied in Van Breda, the court noted the preferred path was one in which an 
overarching fairness veto is not read into real and substantial connection, but that where fairness 
is of such serious concern that the court takes jurisdiction under that doctrine instead.90 On 
appeal, the SCC chose not to opine, although it left the door open to its possibility.91 
While the overarching goal of the forum of necessity mechanism appears to be to provide 
a reasonable remedy for those otherwise excluded from a Canadian forum, in practice it does so 
only rarely. The lower courts that have addressed the forum of necessity provisions have made 
clear the test is high. As the Ontario Court of Appeal noted in West Van Inc v Daisley, all 
jurisdictions that have adopted the test have imposed a threshold of reasonableness.92 Courts in 
Ontario have held that factors such as the expiry of a limitation period and the difficulty in 
obtaining counsel in a foreign jurisdiction would be unlikely to meet the test.93 Today, only in 
one case in Ontario and one in British Columbia has the court accepted they were the forum of 
necessity and taken jurisdiction. They did so on the basis, respectively, that (1) the claimants 
could not reasonably be expected to bring an action in the forum in which they had been tortured 
(Iran),94 and (2) in a complicated case where the claimant and the defendant both agreed on 
British Columbia as the appropriate forum because their home state (Idaho) had mostly abolished 
 
89 Van Breda, supra note 21 at para 100. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 West Van Inc v Daisley, 2014 ONCA 232 [West Van] at para 20. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Bouzari v Bahremani, [2011] OJ No 5009 (Ont SCJ) [Bouzari]. 
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all provisions for joint and several liability and non-patient suits.95 Many other cases brought in 
Ontario and British Columbia have been denied, thus reinforcing the high bar posed by the test.96 
A number of those courts do so citing the first example, Bouzari v Bahremani, as the exemplar in 
considering whether cases before them meet the exceptional test for the necessity doctrine.97  
In Bouzari, Mr. Bouzari and his wife and children brought an action against Hashemi 
Bahremani alleging Mr. Bahremani compelled the abduction, imprisonment, and torture of Mr. 
Bouzari in Iran between June 1993 and January 1994. Shortly after he was released by the 
government of Iran, Mr. Bouzari and his family fled to Canada. In 2005 Low J of the Ontario 
Superior Court took jurisdiction as a forum of necessity because there was no reasonable basis 
upon which Mr. Bouzari could be required to commence the action in Iran, the state where the 
torture took place.98 Not surprisingly, few cases have reached the threshold of serious danger that 
Mr. Bouzari likely faced were he to have returned to Iran. 
Similarly, under the Civil Code, the forum of necessity doctrine is only applied in 
“exceptional circumstances,”99 the same verbal formula used in Québec in consideration of 
forum non conveniens. Decided under Art 3136 of the Civil Code, the decision in Lamborghini 
(Canada) Inc v Automobili Lamborghini SPA,100 has set the standard for that Court’s approach to 
forum of necessity. In Lamborghini, LeBel JA, as he then was, noted the exception is narrow, to 
be used in exceptional circumstances “when the foreign forum that would normally have 
jurisdiction is unavailable for exceptional reasons such as a nearly absolute legal or practical 
impossibility.”101 Justice LeBel provided, for further clarity, some examples: the breakdown of 
diplomatic or commercial relations with a foreign State, the need to protect a political refugee 
(like Mr. Bouzari), or the existence of a serious physical threat if the case were to be undertaken 
by a foreign court. Later, in Anvil Mining, a transnational tort case, the Québec Court of Appeal 
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action against the state of Iran was dismissed pursuant to state immunity, see discussion below.  
99 Van Breda, supra note 21 at para 100; West Van, supra note 92 at para 40. 
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reiterated the “practical impossibility” threshold. There, the proposed representative plaintiff in a 
class action relied on the necessity doctrine in arguing it was not able to find counsel in Australia 
to represent the class. The Québec Court of Appeal held the plaintiff had not shown it was 
“impossible to gain access to a foreign court and [had not] established that the dispute has a 
sufficient connection with Québec.”102  
The forum of necessity test is considered where there is no case to be made for 
jurisdiction simpliciter; it is used by a court to assert territorial competence where it otherwise 
has none. The creation of such a mechanism supports, along with a purposive reading of forum 
non conveniens, a general movement towards equity in the realm of jurisdiction, a desire on the 
part of the legislature and the courts to allow for a more global perspective on fairness. 
Additionally, the rarity of necessity acts as a foil, highlighting and contrasting the exceptional 
nature expected of courts giving up jurisdiction under forum non conveniens. In other words, 
where necessity is only to be used in “exceptional circumstances” — and a review of the case 
law makes clear it is rarely used — then the “exceptional circumstances” (even if understood as 
synonymous with “clear”) standard associated with forum non conveniens should theoretically 
similarly limit its usage.     
The recent birth of forum of necessity and the high bar of forum non conveniens reflect 
the changing reality of transnational relationships, movement of peoples, and commerce. Their 
application to transnational human rights and environmental tort litigation should support 
Canadian courts taking jurisdiction where it is sought. However, seemingly balanced against this 
movement towards internationalism is the concept of comity that was once associated only with 
public international law. Comity is now often cited in Canadian private international law as 
shorthand for “respect for traditional norms of territoriality and sovereign exclusivity.” It is the 
concept courts frequently lean on when shying away from taking jurisdiction and legitimizing a 
restrictive approach to the application of the jurisdiction tests reviewed above. Why courts may 
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do this is the subject of the next section, but first it is necessary to review what this traditional 
concept actually is and the bounds of its current form. In so doing, it will become clear, through 
decisions of Canada’s highest courts, that rather than comity being available as the trump card 
played to evade responsibility, comity’s proper application to transnational human rights tort 
litigation is more restrained.  
B: The public international law concept of comity infuses conflicts 
In the realm of everyday language, comity, from the Latin comitas meaning “courteous,” 
refers to the courtesy and friendship of nations in mutual recognition of the laws and customs of 
others.103 In international law, it is variously described as “informal acts performed out of 
politeness, convenience and goodwill,”104 the way in which a sovereign state “respects the 
independence and dignity of other sovereign states,”105 and a form of “mutual deference and 
respect.”106 It is a concept that is intimately tied to the traditional pillars of public international 
law: the sovereignty and the equality of states. In order to position comity within private 
international law, it is important to briefly review the emergence of comity within, or at least in 
proximity to,107 public international law.  
Comity in public international law 
The emergence of modern notions of state sovereignty birthed the concept of comity; 
where states recognize each other as possessing exclusive control over their own territories, some 
understanding between states with respect to cross-border activity was required. However, the 
modern concept of state sovereignty is relatively new. Before the 16th century, the theocratic 
foundation of medieval Europe required less focus on state territoriality as the centre of political 
power lay with the Catholic Church in Rome. With the rise of the secular state, political power 
 
103 The Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed, sub verbo “comity.”  
104 Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts KCMG QC, eds, Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008) at 50-51. 
105 R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26 at para 47 [Hape]. 
106 Schooner Exchange v M'Fadden et al (1812), 7 Cranch's Reports 116 (US) at 136-7; see also Joel R Paul, “The 
Transformation of International Comity” (2008) 71 L & Contemp Probs 19 [Paul 2008] at 19. 
107 I say “in proximity to” because one of the questions concerning the original and evolving status of comity is the 
extent to which comity is a legal doctrine in public international law or a non-legal doctrine that is analogous to the 
difference between constitutional law and constitutional convention.  
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gained traction and the modern territorialized concept of sovereignty emerged, and along with it, 
the concept of comity.  
One of the first wholly conceptualized frameworks of state sovereignty was explored by 
Jean Bodin in his Six Livres de la Republique.108 Bodin conceptualized sovereignty as amounting 
to the absolute and perpetual power of the republic, over which no other body had supervisory 
power.  Over 70 years later, the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 formally established the principles 
of territorial delineation of state authority/self-determination and its twinned principle of non-
intervention.109 Over the next few centuries, first Thomas Hobbes (1651) and then John Locke 
(1700s) reimagined state sovereignty as no longer unconditionally held by the sovereign but as 
increasingly framed as a contract between the people and the sovereign.110 
In parallel with the developing philosophy of the sovereign as inward-looking — i.e. the 
sovereign’s authority as either experienced by or viewed by its ruled people — the 16th and 17th 
centuries also found increasingly powerful states looking for a way to strike a balance between 
their own domestic interests and their interests in being part of a community of other such 
states;111 the strict boundaries of state sovereignty had not accommodated the reality of 
transnational trade and movement of peoples. The foundation of such a balance was equity but it 
remained unclear what equity required in the context of state relations.112 It was then that comity 
began to take shape in Dutch scholarship. Hugo Grotius, a pioneer of modern public international 
law, delineated law in a proper and strict sense from expectations in social behaviour, which he 
discussed as comity.113 In public international law, comity allowed flexibility in the hardened 
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concepts of territoriality and sovereignty. However, rather than being considered a legal solution, 
the concept of comity was political, to be exercised by rulers and politicians, rather than 
judges.114 As a political concept, comity was normative but not also legally binding.115 While the 
concepts related to territorialized state sovereignty and are now enshrined as the first principles 
of Article 2 of the UN Charter,116 even today a breach of comity at the state level does not allow, 
under public international law, any legal recourse by one state against another. Instead, it may 
lead to a similar retort through unfriendly or unneighbourly action, referred to as “retorsion.”117  
Comity’s bleed into private international law 
Despite the idea of comity having its beginning in public international law — as a norm 
of politeness between states — early in Britain’s judicial history of handling cases involving 
conflicts of law, we see the British judiciary referencing concepts of “statehood” and comity as 
normative concepts to assist decision making, first in criminal law and then in the private 
international law context. While comity served as a discretionary doctrine that empowered courts 
to decide when to defer to foreign law out of respect for the sovereignty of another state,118 later 
it branched out, coming to inform a wider range of cases providing justification for judicial 
decision making in all sorts of conflicts scenarios.119 
In the 1981 case of R v Zingre,120 we begin to see the concepts of public international law 
– relationships between states – begin to seep into Canadian domestic law. In that case, a Swiss 
national was involved in crimes related to business dealings in Manitoba. The accused was living 
in Switzerland, a state that did not allow extradition to Canada. Manitoba — through the 
Canadian federal government — asked the Swiss government for its assistance to prosecute the 
accused in Switzerland pursuant to Canada and Switzerland’s mutual legal assistance treaty. The 
issue in the case was whether the subsequently appointed Swiss investigators could be permitted 
 
Crossroads: An Intersection between Public and Private International Law” (1982) 76 AJIL 280 [Maier 1982] at 
282.   
114 Ireland-Piper 2017, supra note 111 at 19. 
115 Maier 1982, supra note 113 at 281. 
116 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7. 
117 Thomas Giegerich, “Retorsion” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (March 2011). 
118 Paul 2008, supra note 106 at 20. 
119 Ibid. 
120 R v Zingre, [1981] 2 SCR 392 [Zingre]. 
 28 
 
to interview witnesses in Canada despite the accused’s reliance on certain sections of the Canada 
Evidence Act.121 While the case rests entirely on the interpretation of the treaty provisions, the 
SCC — to which the case was appealed — held that one jurisdiction should give effect to the 
laws of another jurisdiction “not out of mutual obligation but of deference and respect” unless it 
is contrary to the public policy of the jurisdiction to which it is requested.122 In that case, 
involving multiple state actors in the mutual legal assistance realm, the Court suggested comity 
is a fundamental concept in not only state relations but in the realm of domestic criminal law.123  
Shortly after the criminal-procedure context of Zingre, comity came to the fore in the 
criminal-jurisdiction context in Libman v The Queen.124 In that case, Justice La Forest for the 
SCC engaged in a thoughtful review of the 19th century history of comity as it applied to 
transnational criminal cases. In Libman, the accused was committed to trial for fraud resulting 
from telephone sales solicitation made from Canada in which he misrepresented business 
opportunities to potential American investors. Mr. Libman sought to have his committal for trial 
quashed on the basis the crimes did not occur in Canada and that the Criminal Code125 is limited 
to territorial crimes unless a provision expressly provides otherwise. Justice La Forest began his 
account by emphasizing the primary basis of criminal jurisdiction is territorial and that states in 
public international law are hesitant to incur the “displeasure” of other states by indiscriminate 
attempts to control the activities that take place wholly within the territorial bounds of another 
state.126 Justice La Forest then engaged in a review of the the English cases to trace issues of 
territoriality through the jurisprudence. He explained that in the 19th century, most common law 
crimes were territorially confined (such as theft), and given the insular nature of Britain’s 
geography, its understanding of transnational law remained similarly insular. Comity, it seemed, 
was originally interpreted to support the isolation of crimes into defined territorial enclaves. It 
was the advent of marketing fraud, first through mail and then through telephone, that the 
question of where a crime took place when it was transnational in nature, became of chief 
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concern.127 Throughout the 20th century, courts applied varying theories of the locus of crime: 
some involving a “continuum,” others involving focus on where the crime began or ended.  
In a series of cases in the 1970s,128 the English courts held that comity did not prevent 
parliament from prohibiting conduct in England that had consequences abroad. In Treacy v 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Lord Diplock concluded that where “prohibited acts are of a 
kind calculated to cause harm to private individuals it would savour of chauvinism rather than 
comity to treat them as excusable merely on the ground the victim was not in the United 
Kingdom (UK) but in some other state.”129 He went on,  
Comity gives no right to a state to insist that any person may with impunity do 
physical acts in its own territory which have harmful consequences to persons within the 
territory of another state. It may be under no obligation in comity to punish those acts itself, 
but it has no ground for complaint in international law if the state in which the harmful 
consequences had their effects punishes, when they do enter its territories, persons who did 
such acts.130  
 
In Director of Public Prosecutions v Doot, a case involving conspiracy to import drugs 
into England, the technique of the continuing offence was again employed when the court stated 
it did not accord with international comity that the courts of the UK should treat defendants with 
any leniency just because the consequences of their actions harm those outside of the territorial 
confines of the home nation.131 In applying comity to conflict of laws (in the widest sense, and 
not limited to ‘private’ law matters), the court went on to explain that the concept of international 
comity is not static and that modern nations are not “nearly as sensitive about exclusive 
jurisdiction” as they once were.132 The fact patterns presented by transnational criminal cases 
provided the UK courts with opportunities to appreciate the often unreasonable outcomes created 
by a strict territorialist approach to state sovereignty and to employ more thoughtful analyses that 
were reflective of the sometimes transnational nature of crime. This less-siloed approach was 
subsequently employed in transnational civil actions.  
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The Canadian approach differed slightly from that taken in the UK. In the early years 
after confederation, the approach to territoriality taken by Canadian courts was narrow, likely 
reflective of Canada’s dependent status.133 However, just as in the UK, as time went on, this 
narrow construction began to give way to a more liberal interpretation with respect to the 
criminal realm. The Canadian courts had begun to realize that such a strict approach involved a 
“large measure of unreality.”134 For instance, the modern approach taken in Canada to criminal 
offences landed on a test to determine whether there is a “real and substantial link” between 
Canada and the offence. This approach, held Justice La Forest in Libman (with reference to 
Treacy and Doot), accorded with the modern and evolving notion of comity, which in his words 
“means no more nor less than kindly and considerate behaviour towards others.”135 Justice La 
Forest ended his discussion in Libman promoting a balanced interpretation of international 
comity in which, as global citizens, we look not only to the traditional notions of sovereignty and 
exclusivity, but at the protection of the public in other states. In a “shrinking world”, he says, 
“we are all our brother’s keepers.”136 
Five years later, and in relation to an inter-provincial civil case, Justice La Forest had a 
second opportunity to take on the changing face of comity, this time in a a civil conflicts case. In 
the seminal case of Morguard (whose impact on jurisdiction simpliciter is explained above), a 
case about enforcement and recognition of an Alberta judgment in BC, he again explained the 
historic basis for the territorial anchor in private international law and the enforcement of 
judgments. However, he quickly goes on to find that modern states cannot live in “splendid 
isolation” and do have to frequently give effect to judgments given in other countries in defined 
circumstances.137 Comity, which he importantly says for the first time is the informing principle 
of private international law, is the deference and respect due other states to the actions of a state 
legitimately taken within its territory. Justice La Forest accepts and applies the formulation of 
comity from the Supreme Court of the United States in Hilton v Guyot, 159 US 113 (1895) at 
163 and more recently cited by Estey J in Spencer v R, [1985] 2 SCR 278 at 283: 
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‘Comity’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one 
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which 
one national allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of 
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the 
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.138  
 
In other words, comity requires a balancing of state interests in private international law, 
both in the maintenance of good relations with the global community as defined by statehood 
and within a state’s own boundaries and interests. As well, it is addressed in the “legal sense” 
and embraced as a legal principle to inform private international law rules compared to the 
earlier public international law origins of comity as an extra-legal (or at least extra-judicial) 
normative concept. 
This balancing re-appeared in Muscutt where the Ontario Court of Appeal, in interpreting 
Morguard, first laid out the test for determining whether there was a real and substantial 
connection. The last factor in that Court’s test was comity. While the Muscutt factors were 
eventually discarded in support of the Van Breda “connecting factors” approach — of which 
comity was not one — the importance of comity as buttressing private international law was 
most recently reiterated in Chevron. In that case, Justice Gascon for the SCC reiterated the point 
made by Justice LeBel in Van Breda, that “the goal of modern conflicts systems rests on the 
principle of comity, which, although a flexible concept, calls for the promotion of order and 
fairness, an attitude of respect and deference to other states, and a degree of stability and 
predictability in order to facilitate reciprocity.”139 Though comity has come to be used as 
shorthand for the twin principles of private international law, “order and fairness”, the SCC has 
been clear such principles are not of equal weight. As Justice La Forest said in Tolofson v Jensen 
(to which I will return), that as order is a precondition to justice — as though fairness is not — 
“order comes first.”140  
Notably comity's bleed into private international law has occurred more in common law 
states compared with civil law states whose civil codes exhaustively define circumstances in 
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which courts take or refuse jurisdiction.141 It is only in common law countries, particularly those 
that grapple with judicially-created tests of forum non conveniens, recognition and enforcement 
of judgments, and forum of necessity, that judges have reached for such normative directives.142 
Indeed, in the development of private international law in Canada, comity swiftly coloured the 
discussion and has left an indelible imprint. Courts now reference comity as if by necessity or 
reflex.143 
Limits on comity 
While comity now appears to be a permanent fixture in the premises of private 
international law in Canada, both a technical and purposive reading of Canadian jurisprudence 
demonstrates that comity, despite its presence, is limited in its reach and application. In the 
following section, I make four arguments to demonstrate this limitation. First, while comity is a 
legal principle, it is not a concrete substantive rule and is further limited in its application by the 
judiciary by its parallel political nature. Second, Canadian courts have recognized comity should 
be and is limited to the extent that it interferes with certain basic standards of international and 
national human rights requirements. Canadian courts have found they should not blindly bend to 
neighbourliness when it would fly in the face of fundamental human rights norms. Third, 
Canadian judicial application seems to have effectively tailored the application of comity to 
situations in which the juridical acts of a foreign state are squarely at issue, rather than the 
application of comity to situations involving no direct state interference. Lastly, comity is widely 
regarded as an inherently flexible concept, due to keep up with, notably, changing international 
business practices; judicial fairness dictates this not be done to benefit the strong while resiling 
the weak to traditional and rigid concepts of territoriality.  
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Comity is not a legal rule 
Comity serves as a structural principle of interpretation for the entire field of private 
international law; it is a high-level framing principle rather than a concrete rule of law. Indeed, 
Canadian courts, while quick to cite comity, are also quick to note that comity does not 
specifically bind them in their decision making. In other words, comity is not a legal rule to 
which courts must adhere and oblige. As may be clear from the definitions included above, this 
international concept of “neighbourliness” does not provide much in the way of clarity. The SCC 
has acknowledged this challenge in interpretation in noting comity is a “very flexible concept” 
and that it “cannot be understood as a set of well-defined rules, but rather as an attitude of 
respect for and deference to other states.”144 Comity’s structure as an interpretive tool comes not 
from its objective definition —we know that it is a relatively loose concept — but from the order 
imbued within it through its use in defining Canadian private international law standards (for 
example, the real and substantial connection test). On comity itself, Upendra Baxi declares the 
concept a “highly pliant, problematic, and fuzzy trope;”145 Harold Maier similarly described 
comity as “an amorphous never-never land whose borders are marked by fuzzy lines of politics, 
courtesy, and good faith.”146 It is perhaps due to this inherent “fuzziness” that comity is 
interpreted differently in different jurisdictions or by different judges in the same jurisdiction;147 
the Court noted in Amchem, for example, that the interpretation of private international law 
recognizes the fact that comity is “not universally respected.”148 
Further, it is suggested that not only is comity too general to provide for specific 
outcomes, it may, when used by courts to consider international and political issues, not even be 
an appropriate consideration for courts; comity, as a principle to be used in expectations related 
to state-state interaction, is inherently a political, not a legal concept.149 Addressing comity and 
its use in the American context, David Gerber notes, “comity balancing” does not provide an 
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effective solution to issues of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Given the separation of powers 
between the executive and the judiciary in Canada, Gerber’s argument is instructive. 
Fundamentally, the traditional public international law concept of comity is political in context 
(and arguably in status) and is now generally considered little more than an undefined 
“neighbourliness.” It is important, then, to distinguish that, when brought into domestic law as a 
high-level principle by Canadian courts, its operation in the extraterritorial jurisdiction-finding 
framework is simply to add a very general reason for courts to favourably consider interests of 
foreign states. However, a determination of whether to make a decision solely in light of the 
“interest of a foreign state” and an associated imperative not to injure foreign relations is unusual 
given that the notion a judge should be making such a political decision is generally considered 
inappropriate.150  
The SCC has held that an “appropriate and just remedy is also one that must employ 
means that are legitimate within the framework of our constitutional democracy.”151 Specifically, 
the executive branch of government, by reason of its prerogative power, is responsible for 
international relations, to be conducted within a range of constitutional options.152 Courts rarely 
have access to the breadth of institutional and situational knowledge held by the national 
government related to state relations. The government must have flexibility to determine how to 
exercise its duties at the international level, taking into account “complex and ever-changing 
circumstances...[and] Canada’s broader national interest.”153 This constitutional separation of 
powers leads to the inevitable conclusion that, in approaching state comity, courts ought to, at the 
very least, tread very carefully. 
This is not to suggest courts must not look to inter-state comity, but perhaps that their 
consideration of comity ought to be limited to the evidence before them, such as often presented 
in international and domestic reports written by trustworthy bodies. In contrast, any liberal taking 
of real or effective judicial notice of the state of affairs as between Canada and another state is to 
be avoided.  
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Comity constrained by justice 
Not only is a territorialist view of comity weakened by comity’s fuzzy and flexible 
nature, Canadian courts have gone further to limit its consideration in circumstances in which 
Canadian and international core human rights values are at risk.  
While this thesis is focused substantially on the jurisdictional test for asserting or giving 
up jurisdiction, the seminal choice of law decision in Tolofson offers a useful first example of the 
way in which a Canadian court’s reliance on comity may be limited where the human rights 
values are at stake. In Tolofson, the parties were involved in a motor vehicle accident in 
Saskatchewan. The plaintiff lived in BC and brought an action in the BC Supreme Court for 
damages. The defendant brought a motion to stay the proceedings on the basis of forum non 
conveniens and, alternatively, a motion to choose the law of Saskatchewan as the applicable law 
were the action to go ahead in BC courts. The case was eventually appealed to the SCC. Justice 
La Forest traced the history of choice of law through British cases and its application in 
Canadian jurisdictions. Lamenting the varied and unprincipled approaches of the past, Justice La 
Forest wrote: 
What strikes me about the Anglo-Canadian choice of law rules...is that they appear 
to have been applied with insufficient reference to the underlying reality in which they 
operate and to general principles that should apply in responding to that reality. Often the 
rules are mechanistically applied. At other times, they seem to be based on the expectations 
of the parties, a somewhat fictional concept, or a sense of “fairness” about the specific case, 
a reaction that is not subjected to analysis, but which seems to be born of a disapproval of 
the rule adopted by a particular jurisdiction.154 
 
Thus, in order to structure a new Canadian approach to choice of law, Justice La Forest 
turned to concepts in the international legal order.155 He found that a court would follow its own 
rules of procedure, but that, when it came to substantive law, the principles of international 
comity — that states should respect the exercise of jurisdiction of another state within that other 
state’s own territory — support an approach that the law of the place where the tort took place 
should apply: lex loci delicti (the law of the place of the delict).156 Justice La Forest explained 
 
154 Tolofson, supra note 21 at 1046. 
155 Ibid at 1048. 
156 Note the CCQ Art 3126 defines the choice of law rules for cases brought in Québec. This rule was in place before 
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that this approach allows for some predictability and ease of application, that it was “fair” in that 
ordinarily people expect their activities to be covered by the law of the place where they happen 
to be, that it discouraged plaintiffs from shopping for fora that have more generous substantive 
law, and that it was an approach supported by other countries.157  
However, although he created a starting presumption that the law of the place of the tort 
would apply to transnational and trans-provincial cases, Justice La Forest left the door open to 
judicial discretion for courts to apply the law of the forum (lex fori) in circumstances where 
applying the law of the place would lead to injustice: “because a rigid rule on the international 
level could give rise to injustice, in certain circumstances, I am not averse to retaining a 
discretion in the court to apply our own law to deal with such circumstances.”158 He recognized 
that such injustices were unlikely to appear in trans-provincial cases but that the exception may 
be of assistance in the international realm. While there is some debate regarding the extent to 
which the “exception” is applied trans-provincially,159 the exception remains available in 
transnational cases. Indeed, the justice exception aligns the Canadian approach closer to that of 
Australia and the UK where the lex fori is applied under the “public policy doctrine” where 
fundamental or universal notions of justice and morality are at risk.160 The exception, limited as 
it appears to be to transnational cases, indicates an awareness on the part of the court that 
Canada’s neighborliness has bounds. 
In the context of issues of enforcement of a foreign state’s non-monetary order in Pro 
Swing Inc v Elta Gold Inc,161 Justice Deschamps for the majority of the SCC wrote that in 
considering whether to assist the US in enforcing its court order, a Canadian court will look to a 
number of factors, including comity. However, stipulating that comity is not some unbounded 
concept, she noted that comity is concerned not just with the nature of a foreign state’s acts, but 
 
Tolofson and remained in place after. The rule focuses on the “injurious act,” which is closer in meaning to the “tort” 
but has a built-in exception to account for cases where the injury “appeared” in another country than the one in 
which the “injurious act” occurred. See also discussion of the differences between the CCQ approach and that under 
Tolofson in Stephen GA Pitel & Jesse R Harper, “Choice of Law for Tort in Canada: Reasons for Change” (2013) 9:2 
J P Int’l L 289 [Pitel 2013] at 294. 
157 Tolofson, supra note 21 at 1050-1052. 
158 Ibid at 1054. 
159 See for example Pitel 2013, supra note 156; Janet Walker, “‘Are We There Yet?’ Towards a New Rule for 
Choice of Law in Tort” (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall LJ 331. 
160 Ben Chen, “Historical Foundations of Choice of law in Fiduciary Obligations” (2014) 10:2 J P Int’l L 171 at 171. 
161 Pro Swing Inc v Elta Gold Inc, 2006 SCC 52 at para 30 [Pro Swing]. 
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also the protection of a domestic nation’s citizens and domestic values.162  Indeed, despite noting 
that the defendant had not raised a public policy defence to the enforcement of the order, she 
went on to write that Canadian courts are the “guardians of Canadian constitutional values,”163 
such that there are sometimes issues that the court must raise of its own volition, such as those 
related to public policy. As an example, she cites the SCC’s decision in United States of America 
v Burns,164 in which the Court looked both to Canada’s international commitments and to its 
constitutional values in crafting its direction to the Minister that the surrender of an accused 
person to American custody for criminal trial would not be imposed without assurance the death 
penalty would not be imposed on him. Courts, she held, should be mindful of the values that 
merit constitutional or quasi-constitutional protection.165 In this discussion, Justice Deschamps 
outlined where principles of comity may be limited and where Canada must turn inward to 
consider its own values aside from those contained within theories of reciprocity.  
Despite being continuously touted by international law traditionalists and Canadian 
courts as a seminal and leading case supporting strict territoriality in public international law,166 
Justice Lebel in R v Hape can actually also be seen to take small steps towards limiting the 
impact of comity. In that case, the RCMP conducted investigations in Turks and Caicos related 
to a money laundering scheme run by a Canadian national. The investigation was conducted 
under supervision of the local authorities. Through the investigation, the RCMP collected 
damning evidence of the scheme from the office of the accused; they did so without a warrant. 
Upon coming to trial in Canada, the accused sought exclusion of the evidence collected sans 
warrant claiming his rights pursuant to section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms167 
(Charter) were breached. In finding the Charter did not apply to the investigation in Turks and 
Caicos, Justice LeBel left the door open for two circumstances in which the Charter may apply 
 
162 Ibid at para 40. By “domestic” Justice Deschamps was referring to the local jurisdiction that is considering 
whether to enforce a foreign judgment, Canada in this instance. 
163 Pro Swing, supra note 161 at para 59. 
164 United States of America v Burns, 2001 SCC 7 [Burns]. 
165 Pro Swing, supra note 161 at para 60. 
166 See, for example, commentary of the Federal Court of Appeal in Amnesty International Canada v Canada (Chief 
of the Defence Staff), 2008 FCA 401 [Afghan Detainees FCA] at paras 18-21.  
167 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
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to Canadian investigators outside of Canada. The first is where the host country consents to the 
application of Canadian law in its jurisdiction.  
The second touches on issues of comity. Justice LeBel noted Canadian authorities can 
participate in investigations abroad but must do so under the laws of the foreign state. This 
permissive rule, he stated, is derived from principles of comity. Citing earlier decisions of Justice 
La Forest in United States of America v Cotroni,168 Justice LeBel noted the importance of state 
cooperation in investigating and prosecuting transnational crime as otherwise cases would fall 
through the cracks. However, comity may be limited, he said, “where the participation of 
Canadian officers in investigative activities sanctioned by foreign law would place Canada in 
violation of its international obligations in respect of human rights.”169 The Court went on to note 
that individuals can reasonably expect that “certain basic standards will be adhered to in all free 
and democratic societies,” and that to rely on evidence gathered in a way that would undermine 
such standards would be “unfair.”170 In coming to this conclusion, it is clear that while Justice 
LeBel remained grounded in a traditional notion of territoriality as the basis of jurisdiction in that 
case, he saw the need for adaptation of the law to the changing world.  
That comity may be limited was further explored by the SCC in the cases related to Omar 
Khadr. In 2008, the SCC determined that Mr. Khadr’s section 7 Charter rights had been 
breached and that he was entitled to (somewhat) limited Stinchcombe disclosure171 related to 
interviews conducted by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS). Mr. Khadr had 
been held since 2002 by US authorities at Guantanamo Bay for allegedly killing an American 
soldier in Afghanistan when he was 15. The interviews were conducted by CSIS agents in 
Guantanamo Bay and the results of the interviews were shared with US authorities to assist with 
building their criminal case against Mr. Khadr in the US. While the Court held that generally the 
Charter does not apply abroad, it noted that Justice Lebel in Hape had stated an important 
exception to comity: that comity cannot be used to justify Canadian participation in activities of 
a foreign state or its agents that are contrary to Canada’s international obligations. Canada’s 
 
168 United States of America v Cotroni, [1989] 1 SCR 1469. 
169 Hape, supra note 105 at para 101.  
170 Ibid at para 111.  
171 R v Stinchcombe, [1995] 1 SCR 754.  
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deference to foreign states, they repeated, ends where clear violations of international law and 
fundamental human rights begin.172 
In that case, the US Supreme Court had already found the process and actions taken at 
Guantanamo Bay, in the time Mr. Khadr was an inmate, were unjust and violated American law 
through, among other things, breaches of the Geneva Conventions.173 Given Canada is and was a 
party to the Geneva Conventions, it was unnecessary for the SCC to determine whether the CSIS 
agents were participating in activities that are contrary to Canada’s obligations. Thus, the SCC 
was able to avoid overruling comity in contradiction to a foreign state’s law, and instead relied 
on that foreign state’s own judicial pronouncements. It is important to note that the Court did not 
hold that such a fortuitous situation was a requirement in future cases; in other words, the Court 
has not held that Canadian courts may not independently find international human rights or 
humanitarian law values are offended by something that a foreign state may treat as fully legal. 
Two years later, Mr. Khadr returned to the SCC to challenge the then Canadian 
government’s decision not to ask the US for his repatriation, which he had continually requested. 
In that decision, the SCC again noted that, in general, international customary law and the comity 
of nations prevent the Charter from applying to the actions of Canadian officials operating 
outside Canada. However, an exception exists where there is Canadian participation in activities 
of a foreign state or its agents that are contrary to Canada’s international obligations and 
fundamental human rights norms.174 In that case, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs agents 
had questioned Mr. Khadr at Guantanamo Bay knowing he had been subjected to a three-week 
sleep deprivation program called the “frequent flyer program,” a program clearly contrary to 
Canada’s fundamental human rights obligations not to engage in or be complicit in torture.  
 While the SCC did not have to decide whether the mistreatment of inmates at 
Guantanamo Bay, and specifically the treatment of Mr. Khadr, clearly met the threshold for a 
breach of “fundamental human rights norms,” (as that work had already been done by the United 
States Supreme Court and relied on by the SCC in Khadr 2008) it is likely they would have 
independently found — like the US Supreme Court did — that the breach of the Geneva 
 
172 Canada (Justice) v Khadr, 2008 SCC 28 [Khadr 2008] at para 18. 
173 Rahul v Bush, 542 US 466 (2004). 
174 Khadr 2010, supra note 152 at para 14. 
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Conventions (relied on in Khadr 2008) would have sufficed to demonstrate a breach of 
international law.175  
The idea of relying on fundamental human rights norms was not new for the Supreme 
Court in these cases. In Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the SCC was 
charged with determining the reasonableness of a decision maker’s consideration of the rights of 
the child pursuant to the then Immigration Act.176 Justice L’Hereux-Dubé for the majority, noted 
that an indicator of the importance of consideration of the rights of the child was Canada’s 
ratification of the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) and Canada’s recognition of the 
rights of the child through the ratification of other similar international instruments — 
notwithstanding Canada had not incorporated such treaties through domestic statute.177 Citing 
Ruth Sullivan’s, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd ed 1994), L’Hereux-Dubé J 
explained that the legislature is presumed to respect the values and principles enshrined in 
international law; even though some international obligations may not have direct application in 
Canadian law, the values reflected in international human rights law can nonetheless be used to 
inform the contextual approach to statutory interpretation and judicial review.178 Canada’s 
commitments in the international realm make up part of the context in which legislation is 
enacted in Canada. Thus, interpretations of such legislation that further or reflect such 
commitments should be preferred over those that do not.  
In interpreting whether the decision at issue was a reasonable exercise of the Minister’s 
power to grant an exemption to deportation for humanitarian and compassionate grounds (s 
114(2) of the Immigration Act), L’Hereux-Dubé J did not limit herself with an analysis of the 
CRC but also specifically looked to the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights179 (UDHR) which, she noted, reflects values that are central in determining the issue.180 
 
175 The detainees at Guantanamo bay between 2002 and 2004 were denied access to habeas corpus in contravention 
of the Geneva Conventions; they were being held indefinitely without any opportunity to challenge the legality of 
their status: Khadr 2008, supra note 172 at paras 21-22; In March 2004, Mr. Khadr was subjected to a sleep 
deprivation technique meant to make him more pliable in interrogation. Despite knowing Mr. Khadr had been 
subject to such cruel and abusive treatment, Canadian officials interrogated Mr. Khadr and made the transcript of 
that interrogation available to US officials: Khadr 2010, supra note 152 at para 5. 
176 Immigration Act, RSC 1985, c I-2. 
177 Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 [Baker] at para 69. 
178 Ibid at para 70. 
179 UNGA, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, 217 A (III) [UDHR]. 
180 Baker, supra note 177 at para 71.  
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This section of the judgment is of particular import given the dissent, given by Iacobucci and 
Cory JJ, was made solely on the basis of disagreement with the majority’s holdings that 
unincorporated international treaty law could generate values relevant to the interpretation of the 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds provision of the Immigration Act. The dissenting 
judges left open the possibility that the matter would have been different if the international 
human rights values were customary obligations;181 Iacobucci J, for the dissent, failed to 
acknowledge that while the UDHR is not a treaty and that, as a UN General Assembly 
resolution, not binding per se, it has long been argued to have helped in the crystallization of 
fundamental general (non-treaty) international law.182  
In 2005, the SCC reiterated the importance of Canadian courts interpreting domestic law 
in a manner that accords with the Canada’s treaty obligations and with the principles of 
customary international law.183 Beyond these cases dealing with interpreting ordinary law in 
light of international human rights law, the SCC has many times held that not simply ordinary 
law but also the Charter must be interpreted on the presumption it offers no less protection than 
Canada’s international human rights obligations.184 
In review of the above-noted SCC cases, it seems reasonable to state that, while comity 
may generally limit the reach of Canadian domestic law, it will not do so where blind adherence 
to neighbourliness would risk undermining or breaching Canada’s commitments to human rights 
norms or constitutional values. 
Comity is variable by genre of application 
It is not necessarily clear that the principle of comity applies equally to all conflict of 
laws scenarios. Upon review of the SCC’s treatment of comity, it is clear that the Court itself 
 
181 Citing Capital Cities Communications Inc v Canadian Radio-Television Commission, [1978] 2 SCR 141. 
182 That said, Justice L’Hereux-Dubé did not make a distinction in her analysis between the UDHR and treaties like 
the CRC, and it may have been more helpful for her to do so. From her majority judgment, it remains unclear to 
what extent the UDHR was an influential text because of its status as customary international law or whether non-
treaty instruments may nonetheless provide normative weight and can be used in domestic legal interpretation 
alongside Canadian-ratified treaties. 
183 Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40 at para 82. 
184Divito v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 47 at para 43; Saskatchewan 
Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4 at paras 64-86; Németh v Canada (Justice), 2010 SCC 56 at para 
34. 
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often defines its interpretation of comity in relation to the actions, rather than inaction, of other 
states. Indeed, in Pro Swing, the Court held the balancing exercise of comity requires “respectful 
review of the relief offered by the foreign court.”185 Such focus on the acts of foreign states 
suggests comity serves a more limited function, keeping Canadian courts from acting in a way 
that may interfere with a foreign state’s sovereignty when the foreign state has demonstrated 
some interest in adjudication and has done so in a manner that aligns with Canadian private 
international law norms. This range of treatment is clear when comparing the three most utilized 
mechanisms in private international law: anti-suit injunctions, recognition and enforcement, and 
finally, forum non conveniens.   
A first example lies in Amchem, the birth of the forum non conveniens test in Canada. In 
that case the SCC was actually primarily asked to look at the principles that ought to apply to 
anti-suit injunctions. In that case, the SCC was sitting on appeal of a BC Court of Appeal 
decision to grant an anti-suit injunction to the defendants in a case launched in Texas to 
determine damages related to asbestos exposure suffered by a large number of plaintiffs. In order 
to define the test for injunctions, the SCC had to distinguish between the two remedies available 
to a defendant: a stay of proceedings — upon which the court defined the new forum non 
conveniens test — and an anti-suit injunction.  
In its discussion of anti-suit injunctions, and in reference to the new test for a stay of 
proceedings, the Court limited the new test for injunctions on the basis of comity; while both a 
stay of proceedings and an anti-suit injunction had the purpose of identifying where a trial should 
be held and legally applied in personam, the effect was that injunctions limited the actions of a 
foreign court.186 In applying his reading of comity outlined by La Forest J in Morguard, Sopinka 
J for the Court held that an anti-suit injunction would only be considered where a foreign 
proceeding is pending; it would be unfair to pre-judge the actions of a foreign court. Only where 
a foreign court has taken jurisdiction may a Canadian court look to that decision to determine 
whether it did so in a manner inconsistent with the principles of forum non conveniens. If so, 
then a Canadian court, confident the foreign jurisdiction had not observed the rules of comity in 
 
185 Pro Swing, supra note 161 at para 30 [Emphasis added]. 
186 Amchem, supra note 59 at 913; see also the discussion in Schultz & Mitchenson 2016, supra note 109 at 371 in 
which the authors discuss the Australian approach to anti-suit injunctions, noting comity in such instances “demands 
courts proceed very carefully.” 
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unjustly finding it was the appropriate forum, may issue an injunction against a private party that 
has the effect of limiting that foreign court’s jurisdiction, thereby reaching the limits of its own 
responsibility to comity. In other words, the Canadian court should not act so as to restrain the 
actions of a foreign court unless it is confident the foreign court acted in such a way as to offend 
Canadian norms.  
In Amchem, the court found that there may be a real issue with comity in respect of 
injunctions because of the effect it had on limiting the actions already taken by a foreign court.187 
There are two important points to highlight. First, the conclusion that an injunction would offend 
comity by interfering with a foreign court’s jurisdiction is not drawn with respect to a stay of 
proceedings pursuant to application ofthe forum non conveniens test, i.e. a distinction is made 
between the two mechanisms (the stay and the injunction). Indeed, this distinction followed that 
made in the UK. The English case,188 from which the new Canadian test for injunctions was 
borrowed for Amchem, SNI Aérospatiale v Lee Kui Jak,189 followed a decision in 1987 of the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to de-liberalize the test for anti-suit injunctions,190 
which had then been adapted by the House of Lords to match the liberalization of the stay of 
proceedings in Spiliada.191 This decision was made on the basis that such liberalization in the 
case of injunctions was inconsistent with comity.  
With respect to recognition and enforcement proceedings, comity becomes an issue for 
the court precisely because of the impact it has on an action already taken by a foreign court.192 
A clear example of the emphasis on foreign action is seen in the recent decision of the SCC in 
Chevron. As noted above, the issue before the SCC in Chevron was whether the Ontario superior 
court would have jurisdiction to provide the plaintiff with enforcement of an Ecuadorean court 
 
187 In fact, the impact of an anti-suit injunction is considered by some civil law jurisdictions to be offensive and a 
breach of their national sovereignty: see for example, Turner v Grovit, [2004] ECR 1-3565. 
188 SNI Aéropostiale v Lee Kui Jak, [1987] 3 All ER 510 (PC). 
189 Ibid. 
190 The test for anti-suit injunctions and stays on the basis of forum non conveniens were historically identical and 
based on the judgment in St Pierre v South American Stores (Gath & Chaves), Ltd, [1936] 1 KB 382, that neither an 
anti-suit injunction nor a stay will be issued by an English court unless it is shown that the foreign proceedings will 
be oppressive or vexatious. Overtime, the House of Lords, in the context of stays held “oppressive” and “vexatious” 
should be read liberally. This approach culminated in the seminal case of Spiliada, which further loosened and 
defined the test for stays for forum non conveniens. It was unclear whether the test for anti-suit injunctions had 
evolved in parallel. The Judicial Committee determined it would not.  
191 Amchem, supra note 59 at 924. 
192 Ibid at 931. 
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order. The Court held that international comity and the prevalence of cross-border transactions 
and movement called for a modernization of private international law in Canada.193 In Chevron, 
the Court distinguished between taking jurisdiction of a matter in the first instance and taking 
jurisdiction in order to recognize or enforce an order already made. In the latter event, the SCC 
noted that comity, which had consistently underlain recognition and enforcement law, militates 
in favour of generous enforcement rules,194 such that the action of a state taken legitimately 
within its territory ought to be afforded deference.195 Citing Tolofson — the case on choice of 
law in tort — the Court held that the notion of comity will “in great measure recognize the 
determination of legal issues in other states.”196 The need to acknowledge and show respect for 
the legal acts of other states, the Court said, is a core foundation of comity, and that this respect 
calls for “assistance, not barriers.”197 Citing Beals v Saldanha198 — another recognition and 
enforcement case — the court concluded that, as cross-border transactions continue to multiply, 
comity requires “an increasing willingness on the part of courts to recognize the acts of other 
states.”199 In other words, to refuse enforcement would be to interfere and effectively neutralize 
the act of another state. 
In Chevron, the Court’s language continually returns to the idea of respect for the acts of 
other states, albeit where those acts are done legitimately.200 Twenty-five years earlier, 
Morguard itself — framing the modern approach to the real and substantial connection test — 
was a recognition and enforcement case: the enforcement of a judgment already entered in 
Alberta and sought enforced in BC. That Canadian courts should not, without good reason, delve 
into the legal arenas and judicial acts of other states, was supportable. To do so would be to 
suggest that Canada must “check the work” of its neighbours. However, the Court, even in the 
wake of another’s state’s action and determination, may curtail its deference to comity where 
there is evidence of fraud or violation of natural justice in a foreign court.  
 
193 Chevron, supra note 25 at para 32. 
194 Chevron, supra note 25 at para 42. 
195 Ibid at para 51. 
196 Ibid at para 52. 
197 Ibid at para 69. 
198 Beals v Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72 [Beals]. 
199 Chevron, supra note 25 at para 75 [Emphasis added]. 
200 For the court relying heavily on the action of another state see also Westec Aerospace, supra note 70, in which the 
BC Court of Appeal granted a stay of proceeding on a forum non conveniens application relying heavily on the fact 
that proceedings had already begun between the same parties in relation to the same cause of action in Kansas.  
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 Unlike an application for an anti-suit injunction where action by a Canadian court would 
serve to restrain the court of another jurisdiction, a Canadian court asserting jurisdiction despite a 
defendant’s suggestion there may be another appropriate forum does not prevent that foreign 
court from acting. In other words, to keep an action in Canada does not have the same 
consequences for international comity as an anti-suit injunction. This is clear in cases involving 
disputes over the forum conveniens where the actions of another state will not be impacted by a 
Canadian court’s determination on the matter. As a result, even where there hasn’t been evidence 
of a violation of natural justice, and where there has already been action by another court, the 
rest of the factors that make up the jurisdiction analysis can outweigh the impact of comity. In 
Teck Cominco Metals v Lloyds Underwriters, the SCC rejected Teck’s argument that the action 
of a foreign state in taking jurisdiction eliminated the need to engage in a forum non conveniens 
analysis — in that case, under the CJPTA — and instead should consider a “comity-based” 
analysis that respects the foreign court’s decision to take jurisdiction.201 The court held that 
considerations of comity are already subsumed within the test for forum non conveniens and that 
the action of a foreign court does not, and should not, act as a factor of “overwhelming 
significance” to lead inevitably to a Canadian court declining to exercise its jurisdiction.202  
It may be agreed that where foreign states (including their courts) have already acted, a 
consideration of comity becomes relevant. But what appears to be more relevant is whether a 
Canadian court’s actions related to comity will interfere with the foreign state’s exercise of its 
own jurisdiction. When claims are initiated and where there may be overlapping claims to 
jurisdiction between states, comity does not act as a trump card favouring the jurisdiction of first-
to-file. The other factors considered in, specifically, the forum non conveniens analysis must also 
be weighed. However, in cases where there has been no initiating foreign action, let alone any 
action completed, consideration of comity must occupy a position of even lesser consideration. 
Surely aggressive notions of comity do not extend to an insistence that Canada, by rote, “hold the 
door” for other states that may or may not decide to engage.  
 
 
201 Teck, supra note 70 at para 17. 
202 Ibid at paras 19, 29. 
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Comity should be flexible for all parties 
Finally, far from being rigid and in keeping with its amorphous definition, comity and, 
more generally, the interpretive practice of private international law have long been promoted for 
their flexibility and ever evolving nature. For example, in relation to the globalization of business 
and the invention of the internet, courts in Canada have consistently recognized the need of 
private international law to keep up with the times.  
In its search to identify the proper forum in Amchem, the Court sourced its struggle in the 
fact that the business of litigation had become increasingly global and more difficult for courts to 
identify the proper forum.203 Similarly, the Court in Pro Swing began its judgment by noting 
modern-day commercial transactions require “prompt reactions and effective remedies.”204 The 
globalization of commerce and the movement of people across borders, held the Court, make 
territorial frontiers and national identity less relevant.205 The doctrine of comity, according to the 
Court in Beals v Saldanha, “must be permitted to evolve concomitantly with international 
business relations, cross-border transactions as well as mobility.”206 And, most recently in 
Chevron, the Court, citing Beals, noted that as “cross border transactions continue to multiple, 
comity requires an increasing willingness on the part of courts to recognize the acts of other 
states.”207 
Perhaps the most engaging discussion of the evolutionary dynamics of comity comes 
from Justice La Forest’s discussion in Morguard. There, he held that principles of “order and 
fairness, principles that ensure security of transactions with justice” underlie the modern system 
of private international law.208 The state of interrelatedness and complexity of the modern system 
calls for coordination and cooperation rather than a state’s unwavering focus on its own 
parochial interests, lest injustice result.209 Modern means of travel, business, and communication 
have made many of the 19th century concerns toward territoriality appear out of step. At the 
international level, he explains, the rules of private international law and comity should be 
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interpreted in accordance with the reality of the international business community and the 
continuous decentralization of political and legal power.210 
That states ought to focus on cooperation rather than adherence to territoriality is 
reflected in significant shifts in what actions may be considered by the state to be “national” and 
“territorial” for the purposes of Canada regulating its own citizens abroad. Examples include the 
criminalization of child sex tourism when conducted by a Canadian — even if the act may not be 
a crime in the state where it is committed — and section 46 of the Competition Act,211 making 
corporate conspiracy a crime where it is committed by a Canadian national regardless of where it 
is done.212 Through globalization, states are forced to reconceptualize the “national” and the 
“territorial” in their creation and application of domestic legislation. With such reconfiguration 
must come a complementary shift in the concept of comity.  
But as private international law rushes to keep abreast of the practices of international 
business, it cannot be allowed to do so only to the benefit of corporate interest. To do so would 
create a type of “buffet development” of the common law in which corporate actors (and then 
judges) pick and choose the elements of comity — for example, the recognition of foreign 
judgments, recognition of patents and copyright, and recognition of contracts — that benefit the 
corporation, while leaving behind those that do not, i.e. access to justice for affected peoples in 
the corporation’s working state. International policy concepts such as comity are flexible enough 
to be interpreted so as not to assume they operate in one direction or at least not to assume that 
comity is the only policy at play.213 As private international law and comity are pulled forward 
into the present, it is equally important that the recognition of “modern day commercial 
transactions” recognize not only the global network and relationships of equal business partners, 
but also the globalization of the corporation itself and its expanding influence in, for example, 
the extraction of resources and exploitation of workers in areas of weak governance. As La 
Forest J said in Libman, “we are all our brother’s keepers.”214  
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While comity has, over time, transitioned from a public international law concept to one 
informing — or as the SCC has recently expressed “inspiring”215 — the application of private 
international law, its application to the practice of the latter is, in law, internally and judicially 
limited. Not only is it not strictly enforceable, it is touted as constantly evolving to meet the 
modern issues of transnational events. Furthermore, it would seem that comity is more 
reasonably and effectively directed at solving apparent conflicts where the action of a Canadian 
court would paralyze the action of another state, but even in those situations, care is due where 
basic tenets of human rights would be violated by a blind deference in the name of sovereign 
respect. Both the legal tests for forum non conveniens and forum of necessity, informed by the 
principle of comity, are on their face, supportive of a liberal approach, in circumstances of 
transnational corporate harm, to access to justice in Canadian courts.   
C: The legal framework supports a reality-framed approach to conflicts 
Some courts in Canada have shown themselves to understand the above-noted principles 
and have engaged reasonably with the tests for forum of necessity and forum non conveniens in 
contexts involving human rights and environmental abuses, although such well-reasoned 
judgments are few and far between.  
With respect to necessity, although few courts have had the opportunity to deal with it, as 
was discussed above, the Ontario Superior Court in Bouzari took jurisdiction, where it otherwise 
had none, on the basis of necessity where the plaintiff alleged he had been abducted, 
incarcerated, and tortured in Iran. The court in that case held that Mr. Bouzari could not be 
reasonably expected to return to Iran to make his claim in Iranian courts, the state in which the 
torture took place.216 In doing so the court clearly rejected traditional territorial notions of comity 
and state equality on the basis justice would not otherwise be served.  
 
at 1, 15. 
215 Barer v Knight Brothers LLC, 2019 SCC 13 at para 108. 
216 Following that decision, the defendant, who had not appeared before the motion judge on the forum of necessity 
motion brought a motion to set aside the default judgment. Mr. Bouzari consented with terms allowing the defendant 
to challenge the forum. The defendant did so. In the meantime, the defendant had voluntarily returned (from 
England where he was living and attending school) to Iran to “clear his name.” Upon arrival he was incarcerated in 
Iran and then prohibited from leaving Iran. Mr. Bahremani agreed with Mr. Bouzari that the latter’s claim could not 
be heard in Iran but argued England was the more appropriate forum. Both parties had connection to England and 
Mr. Bahremani presented evidence he would not be allowed into Canada to defend himself were the proceedings to 
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Well-reasoned judgments related to forum non conveniens in cases involving human 
rights abuses are similarly sparse. In contrast to such problematic judgments (which will be the 
focus of Chapter 2), the BC Court of Appeal has proven itself up to the task in recent years when 
it comes to an accurate reading of the current law on forum non conveniens.  
In Tahoe, the plaintiffs claimed Tahoe’s private security personnel injured seven 
protesters outside its Escobal mine in Guatemala when security opened the gates and began 
firing live rounds at the protesters. Tahoe is a reporting BC company217 with majority 
directorship residing in Canada (not in BC alone);218 Tahoe manages and controls all significant 
aspects of the mine. The protesters claimed the attack was planned, ordered, and directed by the 
head of the security force and that Tahoe expressly or implicitly authorized such use of force by 
the security personnel or was negligent in failing to prevent it. All parties agreed the superior 
courts of BC had jurisdiction simpliciter, however, Tahoe brought a motion for a stay of 
proceedings on the basis Guatemala was the more appropriate forum pursuant to the CJPTA. The 
motions judge allowed Tahoe’s motion and found Guatemala was clearly the more appropriate 
forum for the action.219 That decision was appealed. 
Madam Justice Garson, writing for the Court of Appeal, held that the motions judge had 
misapplied the test for forum non conveniens. While the motions judge had correctly noted the 
onus was on Tahoe to show why the Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction, that judge 
had not appropriately considered the evidence as it related to that burden. The Court of Appeal 
held that neither a stand-alone suit, nor joining the ongoing criminal suit against the head of 
security in Guatemala,220 were “clearly more appropriate” than conducting a trial in BC. Justice 
Garson found the difficulties the plaintiffs would face in accessing Tahoe’s documents in 
 
be heard in Ontario. While the Ontario Superior Court disagreed with Mr. Bahremani, finding Ontario was the more 
appropriate forum, the Court of Appeal overturned the decision and found England was the more appropriate forum: 
Bouzari v Bahremani, 2015 ONCA 275. 
217 Business Corporations Act, SBC 2002, c 57, s 3. 
218 Tahoe has no office in BC other than a registered records office necessary to meet its statutory requirements as a 
reporting BC company. Tahoe holds its annual general meetings in Toronto or Vancouver and its directors meet once 
or twice per year in Vancouver: Tahoe, supra note 63 at para 15. 
219 Garcia v Tahoe Resources Inc, 2015 BCSC 2045 [Tahoe SC] at para 106. 
220 Following the incident, the head of security, a Mr. Rotondo, fled the country. He was arrested and criminal 
prosecution began. In Guatemala, civilians may apply to be joined to a criminal prosecution. However, this option 
didn’t appear open to the plaintiffs as the plaintiffs adduced evidence that Mr. Rotondo had escaped to Peru (which 
stated an intention to oppose his extradition) and the criminal prosecution had thus been adjourned indefinitely in 
Guatemala.  
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Guatemala and the expiry of the Guatemalan limitation period — with no evidence adduced by 
Tahoe that it would be waived — were not given sufficient weight by the motions judge. Further, 
the motions judge had incorrectly isolated the discussion of the risk of unfairness of proceeding 
with the claim in Guatemala.  
The parties in Tahoe agreed the legal test – in making the determination of whether there 
was a risk of legal unfairness before a foreign judiciary – was whether there was a “real risk of 
an unfair process in the foreign court.221 This “real risk” test was borrowed from the English case 
AK Investment CJSC v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd (2011).222 While the wording of the test was clear, 
what was unclear was where the burden lay in proving there was a real risk of unfairness and at 
what stage in the test such concerns were appropriately raised. Recall, in the UK the forum non 
conveniens test is assessed in two stages. First, a defendant must establish there is a more 
appropriate alternative forum. If the defendant is able to do so, a stay will be granted unless the 
plaintiff can establish other circumstances which make the granting of a stay adverse to the 
interests of justice.223 Whether there is a real risk of unfairness is considered at the second stage, 
a burden borne by the plaintiff. Thus, in her decision, Madam Justice Garson examined whether 
the “real risk of unfairness” test could operate in Canada where the approach to forum non 
conveniens is unified, i.e. all factors are weighed together in one stage.   
The BC Court of Appeal held that the “real risk” of unfairness test was an appropriate 
standard and that it forms part of the overall forum non conveniens analysis, for which the 
defendant bears the overall burden. The Court further held the weight of any provided evidence 
of unfairness will be dictated by the quality of that evidence. The motions judge had given 
insufficient weight to the evidence tendered by the plaintiffs related to systemic corruption in the 
Guatemalan judiciary and the “context of the dispute,”224 i.e.: the evidence of weakness in the 
Guatemalan justice system,225 the evidence of endemic corruption in the Guatemalan 
judiciary,226 and the difficulties the appellants would face in bringing a suit against Tahoe given 
 
221 Tahoe, supra note 63 at para 115.  
222 AK Investment CJSC v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd (2011), [2012] 1 WLR 1804 at 1828. 
223 Tahoe, supra note 63 at para 118, citing Spiliada, supra note 58 at 478.  
224 Tahoe, supra note 63 at para 130. 
225 Ibid at para 126. 
226 Ibid at para 127. 
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the limited discovery procedures available in Guatemala.227 The Court allowed the appeal and 
dismissed Tahoe’s application for a stay of the BC proceeding.228 Tahoe sought leave to appeal 
to the SCC and was denied.229 
Later the same year, the same court was provided a second chance to comment on the 
state of forum non conveniens in relation to Canadian mining abroad in Araya v Nevsun 
Resources Ltd.230 In Nevsun, the plaintiffs are Eritrean refugees who allege they were forced, 
through military conscription, to work at the Bisha gold mine in Eritrea owned, in part, indirectly 
by the defendant. While constructing the mine, the plaintiffs allege they were forced to work in 
inhuman conditions and under constant threat of physical punishment, torture, and imprisonment, 
even after they had served their periods of conscription in the military. While all parties 
acknowledged the BC superior courts had jurisdiction simpliciter over the matter, Nevsun 
brought three applications. The first, like in Tahoe, was a motion for a stay of proceedings on the 
basis that Eritrea was the more appropriate forum pursuant to the CJPTA. However, Nevsun is a 
more complicated case than Tahoe as the notice of civil claim includes allegations of not only 
domestic tort violations, but breaches of international law. This prompted the second application: 
to strike the proceedings for no reasonable cause of action. Further, the plaintiff’s allegations 
include the involvement of the state of Eritrea (through the army conscription process), thus 
triggering the defendant’s third application: to strike the pleadings for no reasonable cause of 
action on the basis of the act of state doctrine, claimed to follow from the same principles as 
would, due to the State Immunity Act (SIA), protect Eritrea from being directly sued.231  
Beginning her judgment by citing Justice Lloyd Jones of the English Court of Appeal in 
Belhaj v Straw,232 Madam Justice Newbury, for the Court, accepted that “the traditional view of 
public international law as a system of merely regulating the conduct of states among themselves 
on the international plane has long been discarded…[C]hanges have been reflected in a growing 
willingness on the part of courts in [the UK] to address and investigate the conduct of foreign 
states and issues of public international law when appropriate.” She staked the case before her as 
 
227 Ibid at para 128.  
228 Ibid at para 132. 
229 2017 SCCA No 94.  
230 Nevsun, supra note 20. 
231 State Immunity Act, RSC 1985, c S-18. 
232 Belhaj v Straw, [2014] EWCA Civ 1394 aff’d [2017] UKSC 3. 
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one that may determine whether Canada was to remain on the traditional path of “judicial 
abstention” even where foreign conduct consists of peremptory norms of international law.233 
She concluded Canada ought to adapt.  
For our purposes, it is unnecessary to delve deeply into whether international law can 
ground a cause of action in Canada or whether an act of state doctrine exists and, if it exists, may 
apply. That said, the Court’s discussion related to the appropriate forum is informative. Despite 
the hundreds of witnesses located outside of Canada, their lack of ability to speak English, and 
many similarly complex logistical issues, the Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge’s findings 
that BC was the more appropriate forum. The Court found there was no real risk of multiplicity 
of proceedings, nor any usurping of Eritrea’s internal labour tribunals. The Court found there 
was sufficient cogent evidence that there was a real risk the plaintiff would not receive a fair trial 
in Eritrea. The judicial system in that country was found — on the basis of significant expert 
evidence — not to be set up to ensure judicial independence from the government.  
Nevsun appealed the BC Court of Appeal’s decision to the SCC on the issues of 
customary international law and act of state; that appeal was heard January 23, 2019. Perhaps in 
recognition of the quality of reasoning in the BC Court of Appeal and of the current state of the 
law on forum non conveniens, Nevsun did not seek leave to appeal Madam Justice Newbury’s 
decision with respect to forum non conveniens.  
Similarly, in Piedra v Copper Mesa Mining Corporation,234 and Choc v Hudbay Minerals 
Inc,235 the defendants chose not to move forward with arguments related to jurisdiction 
simpliciter or forum non conveniens, perhaps acknowledging the law is now clear that Canada 
was the appropriate forum in which to face their accusers. In Copper Mesa, Ecuadorean plaintiffs 
alleged they had been victims of repeated harassment, intimidation, and assaults at the hands of 
the security forces hired by the owner of the proposed mine, a BC-incorporated mining 
company’s subsidiary. They brought actions in various torts against not only the mining 
company, but also the TSX (related to the TSX’s decision to list the mining corporations shares 
on the Toronto Stock Exchange). The defendants moved forward only with a motion to strike on 
 
233 Nevsun, supra note 20 at para 1. 
234 Piedra v Copper Mesa Mining Corporation, 2011 ONCA 191 [Copper Mesa]. 
235 Choc v Hudbay Minerals Inc, 2013 ONSC 1414 [Hudbay]. 
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the basis of no cause of action. In Hudbay, the Canadian corporation doing business in 
Guatemala initially raised a forum non conveniens argument in response to claims against it for 
murder, gang rape, and assault of local indigenous people opposed to its Fenix mine. However, 
again, the company eventually discontinued the forum non conveniens argument, moving 
forward only with its motions to strike on the basis of no cause of action and limitations.  
In Nevsun and Tahoe, the BC Court of Appeal approached the issue of forum non 
conveniens with not only an eye to the correct burden and with whom it lies — the defendant — 
but also a thoughtful and broad awareness of the “real risk” for unfairness of litigating in 
alternative fora. In neither case did comity present any real barrier for the Court of Appeal’s 
decision making. In an approach reflective of that taken in Bouzari, the BC Court of Appeal saw 
the reality of uneven state-corporate power dynamics in lesser regulated states and the reality of 
challenged justice systems, whether they be challenged for lack of resources or active political 
interference. In other words, they used an approach that I refer to as a “reality frame” to evaluate 
the otherwise highly discretionary tests.  
Reality framing as a conceptual touchstone 
“Reality framing” can be defined in terms both of what it is not and what it seeks to 
accomplish. Reality framing is about not defining a problem by the black letter law, whether 
common or legislated. It is about not blindly tying one’s hands to precedent. Reality framing 
instead, seeks to understand a legal issue through its context. What is the true source of a legal 
problem? Who or what is fundamentally responsible for that problem? What are the rationally 
predicted results of applying the received, black letter law? Does that outcome adequately 
consider the power dynamics impacting on the legal problem? And, is the legal response likely to 
result in any real change in a situation about which it is generally accepted that the status quo is 
seriously untenable? 
To consider jurisdiction in a reality frame is to acknowledge the conditions in which 
foreign (to Canada) plaintiffs find themselves when facing harms caused to them by CanCorps. 
Indeed, former justice of the SCC, Ian Binnie, had this to say with respect to resistance to 
regulating multinational enterprises (MNE) in developing states: 
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The economic influence of transnational companies is often such that states, 
competing amongst each other for investment opportunities, have little incentive to 
regulate. Even where the incentive exists, the political influence of transnational 
companies, particularly in conflict-ridden and economically underdeveloped countries, 
may be such that a state has little real power to impose its will.236 
 
Reality framing is already present in the way in which the legislature and the courts have 
approached the legal tests for forum non conveniens and forum of necessity, as well as their 
application of the test to the facts. As we have seen above, the test for forum non conveniens 
places the burden on the defendant to prove another forum is clearly more appropriate, looking 
to a number of factors including the real risk that justice will not be done in an alternative forum 
— a seemingly high bar to meet. The existence of a necessity-based jurisdiction, to create 
jurisdiction where there was none, acknowledges situations in which the reality of the involved-
party relationships (and those of third parties) and the nature of the allegations may create 
situations where justice will not be done absent a Canadian forum’s intervention. The flexibility 
of these concepts, and some courts’ resistance to strict rules of interpretation, reflect the 
importance of considering the context of each case on its unique bases. Indeed, the SCC has 
repeatedly held the assumption of jurisdiction must ultimately be guided by order and fairness, 
not a “mechanical counting of contacts or connections.”237 
Such framing was clearly at play in the decisions of Tahoe and Nevsun where the Court 
of Appeal saw beyond the claims made by the corporate defendants and evaluated the 
discretionary factors in a way suggesting the Court was alive to context; in doing so the court 
never lost sight of the reality of the foreign state’s judiciary, the state’s involvement (or lack 
thereof) in the fair operation of the judiciary, the nature of the allegations and how the same 
would be treated by the foreign state’s judiciary, and the nature of the relationship between the 
corporation, the foreign state, and the plaintiffs. In those cases, the Court properly understood its 
role, the discretionary nature of the tests, and the need to safeguard against artificially limiting its 
role — through, for example, relying on dated interpretations of comity — in ensuring justice is 
done.  
 
236 Binnie 2009, supra note 214 at 45. 
237 Hunt, supra note 36 at 326; see also commentary in Black 2012, supra note 76. 
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Even where courts — seemingly uncomfortable with treading into the territorial 
jurisdiction of another state — cite the concept of comity, we have seen that comity is itself 
amorphous and context-specific. Particularly where no action has yet been taken by a foreign 
state and where human rights are at issue, any dedication to strict territoriality is limited and 
waning. It appears that, in law, neither tests of forum of necessity or forum non conveniens nor 
the character of comity should bind the hands of Canadian judges in taking or retaining 
jurisdiction in cases involving transnational human rights litigation. Even while overlapping 
jurisdiction may in theory present comity issues, in practice where there are actual conflicts, they 
can be fairly and effectively dealt with through the operation of the legal mechanisms and 
doctrines described above in a manner that is sensitive to contextual reality. In fact, one might go 
so far as to observe that true conflicts rarely appear, particularly with respect to causes of action 
involving transnational human rights, as transnational corporate activity often occurs in zones of 
weak governance zones characterized by a lack of effective national oversight.238 In such cases, 
there is no conflict between a Canadian court exercising jurisdiction and non-action on the part 
of the host country.  
All that said, while in law there is no real barrier to a foreign plaintiff initiating a cause of 
action for breaches of human rights or environmental torts in Canada against a CanCorp, what 
we see in fact is that Canadian courts have not all had as broad a horizon as the BC Court of 
Appeal in the Tahoe and Nevsun cases. Other courts have been more reticent in moving beyond 
19th century frameworks of territoriality and strict, unsupportable interpretations of what comity 
demands of them. In the next chapter I will examine some of the underlying reasons why too 
many Canadian courts have maintained a 19th century territorialist bias in interpreting comity and 
state non-interference and how that has played out through transnational human rights litigation. 
 
 
 
238 Penelope Simons & Audrey Macklin, The Governance Gap: Extractive Industries, Human Rights, and the Home 
State Advantage (London: Routledge, 2014) [Simons & Macklin 2014] at 185. 
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Chapter 2: Canadian courts are mired in a self-reinforcing territorialist 
version of comity 
Following the release of what Robert Wai terms the “tetralogy” — Morguard, Amchem, 
Hunt, and Tolofson — between 1990 and 1994,239 there was some thought that the significant 
changes to Canadian private international law represented a sign of judicial activism in the name 
of recognizing international norms.240 However, in the following twenty years, it appears some 
courts in Canada have ignored the spirit of those seminal judgments. An analysis of why courts 
in Canada appear in many cases to be unable (or unwilling) to break free of territorialist notions 
of comity could easily remain inwardly focused. Such an analysis could seek to smooth over the 
apparent contradictions between the law on its face (the black-letter tests for jurisdiction) and the 
way in which it is applied. However, it may be more useful to take a step back and apply what 
Rahel Jaeggi refers to as an “immanent critique”241 in which we may ask whether the “form of 
life”242 of private international law is equipped to deal with the “problem” of the 
transnationalization of the corporation and the relative failure of the national juridical arena to 
catch up such that Canada could ensure corporations may be actually held accountable for their 
actions when acting abroad. One way to undertake such an analysis, is to consider the juridical 
system through the lens of Pierre Bourdieu and his field theory. Doing so illuminates some of the 
forces inherent in Canadian judicial decision making that lead to the conservative application of 
comity, the effects of which are clearly visible upon review of some recent Canadian human 
rights case law, and specifically, transnational tort litigation.  
In the following section I will first review Bourdieu’s field theory and how his theory 
applies to judicial decision making. Then, I will review the forces inherent in the Canadian-
specific juridical field and some of the factors that inform the tendencies and inherent 
preferences of Canadian judges. I will end with a review of recent human rights case law — first 
with respect to a case demonstrating today’s judicial hyper-comity and then using several 
 
239 Note, three of the tetralogy were written by the same judge — Justice La Forest — and the fourth by Justice 
Sopinka (with reference to the other three).  
240 Robert Wai, “In the Name of the International: The Supreme Court of Canada and the Internationalist 
Transformation of Canadian Private International Law” (2001) 39 Can YB Int’l L 117 [Wai 2001b]. 
241 Rahel Jaeggi, “Towards and Immanent Critique of Forms of Life” (2015) 57 Raisons politiques 13 [Jaeggi 2015]. 
242 According to Jaeggi, “forms of life” are inert bundles of practice whether they be intentional or unintentional 
actions that can be interpreted, that are regulated by norms, and that are directed at some aim; they are, for example, 
instances of problem solving: Jaeggi 2015 at 16-17. 
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transnational tort claims — to demonstrate how judicial habitus (roughly translated, tendency) 
has informed legal decision making and, in those cases, led to injustice.  
A: Bourdieu, the field, and habitus 
Introduction to Bourdieu and his field theory 
Pierre Bourdieu was a 20th century French philosopher and sociologist who is best known 
for his conception of “field theory.”243 Bourdieu’s approach rejected psychological structuralism 
— the idea that human actions are born of the human mind — and ideas that behaviour is 
entirely outwardly-influenced. Instead, Bourdieu conceived of behaviour and the operation of 
“agents” as fundamentally relational. According to Bourdieu, a “field” is a social and political 
context in which agents operate, compete, and in which they are hierarchically positioned. A 
field, such as the juridical field he described in an article dedicated to law,244 is never completely 
autonomous and is informed and defined by fields around it. Notably, fields are influenced by 
the “meta-field” of power, which is made up of a combination of the economic and political 
fields. 
While the agents within the field are influenced by the nomos — the field-specific, 
largely unspoken, norms that regulate the actions in the field — and the doxa — the underlying, 
normative, and unquestioned beliefs commonly held in a field that are socially constructed as the 
natural order245 — agents retain some, though still circumscribed, agency. This agency is 
referred to by Bourdieu as habitus. An agent’s habitus is a collection of durable and ingrained 
dispositions which function effectively as perception and assessment, tastes and distastes, 
sympathies and aversions.246 Such dispositions are acquired throughout life: a “primary habitus” 
developing through socialization by the family, and a “secondary habitus” built primarily on 
forms of education and on an agent’s movement through (for example, occupational) fields in 
 
243 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, translated by Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977). [Bourdieu 1977] 
244 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field” (1987) 38 Hastings LJ 814 
[Bourdieu 1987]. 
245 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, translated by Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992) 
[Bourdieu 1992] at 66, 110. 
246 Ibid at 53.  
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adulthood. The structures of conditions experienced early in development produce the structure 
of the habitus, whose structure then acts as the basis of perceiving and appreciating all 
subsequent experiences.247 In this way, the habitus is infinitely evolving — subject to 
experiences and the nomos and doxa of the field — but always within the confines of limits set 
by the historically and socially situated conditions of its initial production (the social, cultural, 
and economic capital).248  
While much of Bourdieu’s work focused on the political and economic fields — and 
through analogy is easily applied to law — he and others did demonstrate specifically how field 
theory might apply to the juridical field.249  
The juridical field and the habitus of judges 
In his analysis of the juridical field (the “Field”), Bourdieu resisted the formalist 
approach — that which asserts the absolute autonomy of the juridical form — and the 
instrumentalist approach — that which conceives of law as solely a reflection of, or a tool in the 
service of, a dominant group.250 Bourdieu looked instead between such oppositional approaches 
and concluded the Field is best understood by the social historical conditions that emerge from 
the struggles within the field of power and the habitus of juridical agents; the existence of an 
entire social universe that is otherwise ignored through focus on structure.  
The Field is a production of, on the one hand, the power relations which give it structure 
and which order the struggles between the agents within, and on the other hand, the internal 
barriers which constrain the range of possible actions and outcomes.251 The outcome of such 
confrontations leads to a social division between those on the “inside” and those on the 
“outside,” which serves to buttress the juridical normative perspective that the field of law is 
totally independent of the power relations it, in fact, sustains and legitimizes.252 In his review of 
 
247 Ibid at 54. 
248 Ibid at 55. 
249 Bourdieu used the term “juridical” in his observations of the legal field, a broader term than “judicial” meaning 
relating to judicial proceedings and the administration of the law and justice.  
250 Bourdieu 1987, supra note 244 at 815. 
251 Ibid at 816. 
252 Ibid at 817. 
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the Field, Bourdieu observed and described a number of elements that are informative for this 
review of the Canadian judiciary’s relationship with comity.   
First, the agents occupying the Field are homogenous. While the membership of judges in 
the dominant class is universally understood, class membership more generally in the Field is 
also relatively uniform; the monopoly of the legal profession allows access only to those with a 
common heritage and access to cultural, economic, and social “capital.”253 Having acquired the 
“entry ticket” to the Field, the monopoly of legal education ensures a consistency in the legal 
sources and materials available, modes of thinking, and expression and action.254 Consistency in 
thought is further ensured by the agent’s implied acceptance — through choice and entry into the 
Field — of the dominance of the Field and its ability to resolve conflicts according to the laws 
and conventions of the Field itself.255 The predictability in the law is thus shaped by the 
consistency of the Field habitus. The agreement — or nomos —among agents in the Field that 
the law provides its own foundation for determining conflict reinforces ideas that there is some 
fundamental or universal norm and, in turn, sustains the historical forms of legal reasoning that 
created such norms in the first place.256 That said, it is important to note that, within the Field, 
the struggle between agents is not equal;257 there is variation in the relative power and influence 
certain agents will have over the creation and maintenance of their version of the law. This 
version of the law, however, will continue to be strictly limited by the consistency of the legal 
habitus.  
Second, the study of a field cannot be done from an “objective” standpoint; observers are, 
and become part of, the practices they observe in that their shared observations will influence the 
field. This is true not only of the researcher studying a field, but of the agents who observe a 
 
253 Ibid at 833, 842. Capital is any resource that can produce surplus value for an agent. Bourdieu focused mainly on 
three “species” of capital: economic, social, and cultural. Economic capital includes money, investments and 
property. Social capital includes resources made available by virtue of social network. Cultural capital is the cultural 
knowledge an agent has gathered. Cultural capital may be embodied (accent, posture), objectified (art is particularly 
important), institutionalized (university degrees, awards, qualifications). Symbolic capital is not a species of capital 
but the combination of the economic, social, and cultural capital — it is the reputation (or sense of prestige or glory) 
attached to an agent. Symbolic capital is ‘misrecognized’ by society as attributable only to the agent while failing to 
attribute it to an agent’s social circumstance. A species of capital — listed above — may be specific capital. Specific 
capital is a species of capital that is valued in a particular field.   
254 Ibid at 820; see also Peer Zumbansen’s commentary on the “traditional canon” of legal education in Peer 
Zumbansen, “Transnational Law” (2008) 9 Comp Research in L & Pol Econ 738 [Zumbansen 2008] at 749. 
255 Bourdieu 1987, supra note 244 at 831. 
256 Ibid at 819, 827. 
257 Ibid at 822, 827. 
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field from within. A judge, in reviewing the history of the common law or in describing and 
analyzing a statute, does not do so from a neutral or objective place; her observations — the 
language used, the structure of analysis, the presence or absence of acknowledged doxa — 
inform the approach taken by the next observer. As Bourdieu noted, despite judges preferring the 
role of “lector, or interpreter, who takes refuge behind the appearance of a simple application of 
the law,” judges, in fact, perform work of judicial creation.258 In granting judgment, judges 
imbue the action with symbolic weight rendering it “legitimate.”259 The act of legitimizing is 
intensified through the ritual of written judgment attesting that the decision expressed “not the 
will or world-view of the judge but the will of the law or the legislature.”260 
Third, and related, the Field uses ritual and language to express and re-exert the 
legitimation of the rule of law and the work of agents within the Field. Agents use a common 
language of defined terms in arguments and in judgments that further make the Field inaccessible 
to the lay person. The “omnitemporality” of the rule of law and the use of constative verbs 
emphasize the expression of the factual — i.e. making what is objectively unknown or 
unknowable magically defined and known.261 The judgment of the court publicly proclaims 
“objective truth” and creates a vision of the world through “naming.”262 In naming, the court 
delineates and categorizes, providing actors and agents with identity; in this way, the court is 
engaged in what Bourdieu termed “worldmaking” through defining social units.263 The court is 
only able to do this where its proposed vision aligns with the pre-existing divisions of which the 
agents of the Field (of which a judge is one) are the products; in this way a “correct” definition 
of a social unit “ratifies and sanctifies” the doxic view of the already homogenous Field.264 
Last, through naming and fact-creation, the court also informs the behaviours of all social 
agents. By universalizing and authenticating its world view, it normalizes certain behaviours. By 
normalizing the behaviour that aligns with its interpretation of the “rules” — which already 
reflect the culture that creates and controls the rules — the court sanctions the effort of the 
 
258 Ibid at 823, 826. 
259 Ibid at 828. 
260 Ibid at 828, 831. 
261 Ibid at 820.  
262 Ibid at 838. 
263 Ibid. 
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dominant group to impose an official representation of its world views, which favours its 
interests, thus sustaining the dominance of such views.265 Thus ideas are normalized, passing 
from orthodoxy to doxa.266  
B: The habitus of Canadian courts 
Bourdieu’s framework, particularly that involving the idea of “field” was used as the 
foundation in an early 1990s study conducted by Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth to, for the first 
time, analyze the mechanisms, the actors, the rules, and the role of international (as in, 
transnational) commercial arbitration. In doing so, they applied what they described as a 
framework immediately common and palatable to practitioners of law — while foreign and 
uncomfortable to scholars — in order to examine anew this burgeoning field.267 While this thesis 
is far more modest than that of Dezalay and Garth, I have looked to judicial commentary, state 
action, and secondary sources to, hopefully, in similar fashion, introduce Bourdieu’s framework 
to private international law in Canada as it considers questions of forum non conveniens and 
forum of necessity, and to explore the impact of the habitus of the Canadian Field in considering 
such questions.  
A noted above, the habitus of a field is informed by the structures, nomos, and doxa of 
the field. The habitus of the Canadian Field is informed by, among other things, (a) the structures 
of federalism; (b) the doxa of the incremental movement of the common law, stare decisis, and 
judicial independence; and (c) the nomos of the state sovereignty doctrine through historical 
reference and norm signaling from the field of power. These “inputs” create a Field habitus that 
tends towards and prefers a non-interventionist, territorialist, and hyper-comity approach. This 
habitus is made visible in a number of tendencies — or “outputs” — of the Field. I will introduce 
four such tendencies as examples: (a) the reference and deference to democracies, (b) the 
reference and deference to judicial brethren, (c) the strict delineation and definition of conflicts 
rules, and (d) the quiet and narrow co-option of transnational law — a law that is designed to 
regulate the arena between sovereign states — for the benefit of only advancing comity where it 
 
265 Ibid at 846. 
266 Ibid at 848. 
267 Yves Dezalay & Bryant G Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction 
of a Transnational Legal Order (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996) at 4.  
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serves the interests of the Field, including the meta-field of power. These two elements —the 
input and output — are the subjects of the sections that follow.   
1. Inputs: elements informing habitus 
a. Federalist structures of habitus 
The habitus of agents in the Field is initially defined, and continuously reshaped, by 
Canada’s federalist foundation. Federalism has led to a varied understanding of state equality as 
agents are taught to understand state equality not only as between nation states, but also as 
between provinces. This structure naturally informs the content and further creation of conflicts 
law in Canada and may, in some cases, blind judges to the unique requirements of comity at the 
international, rather than inter-provincial, level. 
As the western concept of state sovereignty moved from its western European origins to 
the shores of America, the Hobbesian and Bodinian concepts of state and national sovereignty — 
featuring one all-powerful secular ruler — were modified to fit the post-Indigenous American 
context. With the signing of the new American constitution in the late 18th century, state 
sovereignty — specifically the question of who held the right to make and enforce law — had to 
be amended to accommodate federalism. James Madison, the American founding father and 
fourth President, emphasized in The Federalist Papers the new national government was one of 
limited and enumerated powers;268 the notion of limitation took shape not only as separation of 
powers at a given level of government but also in terms of the nation-state’s power being shared 
in a defined manner with the sovereign governments of the states through whose union the 
nation-state was created. Although differing in detail in both form and substance, Canada’s 
federalist constitution evinced a similar general conception of split sovereignty, but as between 
the national and the provincial.  
Unlike unitary states whose national governments control both the state’s public and 
private international law approaches,269 Canada’s Constitution Act, 1867, provided most (though 
 
268 Federalist papers No 45. 
269 Canada’s federalist approach is also unlike other federalist states such as Australia and the USA whose 
constitutions more specifically set out national sovereign powers to legislate and enforce on civil issues, thus 
providing constitutional jurisdiction to do the same with respect to private international law: see Joost Blom, 
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not all) powers of private law to the provinces, while the national government retained control 
over Canada’s international relationships.270 Thus, as Joost Blom recently explained, it becomes 
“logically impossible” to situate private international law in a non-constitutional space.271 As a 
result, Canadian courts deal not only with questions of “private international law” at the level of 
nation states, they also deal with “private inter-provincial law” as between the provinces; both 
streams can be dealt with compendiously under the more general denomination, “conflict of 
laws.” As will become clear, the majority of seminal cases that have set Canada’s approach to 
conflict of laws were indeed determined not on the basis of international but on the basis of inter-
provincial legal conflicts.272  
A number of these seminal decisions in the conflict of laws arena have made clear the 
different approaches to be taken to actions resulting from international events and from those that 
are inter-provincial. In 1990, Justice La Forest explained in Morguard that the underlying 
principles of private international law and comity must be adapted to the situations in which they 
were applied. There, he found that such application in the context of a federation implies a 
“fuller and more generous acceptance of the judgments of the courts of other constituent units of 
the federation.”273 The courts in one province, said Justice La Forest, should give “full faith and 
credit” to the judgments given by a court in another province provided that that other court 
exercised proper jurisdiction in the action.274 Fundamentally, he found, issues of fair process are 
not an issue within the Canadian federation.275 In coming to his conclusion in Morguard — a 
recognition and enforcement case — La Forest J cited Justice Dickson who had held for the SCC 
in Zingre that comity is based on the common interest of both the jurisdiction giving judgment 
and that enforcing it. Indeed, he stated, a recognition of comity is in the interest of the whole 
country, “an interest recognized in the Constitution itself.”276 
 
“Constitutionalizing Canadian Private International Law - 25 Years since Morguard” (2017) 13(2) J P Int’l L 259 
[Blom 2017] at 262-3.  
270 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5 [Constitution Act, 1867]; 
see for instance ss 91(10) (“navigation and shipping”), (21) (“bankruptcy and insolvency”), (22) (“patents of 
invention and discovery”), (23) (“copyrights”), (26) (“marriage and divorces”), and 91(2) (“the regulation and trade 
and commerce”).  
271 Blom 2017, supra note 269 at 261; see also Van Breda at para 21. 
272 Van Breda, supra note 21 at para 22. 
273 Morguard, supra note 33 at 1101. 
274 Ibid at 1102. Note that this term “full faith and credit” is lifted directly from the text of the US Constitution. 
275 Ibid at 1103. 
276 Ibid at 1107. 
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As noted in Chapter 1, the Constitutional status of the real and substantial connection test 
from Morguard was cemented in Hunt, in which the SCC found that “litigation engineered 
against a corporate citizen located in one province by its trading and commercial activities in 
another province should necessarily be subject to the same rules as those applicable to 
international commerce.”277 In Hunt, the real and substantial connection test was deemed 
appropriate to prevent provincial overreach and uphold Constitutional division of powers.  
However, it was not clear that the test would be applicable beyond Canadian shores. 
Indeed, in Spar Aerospace v American Mobile Satellite Corp, Justice LeBel for the SCC 
suggested in obiter that it may be necessary to afford foreign judgments different treatment than 
that given to inter-provincial judgments, wherein the latter would be subject only to a connection 
test and not to wider fairness considerations. In Spar Aerospace he stated,  
[h]owever, it is important to emphasize that Morguard and Hunt were decided in the 
context of interprovincial jurisdiction disputes. In my opinion, the specific findings of these 
decisions cannot easily be extended beyond this context. In particular, the two cases resulted 
in the enhancing or even broadening of the principles of reciprocity and speak directly to the 
context of interprovincial comity within the structure of the Canadian federation…278 
 
Two years later, in Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v 
Canadian Assn of Internet Providers, the SCC highlighted the lower status of comity in the 
international realm as compared to the inter-provincial realm; comity in federalist Canada — as 
opposed to internationally — enjoys “constitutional status.”279 Where the SCC finally did 
comment in Beals on the test’s application to the international realm, the SCC held that the real 
and substantial connection test could be applied in the international realm so long as any 
unfairness that may arise be taken into account.280 
 
277 Hunt, supra note 36 at 323.  
278 Spar Aerospace Ltd v American Mobile Satellite Corp, 2002 SCC 78 [Spar Aerospace] at para 51 [Emphasis 
added]. 
279 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn of Internet Providers, 2004 
SCC 45 at para 55. 
280 Beals, supra note 198 at para 30. In Beals, LeBel J dissented arguing that the real and substantial connection test 
should be significantly modified when applied to foreign judgments in a way that recognizes the additional hardship 
imposed on a defendant who is required to litigate in a foreign country. He argued that liberalizing the test while 
narrowing the defences to enforcement was not a coherent approach: Beals, supra note 198 at paras 134-135.  
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Such differentiation was not limited to the real and substantial connection test. In 
Tolofson — the seminal case on choice of law — La Forest J preferred application of the lex loci 
delicti rule because, among other things, the nature of Canada’s constitutional arrangements 
support a rule that is certain and that ensures an act committed in one part of the country would 
be given the same legal effect everywhere.281 Notably, in leaving open the door to a public policy 
“exception” to the rule, La Forest J stated that he predicted limited application of such an 
exception to actions that take place wholly within Canada and that any public policy problems, 
particularly between provinces, tend to disappear over time.282 In other words, the public policy 
exception was effectively limited to international actions. 
By virtue of the interprovincial trade and movement of Canadian residents, Canadian 
courts will naturally deal with far more volume of conflict of laws issues in the inter-provincial 
realm than in the international realm. As a result, the application of the fundamental conflict of 
laws principles from, for example, Morguard, Hunt, and Tolofson — three seminal cases in the 
Field — whose findings and discussion centred largely on the relationships between provinces, 
will be the norm. Through a continuous application of such principles, without thoughtful 
reference to the context of their creation, courts may begin to lose sight of the differences in the 
way in which comity and fairness apply as between inter-provincial and international cases.  
As was noted by the SCC in Morguard and Hunt, comity, as between provinces, 
recognizes the legitimacy and capability of sister provincial courts; generally speaking, the 
courts of BC can be confident parties will see justice done as equally in Ontario as in BC. For 
instance, Canadian provinces have similar, if not identical, rules of court, judges in every 
province in Canada enjoy security of tenure, and by virtue of the proliferation of law schools in 
Canada and government funding, it is generally possible for plaintiffs to find some legal 
representation.283 These factors are not necessarily present in the courts of foreign state 
jurisdictions. A judge in the Canadian Field, frequently engaging in conflict of laws issues 
 
281 Tolofson, supra note 21 at 1063, 1065. 
282 Ibid at 1054, 1059. 
283 I do not purport to suggest that access to legal representation is not an issue; indeed, there are many plaintiffs 
who proceed in Canada unrepresented or those that do not proceed at all. However, the point was simply made to 
illustrate that Canada is home to a number of law schools, legal aid exists for some types of actions (depending on 
the province), and many lawyers offer pro bono services or services on contingency bases. In other words, while the 
Canadian system needs work, it is functionally operational in a way in which the systems of many countries are not. 
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between provinces, may not be turning his or her mind to whether justice can be done in another 
provincial jurisdiction in a way that is required of international questions. Indeed, despite clearly 
delineating between conflict of laws scenarios in the early 1990s, the SCC and other courts have 
more recently readily applied the same provincially-situated tests to the international with little 
account for the difference in context.284 
For instance, in Van Breda, an international conflicts case heard in 2012, the SCC 
reviewed the constitutional history of the real and substantial connection test and focused almost 
entirely on the inter-provincial context. Indeed, even the presumptive connecting factors the SCC 
created to support the real and substantial connection test are phrased in respect of connection to 
a province.285 In the decision, there is no real discussion of how such factors may be modified in 
the international context. Further, in its application of the law to the facts of the case, there is no 
reference to the way in which the real and substantial connection test may be modified in the 
international law context, nor any reference to the “fairness” issue highlighted in Beals when 
considering an international action.286  
While the constitutional treatment of comity in Canada — grounded in the equality of 
provinces — is paralleled in the UN’s Charter regarding the equality of states, the reality is far 
from the written aspiration. Canadian courts cannot realistically assume the courts of all other 
states are equipped to see justice done. To assume as much, or, by virtue of habit, to fail to turn 
attention to issues of fairness and justice, is to be wilfully blind to that fact. It is this reality — 
the non-equality of states — that informed the decisions of the SCC in the early 1990s and 
grounded the need to take account of the differences between inter-provincial and international 
conflict of laws.   
Through the frequent interaction of provincial courts with one another — notably, 
through assessments of jurisdiction — and the continual rote naming of the appropriate tests, the 
setting that grounded the original tests is lost and the tests designed for the federalist, inter-
provincial context is normalized for all areas of conflict of laws. Thus it is through the structure 
 
284 See for instance the application of the public policy exception in Das v George Weston Limited, 2017 ONSC 
4129 [Das SC], discussed below; the application of real and substantial connection in Beals, supra note 198; the 
discussion of the constitutional underpinnings of private international law in Canada in Van Breda, supra note 21 at 
para 21. 
285 Van Breda, supra note 21 at para 90. 
286 Ibid at paras 114-117. 
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of federalism that the Field habitus is biased toward a more conservative, non-interventionist 
approach to comity and private international law. 
b. Field doxa 
Three doxa of the Field — unquestioned and effectively non-derogable assumptions — 
that are either implicitly or explicitly perpetuated by and for the Field contribute to the 
traditionalist habitus of the Field. The first is the doxa that the common law is supposed to move 
forward only incrementally lest it have unintended and radical impacts on the meta-field of 
power.287 The incremental change in the law is a fact that is so well understood that it almost 
need not be referenced. That said, the SCC has been quick to remind the Field of this doxic 
“rule,” particularly in the arena of private international law.288 The result is that we see the Field, 
unable by its doxa to effectively adapt, continuing to cite concepts of 16th century sovereignty 
and equality of states. Such references perpetuate and continuously remake the norm of 
territoriality and imbue even modern issues with dated justifications. 
A second example, and related to the incremental development of the law, is the doxa of 
stare decisis. The common law system requires that lower courts must follow and apply 
decisions of higher courts in the same jurisdiction, to the extent that the higher court has decided 
the same or a substantially similar issue. The “traditional view” is the doctrine applies only to the 
ratio decidendi.289 However, while statements made outside the “ratio,” deemed “obiter dicta,” 
are not strictly binding on lower courts, in some cases, where they are clearly meant as guidance, 
they should be accepted as authoritative.290 The approach preferred in Canada when lower courts 
are presented with differing facts on an issue already decided is to clearly provide commentary 
and facts that may assist a higher court in reconsidering the law, but not to try to change the law 
itself.291 As recently held by the SCC, “the doctrine that lower courts must follow the decisions 
of higher courts is fundamental to our legal system. It provides certainty while permitting the 
 
287 This focus on incremental movement was recently relied on by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Das v George 
Weston Limited, 2018 ONCA 1053 [Das CA] at paras 137, 144, 192, to which I will return below; also see Michael 
Chief Constable of South Wales Police, [2015] UKSC 2 at para 102. 
288 See for example, Pro Swing, supra note 161 at paras 79, 86; Van Breda, supra note 21 at para 54; and Douez v 
Facebook Inc, 2017 SCC 33 at para 36.  
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orderly development of the law in incremental steps.”292 To overcome the barrier of stare decisis, 
a lower court must be convinced a new legal issue is raised and there is a change in the 
circumstances or evidence that “fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate.”293 Stare 
decisis favours a conservative and incremental approach to the change in the common law, and 
arguably slows the adaptation of the Field to a changing world order.  
A final example is the doxa of judicial impartiality and independence. While this example 
may overlap with the “structure” of the Field, its existence is also socially constructed; judges 
today are administered and appointed through instruments we consider to have independence at 
their core – the Constitution Act, 1867,294 and the Judges Act295 — but this independence actually 
developed gradually in the Field. In the UK, judicial power was initially concentrated in the 
hands of the king and his immediate entourage (Curia Regis). Over several centuries, the UK 
saw the emergence of specialized courts and a professional judiciary. By the end of the 15th 
century, the king’s participation in judicial functions had greatly diminished, though he 
continued to exert pressure on judges who could be dismissed when they refused to bend to royal 
prerogative.296 Over time, judicial non-interference became expressed as a “constitutional” 
principle though the term “constitutional” holds a very different meaning in Britain where, unlike 
in Canada, there is, generally speaking, no written constitution.297 In Canada, the fundamental 
components of judicial independence were inspired by the British principles, but actually 
entrenched in sections 99 and 100 of the Constitution Act, 1867.298 The fact of judicial 
independence in Canada is a shared attribute among Canadian judges, thus furthering ideas that 
justice may be reasonably expected to be done in every province. This tenet, however true in 
Canada, is not the case worldwide. 
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c. Nomos of state sovereignty and norm signalling from the field of power 
Finally, the nomos of the Field — the field-specific, largely unspoken norms — inform 
the territorialist Field habitus. The nomos of state sovereignty is born of the significant history of 
western legal thought and understanding of the role of the state. As canvassed in Chapter 1, 
Bodin’s conception of the sovereign state, the Grotian addition of comity, and the subsequent 
centuries of territorial sovereignty playing the cardinal role in both public and private 
international law have remained steadfast. Such historical roots are perpetuated through the 
homogeneity and monopoly of Canadian law schools, primary and secondary sources of 
learning, and legal agents. Students of law are first exposed to a “traditional canon” — thus 
cementing the structures through which they are able to understand and apply modern concepts 
— before moving on to more complicated specializations.299 The canonical attachment to 
territoriality requires the current school of private and public international law agents to perform 
mental gymnastics to continually define and justify theoretical boundaries to match boundaries 
drawn in the physical earth (state borders). The effect is that, while international corporations 
seamlessly move around the globe, conveniently forum shopping to maximize profit, many 
respected legal scholars and judges are sidetracked and distracted by whether a court may assert 
private international law jurisdiction and upon what enumerated and normalized basis: extended 
territorial or extraterritorial, the latter subdividing further to include national, universal, 
objective, subjective jurisdiction etc. Through its focus on silos of interpretation, the Field self-
references in a continuous action of “naming” and categorizing the world of “possible” answers, 
thus repeatedly defining, identifying, and legitimizing a territorialist approach to conflict of laws. 
A second source of territorialist nomos comes from the Field’s executive and legislative 
sisters (field of power). As noted in Chapter 1, Canadian private international law rules err 
towards asserting jurisdiction where one of many connecting factors is made out (under the real 
and substantial connection tests).300 As a result, Canadian courts may arguably run the risk of 
stretching further over the extraterritorial line than their civilian counterparts. Thus, a predictable 
traditionalist reaction is to employ forum non conveniens liberally to demonstrate to the 
international community that Canada is not one to overstep her bounds. Indeed, whenever a 
 
299 Zumbansen 2008, supra note 254 at 749. 
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Canadian decision maker acts extraterritorially, it contributes to international norm setting, 
making it increasingly more acceptable for other states to do the same, and perhaps to do the 
same to the detriment of Canada’s own sovereignty.301 As a result, in some instances, we see the 
Canadian legislative and executive branches norm signalling to the Field through demonstrations 
of territorialist action. 
It appears that Canada’s neighbour to the south is particularly concerning to the Canadian 
political field. In the 20th century, the US has emerged as an outlier in taking aggressive steps to 
assert its extraterritorial jurisdiction over, for example, certain forms of crime (including 
economic conduct that is often regulated by categorizing it as crime) in a manner arguably 
inconsistent with fundamental international law principles. This was only heightened after the 
attacks of September 11, 2001, which led to, what Coughlan et al refer to as, “belligerent 
exertions of extraterritorial executive jurisdiction that were driven by the rhetoric of the ‘global 
war on terror.’”302  
In response, the Canadian political field has resisted. A first example occurred in 1985, 
when the Canadian legislative branch passed the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act 
(FEMA).303 FEMA responded to a number of United States measures passed to force disclosure 
of documents from Canadian companies or to issue judgments against same in certain 
circumstances including a company’s restrictive business practices, export controls, securities 
measures, and bankruptcy and insolvency. The Minister of Justice at the time, the Honourable 
John Crosbie, explained to Parliament in introducing the bill, that FEMA would give the 
Canadian government (and presumably Canadian courts), the “muscle” to defend Canadian 
sovereignty.304 FEMA was further amended in 1996 to respond to the US Helms-Burton Act, 
which penalized non-US businesses for dealing in property that was expropriated from 
Americans in Cuba.305 The Canadian government responded by adding sections 7.1 and 8.1 to 
FEMA which, unlike the rest of FEMA, calls out the American government by stating that any 
judgment made under, specifically, the Helms-Burton Act, would be unenforceable in Canada.  
 
301 Coughlan 2014, supra note 18 at 139. 
302 Ibid at 77. 
303 Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, RSC 1985, c F-29 at ss 3, 5, 8, 9.  
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Even where the US has taken steps that are arguably well within their own jurisdiction, 
the Canadian political field’s response has been aggressively insular. For instance, in 2003 
Canada tried to intervene on the part of a Canadian oil and gas company, Talisman Energy Inc, 
which faced a civil suit in the United States for alleged wrongdoing in the Sudan. Talisman was 
accused of cooperating with the government of the Sudan through the provision of oil revenue 
that government relied on to fund its military effort in the Second Sudanese Civil War. More 
specifically, the government of the Sudan was accused of a number of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, for which Talisman was accused of, effectively, aiding and abetting (for 
example, by providing airfield access for the Sudan’s military). The Presbyterian Church of 
Sudan sued Talisman in the US pursuant to the American Alien Tort Claims Act arguing the US 
had jurisdiction by virtue of Talisman’s breach of international law.306 On a motion to dismiss on 
the basis of forum non conveniens, among other motions brought by Talisman, the Canadian 
government sent the US Court a letter alleging the Court was violating traditional restraints on its 
exercise of territorial jurisdiction.307  
Contrary to Canada’s insistence, Judge Schwartz of the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York found Talisman, as a corporation, was capable of violating the law of 
nations, the plaintiffs had adequately pled breaches of the law of nations on the part of the 
government of the Sudan, and a substantial degree of cooperation between Talisman and the 
Sudan made clear the Sudan was not an adequate alternative forum. While not deciding it — as 
the plaintiffs had not questioned the adequacy of Canada as an alternative forum — the US Court 
questioned whether Canada would be an adequate forum. First, Canada presumptively applies the 
law of the place of injury (lex loci delicti) — which would not result in increased fairness 
compared with the trial proceeding in the Sudan — and Canada does not allow a cause of action 
for violations of the law of nations itself — as differentiated from common law torts of battery, 
assault, false imprisonment, and so on — which failed to recognize the gravity of the plaintiffs’ 
 
306 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 USC s 1350 
307 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy Inc, 244 F Supp 2d 289 (SDNY 2003), aff’d 374 F Supp 2d 
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allegations. Whether or not Canada was an adequate forum, the judge found the US, namely that 
Southern District of New York located in New York City, to be the forum conveniens.308  
Canada’s sensitivity to the shadow of American legislative and judicial reach is clearly 
evident in the actions of its legislative and executive bodies. As a result, it is likely this message 
has seeped into the nomos of the Field as a resounding and perpetual chorus: “we do not give 
them an opening.” 
The federalist structure; the doxa of judicial independence, incremental advancement of 
the common law, and stare decisis; and the nomos of state sovereignty through historical 
reference and modern executive signalling — all of these elements combine to inform, 
perpetuate, and ground the Field habitus of territorialism and non-intervention. This habitus and 
its impact on transnational litigation can be spotted in the language of judicial decisions and the 
tendencies of Canadian courts in such actions. What follows are some examples of such 
indicators. 
2. Output: evidence of the Field habitus 
a. Comity towards democracies 
As noted above, state sovereignty is supported by the public international law concept of 
equality of states. This concept was born of Western Europe at a time when “legitimate” nation 
states — and those to be afforded “equality” — were few and other “uncivilized” regions were 
under colonized control of the former. At the time, it may have followed that equality of states 
was a real and manageable concept. Today, with over 200 nation states “recognized” by the 
United Nations — many of which are former colonies of those early select few — featuring 
wildly variable geographies, government structures, economic power, and access to military 
defence, it is charming to suggest the “equality” of states remains more than, at best, aspirational, 
and more likely, a relic.309 
 
308 The Court eventually granted Talisman summary judgment on the basis the plaintiffs had been unable to establish 
Talisman’s purposeful complicity in the human rights abuses suffered: Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman 
Energy Inc, 453 F Supp 2d 633 (SDNY 2006), aff’d 582 F3d 244 (2d Cir 2009). 
309 See Robert H Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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In what appears to be a very mild adaptation to this “reality,” we see the Field adapt 
territorialist sovereignty concepts through reference to “democracies” or states with “similar 
values” rather than simply nation states. This modification is clear in Van Breda; one of the 
guiding principles the SCC introduced to use in adding any new presumptive connecting factor 
for asserting jurisdiction on the basis of real and substantial connection is the treatment of that 
factor in the private international law of other legal systems “with a shared commitment to order, 
fairness, and comity.”310 Indeed, this approach echoes with what is “internationally recognized” 
by the International Court of Justice as key sources of international law, namely: “general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”311 Unfortunately reference to democracies or 
those states that share similar “commitments” appears to be a low bar — once a nation state is 
“defined” as a democracy, the Canadian courts appear to revert to traditional notions of non-
interference-based comity lest they offend Canada’s “democratic” sisters. 
A clear example is provided by the 2008 determination of the Federal Court in the 
Afghan Detainees case.312 The applicants in that case launched a judicial review of the decision 
of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to transfer Afghan detainees to Afghan government 
prisons. The fundamental question in that case was whether the Charter applied to the actions of 
the CAF when operating abroad. To solve this issue, the parties agreed to bring a motion to 
determine that legal question alone. Evidence was presented that when CAF personnel 
apprehended Afghan citizens, they could temporarily hold them before transferring them to 
Afghan custody. Before transferring a detainee, the Commander Joint Task Force Afghanistan 
had to be satisfied there were no substantial grounds for believing that there existed a real risk 
that the detainee would be in danger of being tortured or suffering other forms of mistreatment at 
the hands of the Afghan authorities.313 To follow up on detainee transfers, the CAF formed 
agreements with the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission which agreed to monitor 
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the condition of transferred detainees.314 In November 2007, the CAF decided to suspend the 
transfer of detainees as a result of a credible allegation of mistreatment of detainees.315  
In determining the Charter would not be available to the detainees, the Court reviewed 
Justice LeBel’s decision in Hape, and several foreign judgments — although the Court’s 
interpretation of Hape formed the foundation of the Court’s analysis and ruling. The motions 
judge thus tried to apply the principles from Hape — collectively understood by all parties to be 
the governing law — to a fact situation that significantly differed from that in Hape.  
The first evidence of the judge’s territorialist approach to comity is evident in the judge’s 
treatment of “consent.” Recall, in Hape, Justice LeBel noted that the Charter would not apply to 
the actions of Canadian agents operating in a foreign territory absent (1) consent of the foreign 
territory or (2) some other basis under international law.316 It was clear from the numerous bi-
lateral and international agreements signed by the CAF and Afghan government that the Afghan 
government had not provided clear written consent for the application of the Charter to its 
territory. However, the applicants argued the consent test should not be applied strictly in the 
case of Canada exercising military functions.317 In support of their argument, the applicants 
relied on examples of previous CAF deployment to territories where it would have been unclear 
whether the host government would be able to consent: namely, deployments to Somalia and 
Yugoslavia. The argument a host government could not consent was deemed a legal exception 
for “effective military control.” The motions judge first distinguished Somalia and Yugoslavia 
on the basis the Afghan government was an “internationally recognized, democratically elected 
government.”318 Second, the motions judge analyzed a series of UK and European Court of 
Human Rights cases319 in which courts had determined jurisdiction in the context of military 
operations. As admitted by the motions judge, the decisions were variable,320 some extending 
 
314 Ibid at para 69. 
315 Ibid at para 76. This suspension was eventually lifted while the decision of the Court was under reserve: Ibid at 
para 99. 
316 Hape, supra note 105 at para 65. 
317 Afghan Detainees FC, supra note 312 at paras 187-203. 
318 Ibid at paras 40, 206. 
319 Issa and Others v Turkey, Application No 31821/96, judgment dated 16 November 2004 (ECHR); Al-Skeini and 
others v Secretary of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 26; Bankovic and Others v Belgium and 16 Other 
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320 Afghan Detainees FC, supra note 312 at para 332. 
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jurisdiction of a home nation into the territory of another, and in others taking a more 
conservative approach. In this variable context, and in applying Hape to the fact pattern at bar, 
the motions judge chose to apply the more conservative approach.  
In these determinations, the Court took up a blind adherence to territorialist applications 
of comity and equality of states. First, the Court, through “defining” the government of 
Afghanistan as an “internationally recognized democracy” secured that nation state among those 
deserving of “equal status” and thus whose sovereignty is unencroachable but for exceptional 
circumstances. This was done despite clear evidence that the Afghan government was torturing 
detainees — a clear breach of jus cogens and arguably not a characteristic, or, at least, not an 
accepted characteristic321 – of “recognized democracies.” Second, the Court’s novel 
interpretation of Hape’s “consent” standard errs towards a conservative approach, despite there 
being room to manoeuvre, i.e. LeBel J’s open reference to exception on international bases.  
This territorialist approach is starker given the Court’s conclusory comments. The 
motions judge concluded by outlining some of the concerns that flow from “the Court’s 
findings.”322 Such concerns included: (1) the fact that the content and scope of international 
human rights are more limited and less likely enforceable than Charter rights; (2) the impact of 
non-enforcement as a reflection of the “serious concerns” raised with respect to the treatment of 
detainees; and (3) the fact that, while Canada can prosecute its CAF personnel after the fact if 
they have engaged in mistreatment of detainees, a constitutional instrument (the Charter) 
designed to prevent such abuse will not apply.323 Nevertheless, the Court concluded its hands 
were tied by the narrow reach of Hape. In doing so, the Court clearly leaned heavily on its 
obligation to stare decisis. The Court engaged in its own fact-finding that led to a determination 
that neither the law nor the facts at bar differed enough from those of Hape to warrant a 
departure from the earlier case – notwithstanding that, as noted above, such a finding would not 
 
321 See, however, research highlighting the apparent hypocrisy of powerful states preaching against torture but then 
engaging in it themselves: Omar Sabry, “Torture of Afghan Detainees: Canada’s Alleged Complicity and the Need 
for a Public Inquiry” in Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (September 2015) online: 
<https://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%20Office/2015/09/Torture_of_
Afghan_Detainees.pdf> at 28-43; Ian Cobain, Cruel Britannia: A Secret History of Torture (London: Portobello 
Books, 2012); Mohamedou Ould Slahi, Guantanamo Diary, ed by Larry Siems (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 2015). 
322 Afghan Detainees FC, supra note 312 at para 336 [Emphasis added]. The judge’s use of the third person — “the 
Court” — suggests an analysis devoid of personal accountability.  
323 Ibid at paras 336-340. 
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even have been needed, given the “international bases” exception to the narrow test defined by 
the Hape Court. On a positive note, the motions judge found it was not leaving the detainees in 
“no-man’s land” because — seemingly unaware of the conclusion in Bouzari that a court cannot 
expect a torture victim to seek redress in the state by which they were tortured — the detainees 
may still exercise their Afghan constitutional rights and international human rights — those that 
by this Court’s admission may not be effective — in Afghanistan.324  
Similar deference to democracies by Canadian courts — as used to either reject 
jurisdiction (forum of necessity) or to choose not to keep jurisdiction (forum non conveniens) –  
are found across a spectrum running from Italy325 to Israel326 to Guyana.327 While not always 
clear on its face (as with respect to the language used to describe Italy’s “long legal tradition”), 
the deference to legitimate statehood is clear through the Field’s choice to dismiss clear evidence 
suggesting otherwise. For instance, in the case of Israel, a Québec court, despite clear evidence 
to the contrary, suggested not that the state clearly did allow elements of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention to be applied in its courts in relation to harms on the West Bank but that, if it did not 
Israeli courts would probably (if given the chance by the Canadian judge) acknowledge elements 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention, thus creating no injustice for plaintiffs.328 In the case of 
Guyana, the court ignored evidence that that state’s movement toward democracy and rule of law 
had been slow and halting, and instead chose to contrast the current system with the fact there 
had been a dictatorship — a contrast that makes even the feeblest of democracies look deserving 
of full respect.329  
It is important to note that in highlighting this democratic-deference some academics are 
met with arguments that to suggest states are unequal and unequally able to provide justice to 
victims of harm — particularly harm caused by multinational corporations — is to take an 
 
324 Ibid at para 343; the applicants appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal and their appeal was denied. That Court 
found the motions judge had not erred in her interpretation of Hape and that the recent release of the SCC’s 2008 
decision in Khadr had not changed the analysis: Afghan Detainees FCA, supra note 166. Leave to appeal to the SCC 
was denied: [2009] SCCA No 63. 
325 “…lorsque l'on connaît la longue tradition juridique de l'Italie et son rôle comme source de bien des éléments des 
droits occidentaux.” [since we know Italy’s long legal tradition and its role as the source of many elements of 
Western law.]: Lamborghini, supra note 100 at para 49. 
326 Bil’In (Village Council) v Green Park International Inc, 2009 QCCS 4151 [Green Park SC]; Green Park CA, 
supra note 83. 
327 Cambior, supra note 83.  
328 Green Park CA, supra note 83 at para 79. 
329 Cambior, supra note 83 at para 73. 
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imperialist perspective.330 This corrupted “angel colonizer” argument is favoured among those 
preferring the conservative approach to comity, resulting in shielding traditional notions of state 
equality and non-interference from critique. While pretending to promote the “equal rights of 
decolonized states” the defender of such arguments actually promotes conveyors of harm to be 
under-penalized for such harms by ignoring the reality of state-state and state-corporate power 
dynamics. As Sundhya Pahuja describes in Decolonizing International Law, the transition from 
formerly colonized nations to players at the table of the international community was done under 
the rubric of Western liberalism, human rights, and democracy;331 the emergence of newly 
formed nations and radical decolonization at the formal level has outpaced the reality of power 
and of traditional notions of comity.332 Indeed, while “equality of states” is a foundational 
principle of public international law, the reality is that “third world” states have never 
experienced sovereign equality among states, let alone environmental or human rights 
sovereignty within their own borders.333 While I do not propose to engage in an extensive review 
of legal legacies of colonization — many others have laudably and effectively taken on this 
task334 — one example of the stark application of this “non-imperialist” approach is Judge 
Keenan’s dismissal of the Bhopal action.335 While it is not a Canadian example, one can see very 
similar values reflected in the Afghan Detainees judgment. In the Bhopal case, Judge Keenan 
determined that to assert jurisdiction — even where the Indian state asked him to do so — would 
constitute “another form of imperialism.” He even ended his judgment by claiming he was 
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giving judges in this sister democracy a chance to “stand tall.”336 However, as Upendra Baxi 
effectively argues, those that support such a determination remain wilfully blind to the reality 
that were the Bhopal action to have gone ahead in India — rather than settle, as it did — Union 
Carbide (the defendant in that case) would have been subject to strict multinational enterprise 
liability rules — which Judge Keenan was aware of — thus resulting in a decision that likely 
would not have ever been enforced in the United States against Union Carbide’s assets on the 
basis that such strict liability law is “against US public policy.”337 In other words, in refusing to 
assert jurisdiction — allegedly on the basis of avoiding modern imperialism — the court would 
then very likely have rejected recognition and enforcement of an Indian judgment on the basis 
such a judgment was “repugnant,”338 thus engaging in the very imperialism it sought to “avoid” 
in the first place.  
Modern reference to “democratic” states and the use of imperialist avoidance as a 
shield339 promotes traditional notions of non-interference and comity through identifying de jure 
or official norms to which the existence of states and their exercise of jurisdiction is compared at 
a theoretical, rather than practical, level. In official recognition of the “democracy” of states, 
through the ceremony of judgment writing, Canadian judges engage in fact-making that doesn’t 
necessarily align with the reality on the ground. The act of doing so grounds their legal logic, 
promotes the doxa that justice may equally be done in every democracy, and effectively serves to 
advance/protect the interests of the Field and the interests of the field of power.  
 
 
336 Re Union Carbide Corp Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December 1984, 634 F Supp 842 (SDNY 1986), 
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b. Comity towards judicial brethren and their “legitimate judicial acts” 
In her piece, “International Law in a World of Liberal States,” Anne-Marie Slaughter 
reimagines international law as it would adapt to a world recognizing distinctions among 
different states based on their domestic political structure and ideology.340 She imagines that in 
such a construct, courts in liberal states would recognize each other as like units dedicated to the 
same underpinning of rule of law, impartiality, and independence.341 I suggest that today, such 
assumptions are already made by the Field and that this is clear in the judgments of the Canadian 
judiciary in human rights conflicts law.  
As noted, judges — by virtue of their shared economic, cultural, and social capital — are 
largely “cut from the same cloth.” While, as described above, Canadian courts can be seen to 
tailor the traditional notions of state equality to account primarily for states that are “like us” or 
are “internationally recognized democracies” that are engaged in “legitimate judicial acts”342 — 
despite what may be true in reality — written judgments make clear that above all else, judges 
will protect their judicial brethren, generally with the result of deferring to such brethren.  
Where counsel for plaintiffs have suggested that the judiciary of a foreign state is 
wanting, either in training or independence, the response from the Field can be informative. A 
first example is drawn from a judgment related to whether the courts of Guyana could provide 
justice to plaintiffs alleging harm done by a catastrophic effluent spill caused by the Québec-
based Cambior Inc. On the issue of interests of justice, the Court heard expert evidence from 
William Schabas, a leading professor and expert in international human rights law who was then 
a professor of law and head of the department of law at the Université du Québec à Montréal.343 
Professor Schabas visited Guyana to conduct interviews and observe the court systems. He 
provided the Québec Court with adverse conclusions related to the willingness and capacity of 
the Guyanese judiciary to deliver justice for the plaintiffs. The Court, seemingly finding the 
intrusion of an international human rights lawyer “presumptuous,”344 reduced and characterized 
Professor Schabas’ testimony in flagrantly dismissive terms: “Professor Schabas…would have 
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the court believe that Guyana is little more than a judicial backwater…”345 While the Court 
recognized the professor’s expertise, it dismissed his evidence as being based on “secondary 
sources” rather than his own experience.346 
In contrast, the Court much preferred the testimony of three former Guyanese judges and 
a former judge of the Québec Court of Appeal, all of whom testified to the independence and 
integrity of the Guyanese judiciary. The Court wrote it was “particularly impressed with the 
quality of [one of the Guyanese judge’s] evidence. To say the least, his legal credentials are 
beyond dispute.”347 One of the former Guyanese judges even testified that the judiciary had 
always been independent, even under dictatorial rule.348 It is certainly the prerogative of a trial 
judge to admit and weigh evidence before her and determine which she prefers. However, in this 
case, the weight provided to the Québec Court of Appeal justice witness — who had, like 
Professor Schabas, only briefly visited Guyana and learned about the judiciary second hand — 
and the weight provided to witness judges whose testimony regarding independence was 
questionable on its face, suggests the Québec Superior Court justice could not fathom impugning 
his brethren judges, particularly those of a “sister democracy.”349 
Similar commentary can be found in the recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court in 
Das v George Weston Ltd, to whose facts I will return below.350 In response to the plaintiffs’ 
suggestion that the judges of Bangladesh could not handle what would be an extremely 
complicated and significant personal injury case against a multinational corporation, the Court 
responded, “I need not dignify this argument and the one that follows, which insults the courts 
and judges of Bangladesh, with an elaborate analysis...”351 The Court then engaged several 
paragraphs vigorously responding to the plaintiff’s argument that the tort law of Bangladesh was 
at a somewhat nascent stage of development, noting the plaintiffs’ argument was “patently 
incorrect,” that the “bench and the bar in Bangladesh are well-educated,”352 and that the 
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plaintiff’s argument was “somewhat insulting.”353  
This charged response by the Court in Das is reflective of the judgment of Judge Keenan 
in the Bhopal decision in the US. While, as noted above, India urged that Court to take 
jurisdiction over the actions of an American corporate national — whose headquarters lay down 
the street from the Court — Judge Keenan held he would “defer to the adequacy and ability of 
the courts of India,” that the Indian government insulted its judiciary by taking such a position, 
and that, as noted in the last section, this was an opportunity for the courts of India to “stand tall 
before the world and to pass judgment on behalf of its own people.”354  
In some cases, like in Tahoe and Nevsun discussed in Chapter 1, where we have seen a 
Canadian court hold that there was a real likelihood justice would not be done, we see paired 
commentary regarding the poor treatment judges in those countries have undergone, perhaps 
suggesting in some cases the support of poorly-treated judicial brethren may be a factor for 
consideration. For instance, in Nevsun, evidence was presented — and accepted as persuasive — 
from a former judge of Eritrea who had been expelled from the judiciary after he was 
imprisoned. He testified that the government had closed the only law school, the only lawyers 
being issued a licence were conscripts from a new law department who are assigned by the 
government to their work placements, and that many judges and lawyers had fled the country.355 
In Tahoe, the BC Court of Appeal noted judges in Guatemala did not have security of tenure and 
judges who make unpopular decisions may be subject to disciplinary proceedings and subsequent 
sanctions.356 In both cases, evidence was presented that the foreign state was extremely 
supportive of international industry for largely financial reasons. It may, thus, be fair to say that 
one factor that appears to be persuasive to the Canadian Field is the importance of respect for a 
foreign judiciary and the support a Canadian court may be able to show such foreign brethren, 
whether that support is in favour of the foreign court exercising its power or, by punishing — 
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through asserting jurisdiction and thereby potentially impacting the economic incentives 
multinational companies have to stay in the foreign state — the foreign state actors.   
Most commonly, through the use of language, Canadian justices are signalling — norm-
making — to the rest of the Field that while they may readily leave plaintiffs without any real 
remedy, they will be hesitant to entertain any suggestion their judicial brothers are lesser or 
unable. In doing so, such judges create an awkwardness between their adherence to traditional 
norms and judicial unity, and the language of the jurisdiction tests they created. For instance, 
rather than focusing inwardly on whether Canada is an inappropriate jurisdiction for the purposes 
of the forum non conveniens test, as Australia and the US do, the test in Canada is outward 
looking; the test asks whether another jurisdiction is clearly more appropriate taking into account 
issues such as justice and unfairness. It is structured as a presumption that Canadian courts 
should keep jurisdiction. By its very nature, the test for forum non conveniens forces judges in 
Canada to fairly evaluate the ability of their judicial brethren.357 The same is true in determining 
whether a court should take jurisdiction under forum of necessity. It is thus, perhaps for this 
reason, that in Canada we see a disconnect between what the tests for forum non conveniens and 
forum of necessity actually require in law, and how they are being applied by a number of lower-
court judges (Bil’In (Village Council) v Green Park International Inc, Tahoe, Cambior, and Das) 
and supported by courts of appeal in Québec and Ontario (Green Park, Das, Cambior) in 
contrast to BC (Tahoe) with excessive comity to perceived equals.  
c. Adherence to habitus through further delineation and traditional definition 
The adherence to a territorialist and traditional approach to private international law — to 
further the “logic” of the Field — in a world that no longer reflects that in which such notions 
were born often requires internal inconsistency in naming/defining, wilful blindness to the global 
reality of statehood and sovereignty, and strict practice of delineation (or isolating) of traditional 
norms to re-trench traditional values. Such judicial tendencies are clear in the language of 
Canadian jurisprudence.  
 
357 Schultz and Mitchenson note that this very issue makes the “inward” focused test less of an issue with respect to 
international comity as judges in Australia need not comment on a foreign court’s ability to ensure justice is done: 
Schultz & Mitchenson 2016, supra note 109 at 368. 
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As a first example, we see internal inconsistency in defining thresholds for jurisdiction 
and identifying the goals of assertion of jurisdiction. For instance, LeBel J inconsistently 
interpreted the term “exceptional” in the contexts of forum of necessity and forum non 
conveniens. Recall, with respect to the former, he described in Lamborghini the term 
“exceptional” as requiring “near absolute legal or practical impossibility.”358 Meanwhile, when 
defining the “exceptional circumstances” in which a claim will be stayed for forum non 
conveniens, he describes exceptional as being akin to “clearly” — an obviously lower 
standard.359 Only in an arena where non-intervention and comity are non-derogable does this 
kind of distinction make sense; where the presumption is non-intervention (necessity) it is easy 
for a judge to extend deference and refuse jurisdiction; and where the presumption is 
intervention, reversing the presumption is made easier. A further inconsistency is evident in 
Kazemi Estate v Islamic Republic of Iran360 (reviewed in detail below), in which the Court 
repeatedly refers to the “purposes” of the subject legislation to support its interpretation, despite 
there being no purpose section in that legislation and no official legislative purpose from any 
other source cited by the Court.361  
A second example of the promotion of traditional definitions demonstrates the arbitrary 
adherence to comity based on equality and exceptional nature of states. Since the 1700s, the 
concept of territorial sovereignty and of the state as the ultimate source of power has suffered 
significant restriction through the rise of international organizations.  
First, through membership in various organizations such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), for example, states voluntarily give up bundles of state sovereignty 
rights, allowing such institutions to prescribe and even enforce legal rules against member states. 
The same is true with respect to treaties and agreements made between states including mutual 
legal assistance treaties and trade agreements. While one could argue that in treaty organization 
contexts the state has always maintained the power to opt in (or out), thus preserving its 
sovereignty, the existence and enforcement of customary international law and jus cogens — 
 
358 Lamborghini, supra note 100 at para 45. 
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norms whose violations by a state could impact its sovereignty — poses a direct challenge to the 
Bodian concept of state sovereignty as a cardinal legal principle.  
Second, further to the reality of “developed” state sovereignty being progressively 
infringed, it is arguable that state sovereignty as it applies to the “third world” has never been a 
reality – or at least not a comparable reality to that of more politically, historically, and 
economically privileged states.362 As noted above, the aspirational equality of states as imagined 
by the UN in its originating Constitution has never substantially reflected reality. In post-colonial 
world governance, while formerly colonized states have a de jure “seat at the table,” the reality is 
far from one of equality.  
Finally, rigid adherence to traditional notions of the state as the only source of power 
ignores the reality that the economic and political power of many multinational corporations far 
exceeds that of a significant number of states. Equally important is the advancement, in public 
international law, towards more and more robust recognition of individuals363 — not just states 
— as legitimate players, particularly in the realm of human rights.364 Thus to reserve attention 
only for the actions and the dynamic between states — arguably even if those states were equal, 
which they are not — while not recognizing the lessening of the role of the state is to be wilfully 
blind to the burgeoning group of non-state actors at play. This adherence to the domination of 
states is clear not through the presence of judicial language, but in its absence. While the SCC 
frequently remarks on the equality of states and state sovereignty, it does not do so in reference 
to other international non-state players.  
 
362 Seck 2011, supra note 330 at 188.  
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treaties that allow foreign companies extra protection from states while doing nothing to protect human individuals 
from the harms caused by those corporate individuals): Craig Scott, “Multinational Enterprises and Emergent 
Jurisprudence on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” in A Eide et al, eds, Economic, Social and 
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UNGA, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, UNTS vol 993 p 3; UDHR, supra 
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 A clear example of the mismatch between traditional sovereign equality and the factual 
reality is clear in the discussion of state sovereignty in Hape. While recognizing there has been 
some incursions into state sovereignty — notably through customary international law — Justice 
LeBel concludes “the sovereignty principle remains one of the organizing principles of the 
relationship between independent states.”365 That the Court then acknowledges that not all states 
are in fact equal,366 this fact does not appear to moderate or dissuade the Court’s interest in 
preserving sovereign equality as a “cornerstone of the international legal system.”367 
A third example of defining and delineating traditional norms is evident from those 
juridical decision makers who hesitantly accept a need for a reality frame of global state-
corporate-individual dynamics, comity, and non-interference through the application of 
international law in/by Canada. There, however, traditional notions are still preserved through 
the apparent need to delineate between permissive and prohibitive/mandatory rules. While the 
prohibitive/permissive debate has long been described,368 it may today be understood as two 
dichotomies: first, with respect to the international application of Canadian domestic law, 
permissive as non-binding and prohibitive as binding; and second, with respect to the application 
of international law in Canada, permissive as requiring a state to act to provide some good or 
service and prohibitive as a state preventing negative interference with a protected population. In 
either case, the reliance on such formalistic delineations provides an “out” for Canadian judges 
aware of modern international dynamics and the need for a transnational application of the law, 
but still resistant to interference in or by foreign states.  
In the first case — the application of Canadian norms outside of Canada — the traditional 
understanding is that permissive — “may” — rules are favourable to prohibitive — 
“must”/“will” — rules, which are odious and have extra-territorial effect only when clearly 
stated or accepted by a foreign state.369 This dichotomy has appeared influential in cases 
involving the extra-territorial application of the Canadian Charter. As we saw in Hape and in 
 
365 Hape, supra note 105 at para 43. 
366 Ibid at para 44. 
367 Ibid at para 45. 
368 Seck 2011, supra note 330 at 169. Note: I use prohibitive and mandatory interchangeably to reflect the 
command-like nature of the rule described. 
369 Yntema’s description of 14th century concepts of domestic statutes as “permissive” — favourable — and 
“prohibitive” — odious: Yntema 1966, supra note 113 at 14.   
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Afghan Detainees, the courts looked for clear acceptance of the application of not just Canadian 
norms but specifically the Charter. In those cases, the courts, failing to find such crystal-clear 
instruction (despite each case involving significant coordination and cooperation between states), 
held back the application of the Charter to the detriment of the vulnerable plaintiffs.370  
Where international norms are delineated on the permissive/prohibitive dichotomy 
invoking the action required/action prevented interpretation, and where international rules are 
customary, courts are significantly more likely to read prohibitive rules (do not commit 
genocide) as binding or informative to Canadian courts (through adoption) than permissive rules 
(provide victims of torture with remedies) which require transformation.371 With such 
distinction, it thus becomes important for Canadian courts to properly delineate between which 
international norms are prohibitive and which are permissive. As an example, Justice Lebel in 
Kazemi held in obiter that should an exception to state immunity for acts of torture have become 
customary international law, such a rule “could likely be permissive — and not mandatory — 
thereby, requiring legislative action to become Canadian law.”372 Holding that permissive 
principles may only be “informative” without transformation — read optional and ignorable373 
— avoids any offence to state sovereignty and are thus preferable. Indeed, while international 
human rights treaties and conventions saw an increase in “reference” at the turn of the 21st 
century in Canada,374 such reference was restrained, described as informative or helpful for 
interpretation, but not used to ground decision-making.375 In other words, international human 
rights norms are more frequently defined as permissive rather than prohibitive; while they may 
provide some “guidance” for the court – imbuing the court with a modernist veil – such norms 
will not be defined as prohibitive such that they would form the basis for asserting jurisdiction in 
a private international law tort claim, lest comity be offended.  
 
370 Hape, supra note 105 at paras 115-118; Afghan Detainees FC, supra note 312 at paras 151-184. 
371 Hape, supra note 105 at 314; Louis LeBel & Gloria Chao, “The Rise of International Law in Canadian 
Constitutional Litigation: Fugue or Fusion?  Recent Developments and Challenges in Internalizing International 
Law” (2002), 16 Sup Ct L Rev: Osgoode’s Annul Const’l Cases Conf 23 [LeBel & Chao 2002] at 34; Kazemi, supra 
note 360 at para 61; R v Finta, [1994] 1 SCR 701 [Finta] at 729. 
372 Kazemi, supra note 360 at para 61. 
373 Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J Toope, “A Hesitant Embrace: The Application of International Law by Canadian 
Courts” (2002) 40 Can YB Int’l L 3 [Brunnée & Toope 2002] at 9. 
374 See for instance LeBel & Chao 2002, supra note 371 in reference to Finta, supra note 371, Baker, supra note 
177, Burns, supra note 164, and Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1.  
375 Brunnée & Toope 2002, supra note 373 at 4-5 (in response to and in partial critique of LeBel & Chao 2002). 
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In the foregoing examples, we see Canadian courts marching faithfully to the beat of the 
traditional territoriality drum. They define silos or categories of sovereignty and territoriality 
narrowly, and sometimes inconsistently. In finding it necessary to delineate between permissive 
and prohibitive applications of domestic and international norms, Canadian courts ground 
modern interpretations in traditional views of sovereignty: a state must be allowed to control —
to accept or reject — norms before they are applied. In other words, even where the Field can be 
seen to dabble in international human rights norms, as they impact and interact with Canadian 
law, the Field still finds a way to restrict such human rights norms. Where some courts have 
demonstrated some limited flexibility they remaining restrained, the realm of possible options 
being limited by the doxa of the Field. 
d. Stunted application of lex mercatoria and jus gentium 
Even if we are to accept that an approach to law that is incremental and — sometimes 
blindly — self-re-enforcing is “desirable” or at the very least, not problematic, what we see is 
that often only the structures and norms of private international law that support a siloed world 
for human individuals  — rather than corporations — are perpetuated. What is ignored, to the 
detriment of individual human rights, is the significant history of “the law of nations” and “law 
merchant” that have equally historic claims to legitimacy as does state sovereignty.376  
In Blackstone’s Commentaries, published in 1769, Sir William Blackstone states:  
[a]s it is impossible for the whole race of mankind to be united in one great society, 
they must necessarily divide into many; and form separate states, commonwealths, and 
nations; entirely independent of each other, and yet liable to a mutual intercourse. Hence 
arises a third kind of law to regulate this mutual intercourse, called “the law of ‘nations;’” 
which, as none of these states will acknowledge a superiority in the other, cannot be 
dictated by either; but depends entirely upon the rules of natural law, or upon mutual 
compacts, treaties, leagues, and agreements between these several communities: in the 
construction also of which compacts we have no other rule to resort to, but the law of 
nature; being the only one to which both communities are equally subject: and therefore 
the civil law very justly observes, that quod naturalis ratio inter omnes hominess conftituit, 
vocatur jus gentium [that which natural reason has established among all men is called the 
law of nations].377   
 
376 Wai 2001b, supra note 240 at 166-7. 
377 Blackstone, supra note 296 at 47. 
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A subset of the law of nations is the law merchant, lex mercatoria, a specialized set of 
norms meant to ease the burdens of inter-state transactions and to benefit international trade.378 
This systems of norms, like comity, was a reaction to the delineation of states and the impact 
such structure had on inherently non-siloed activities. Importantly, lex mercatoria incorporated a 
version of state comity to the extent that comity – here, a nation’s desire to enhance its economic 
and legal sovereignty – is established and maintained through the promotion of a co-operative 
legal system that supported the economic interests of participating nation states. In other words, 
comity is realized not only through territorialist sovereignty, but also through cooperation.  
Following World War II, commercial lawyers began a revival of a “borderless, universal 
trade law of nations.”379 In the 1950s, Philip Jessup, the American jurist and scholar, famously 
proposed a revisiting of the informal, unofficial lex mercatoria of medieval merchants — the law 
that regulated actions that transcended national frontiers — which he proposed referring to as 
part of or a core example of  “transnational law.”380 Such law would challenge the delineations 
of private and public international law, bringing to light the vulnerability of “official” and state-
state-based law and regulatory governance.381 According to Jessup, the problem in applying 
international law lay not in fact, but “in the minds of men,” a problem to be solved through 
creating better understanding in law students, legal practitioners, and the judiciary.382 
Today, transnational law has, as Peer Zumbansen suggests, “both a destructive and 
constructive thrust. It is employed to destroy, erode and relativize the view that states alone are 
relevant actors in border-crossing activity.”383 Many scholars, concerned with human rights and 
environmental issues, and who have in their sights multinational corporations, have argued that 
 
378 Defined as: “in mercantile questions, such as bills of exchange and the like...the law merchant, which is a branch 
of the law of nations, is regularly and consistently adhered to.” Blackstone, supra note at 67. 
379 Zumbansen 2008, supra note 254 at 740; Scott 2001a, supra note 15 at 52. 
380 Philip C Jessup, Transnational Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950) [Jessup 1950] at 3-5; Zumbansen 
2008 at 743. 
381 Zumbansen 2008, supra note 254 at 741. 
382 Jessup 1950 at 108-9. 
383 Zumbansen 2008, supra note 254 at 744. 
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the reemergence, use, and acceptance of transnational law may be the weapon with which 
plaintiffs may seek and actually win justice.384  
Lex mercatoria — whether understood as part of a wider transnationalism or as a unique 
law merchant — is alive and active, its shadow visible in international arbitration law385 and the 
“modernist” approach to comity. It is to be expected that, in trade, intellectual property, and 
finance, such a liberal and modernist approach to transnational activity is applied. Indeed, where 
the dominant political, economic, and moral norms promote the liberal internationalization of the 
economic community, courts will justify a liberal interpretation of comity and inter-state 
cooperation to further the goals of the Field. However, such historical notions of lex mercatoria, 
a body of law that existed in the “in-between” and meant to reflect the needs of those whose 
interests spanned national boundaries, today apply only to those whose policy goals are not too 
controversial or political.386 Lex mercatoria has not been imagined to have folded into itself civil 
liability of corporations for the harms they do in the course of business, but rather remained a 
transactional, largely contractual sub-field. There is thus a “fragmentation” of transnational law 
between the commercial and the human as there also is between transnational investment law 
and transnational human rights law.387 
As Scott notes, the further regulation moves away from criminal law and states seek to 
regulate their nationals — specifically their corporate nationals — with respect to economic 
interests, the more one sees resistance on the part of the state not to interfere or be seen to 
interfere with another state’s sovereignty.388 Scott assigns this resistance to the possibility that 
economic policy belongs in some “intrinsic way” to the very idea of sovereignty — that a state’s 
 
384 See for instance: Scott & Wai 2004, supra note 12; Harold Koh, “Transnational Public Litigation” (1991) 100 
Yale LJ 2372; Sandra Raponi, “Grounding a Cause of Action for Torture in Transnational Law” in Craig Scott, ed, 
Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on the Development of Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2001); Daniel Augenstein, “Torture as Tort? Transnational Tort Litigation for Corporate-Related 
Human Rights Violations and the Human Right to a Remedy” (2018) 18:3 H R L Rev 593; Franzki & Horst 2016, 
supra note 14. 
385 Scott 2001a, supra note 15 at 52; Scott & Wai 2004, supra note 12 at 292; see also the discussion of how 
transnational law in international arbitration is at odds with transnational human rights law in being wilfully blind to 
the impact on an affected third parties (often the victims of human rights abuses) with respect to the Chevron Case 
in Ecuador in Franzki & Horst 2016, supra note 14.  
386 Scott & Wai 2004, supra note 12 at 293. 
387 Franzki & Horst 2016, supra note 14 at 348. 
388 Scott 2001a, supra note 15 at 53. 
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self-determination is thought to include the prerogative to make decisions pertaining to their own 
economic interests.389  
Another way to frame this resistance is that in a field where there are limited “possible” 
answers, as Bourdieu noted, those that are “correct” are those that align with the habitus of 
power. Thus, where territorialism and lex mercatoria are available as oppositional normative 
avenues, the judiciary may choose an approach of transnationalism where it benefits the 
economic or political fields — thus supporting the historical notion that lex mercatoria existed to 
support the ease of commercial transactions or that much of admiralty law initially emerged as a 
complex sub-field imagined as judicially-led transnational common law as a ‘necessary’ adjunct 
to lex mercatoria — but choose a non-interventionist approach to benefit the same group when 
“outsiders” seek accountability of that group, supporting such a decision by citing traditional 
notions of comity and non-interference.390 This leads to a buffet-style development of the law 
where the historical roots of legal structures are either championed or blindly ignored, almost 
always to the benefit of those hierarchically advantaged in the Field.  
What is thus interesting is how the potentially awkward existence of a form of law that 
moves beyond states — lex mercatoria — is co-opted and reshaped to the benefit of the 
economic field and, through arbitration and a modernist approach to comity, is touted as the 
response to a changing world. In other words, it is not as though a basis in traditional law doesn’t 
exist to ground transnational tort litigation — the hands of justice are not tied — that basis has 
simply been shaped to serve a narrower, more economically-interested, purpose.  
The Field is self-referential, consistently re-stating and re-legitimizing the habitus of state 
equality and non-intervention through the application of comity.391 This mechanism is 
concerning given the reality of internationalism and resulting violations of human rights, and 
particularly in reference to the apparent conflict of this Field-wide territorialist habitus and the 
formulation of jurisdiction-asserting thresholds designed by this same Field. In any event, the 
 
389 Ibid at 54. 
390 Several authors have noted that the legal protection of foreign investment through transnational investment law 
developed in the context of decolonization and served primarily to interest of capital exporting countries, i.e. the 
developed world: Franzki & Horst 2016, supra note 14 at 354; Pahuja 2011, supra note 331 at 95; Kate Miles, 
“International Investment Law: Origins, Imperialism and Conceptualizing the Environment” (2010) 21 Colo J Int’l 
Envtl L & Pol’y 1 at 10. 
391 Franzki & Horst 2016, supra note 14 at 356. 
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markers or indicators of Field habitus — deference to democracies, deference to judicial 
brethren, commitment to narrow delineation, and the co-opting of lex mercatoria — demonstrate 
a clear tendency — habitus — of the Field towards traditionalist territorial notions of state 
sovereignty, state equality, and the preference for a non-interventionist form of comity. These 
markers are on clear display in some private international law decisions involving human rights 
violations allegedly carried out by transnational corporations or foreign states. In the next 
section, I will explore how the impact of the Field habitus on decision making in some cases 
(some of which have already been discussed in part) has arguably led to injustice.    
C: The impact of Field habitus on private international law human rights and 
environmental tort litigation 
In this section, I discuss a number of cases decided in Canada through the written 
judgments of which the judicial territorialist habitus can be observed in real time. I begin with a 
discussion of Kazemi, a decision of the SCC related to state immunity. While this case deals with 
whether a cause of action does or does not exist, and does not engage issues of jurisdiction (real 
and substantial connection, forum non conveniens, forum of necessity), it serves as a useful 
starting place for this section as it is one of the most territorialist, hyper-comity judgments of 
recent years. As with the cases that follow — that engage the jurisdictional tests discussed above 
— it is not the law in Kazemi that gets in the way of justice, but its application by a judiciary 
trapped by its own habitus. As will become clear, the Field continuously struggles with its 
territorialist origins and doxic traditions of slow development in the law and a favourable 
defining of terms to the benefit of the field of power. In this struggle, agents remain seemingly 
blind to clear escape hatches (exceptions to jurisdiction tests to advance justice), the reality of 
state-inequality, and the changing face of sovereignty. 
Hyper-comity and the SCC’s dated territoriality approach in Kazemi 
One of the most stunning displays of reliance on a Westphalian, state-absolutist version 
of comity in recent years is the SCC decision in Kazemi. Justice LeBel’s decision, and its 
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acceptance by nearly the entire SCC,392 is reflective of the state-equality and non-interference 
habitus inhabited by the judges at Canada’s highest court.  
Zahra Kazemi, a Canadian citizen, travelled to Iran in 2003 as a freelance journalist and 
photographer. In the midst of taking photographs of protesters outside a prison, she was arrested 
and herself imprisoned in the building she had been photographing. While imprisoned, she was 
beaten, sexually assaulted, and tortured. She was later brought to a government-controlled 
hospital displaying massive head trauma; she was deemed “brain dead.” Upon arrival at the 
hospital, the contusions on her body and internal damage revealed the extent of the violence she 
had endured. Despite requests made by her family to be transferred to a Canadian hospital, staff 
at the hospital in Tehran took Ms. Kazemi off life support. Ms. Kazemi was then buried in 
Tehran, again, contrary to the wishes of her family.  
Following a state investigation into Ms. Kazemi’s death, members of the judiciary and of 
the office of the prosecutor were identified as perpetrators. Nevertheless, only one man was 
prosecuted, and he was acquitted. Ms. Kazemi’s son — still living in Canada — brought an 
action in the Québec Superior Court against the Islamic Republic of Iran, its head of state, the 
chief public prosecutor of Iran, and the deputy chief of intelligence at the prison. The defendants 
brought a motion to dismiss on the basis of state immunity pursuant to the SIA. The issue was 
eventually appealed to the SCC.  
The 2014 decision of the SCC espouses a dated and strict interpretation of international 
law, comity, and state sovereignty, while employing an internally inconsistent analysis to arrive 
at what was clearly the legal result that aligned with the inner “logic” of the Field. While there 
are numerous examples of contradictory and confusing analysis, four themes emerge that 
demonstrate the enduring influence of a non-interference form of comity.  
The first theme is that the SIA may be interpreted in light of the purposes of state 
sovereignty, but no other purpose. Throughout the decision, LeBel J refers to the “purposes” of 
the SIA which he aligns with state sovereignty, and the principles of state equality and non-
interference.393 It is important to note there are no enumerated purposes contained within the SIA 
 
392 Justice Abella provided a thoughtful and progressively-minded dissent, but she did so alone.  
393 Kazemi, supra note 360 at para 35. 
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and LeBel J offers no evidence of official legislative purpose from official statements or Hansard 
debates.394 At no point does LeBel J suggest there may be any other overarching purposes to the 
SIA or any overarching tenets of fundamental justice in reference to which the SIA may be 
understood. In fact, at nearly every opportunity, LeBel J rejects any reference to overarching 
norms of customary international law that include access to justice, particularly for breaches of 
jus cogens norms.  
The second theme is that international law can be used as a tool of interpretation, but only 
when it leads to a conclusion of state non-interference. Justice LeBel begins his analysis by 
finding that the SIA is a complete code into which no additional exceptions may be read, 
regardless of whether those exceptions are drawn from customary international law or common 
law. Justice LeBel asserts that because the SIA is clear in its language, no additional tools of 
interpretation are needed to determine the extent of Parliamentary-intended exceptions to state 
immunity.395 This approach — assuming he is correct396 — is an accepted approach with respect 
to statutory interpretation.  
However, in the analysis that follows, LeBel J offers several instances where he admits 
provisions or wording in the SIA are ambiguous but then makes subjective (preferential) 
decisions with respect to the kind of additional information or context he is willing to consider, 
always to uphold a traditional notion of comity. For example, in determining whether the 
exception outlined at section 6(a) of the SIA (bodily injury) may be interpreted to include the 
psychological injury of Ms. Kazemi’s son, LeBel J prefers an interpretation that the act(s) that 
cause the injury must occur in Canada, thereby limiting the reach of the exception. This 
interpretation is particularly curious given LeBel J was personally familiar and supportive of 
approaches in the determination of transnational — albeit, criminal — activity that a criminal act 
 
394 At para 44 he does include some citation to government purpose with respect to 2012 amendments to the SIA, 
but not to the original SIA.  
395 Kazemi, supra note 360 at para 56. 
396 LeBel J does admit that there is debate among the academic community regarding whether the SIA is truly 
exhaustive, but chooses to ignore that debate. For the purposes of this analysis it is unnecessary to engage with this 
debate as the plaintiff’s strongest case arguably lay in the interpretation of the statute as written, rather than reading 
in additional exceptions. That said, while Lebel J may be correct that s 3(1) of the SIA is unambiguous as a 
statement of a general rule that only has exceptions as laid down elsewhere in the SIA, he was on less convincing 
ground when it came to the meaning of “state” within s 3(1)’s “state immunity,” given the ambiguity in the 
definition of state in s 2; it was precisely such definitional ambiguity through which Abella J (in dissent) was able to 
avoid whether s 3 was exhaustive and instead find that, even if exhaustive, the conduct in question was 
fundamentally illegal activity that rendered it “unofficial” and thus being “non-state.”  
 94 
 
may be continuous, reasonably said to occur and to have connection to multiple jurisdictions at 
once.397 Further, LeBel J prefers an interpretation of section 6(a) that requires any psychological 
distress to be based in physical harm. In doing so, LeBel J rejects an interpretation offered by the 
appellants and intervenors of where/how acts may occur and be felt using Canadian Charter 
principles398 in favour of US judicial commentary and his own “common sense” — read, habitus. 
Another example can be seen in LeBel J’s analysis of which actors Parliament intended 
to capture in its inclusion of the word “government” in the definition of “foreign state.” Justice 
LeBel again looks to the “purpose” of the SIA — which remains undefined — and to a UN 
Convention that includes within the definition of “state,” representatives of the state acting in 
that capacity.399 However, when the appellants argued that “government” must be construed with 
reference to international norms, including the jus cogens norm against torture, such arguments 
are dismissed. Indeed, the appellants argued a state official cannot be understood to act in their 
official capacity when such an act constitute breaches of jus cogens, citing the American 4th 
Circuit Court of Appeals case Yousuf v Samantar,400 that held as such. LeBel J implied the 
American decision was unpersuasive, not least because it was under appeal; notably, that 
decision was later upheld by the US Supreme Court.401 LeBel J concludes, in what appears to be 
a misreading of the presumption to act in conformity with international obligations — which he 
cites earlier in the decision — and perhaps forgetting that he sits as a law-maker on the highest 
court in Canada, that the Canadian legislature had given no indication that the courts are to deem 
torture an “unofficial act.”402 To be clear, Canadian legislation is presumed to be written in 
accordance with Canada’s international commitments unless clearly written to indicate an 
intention to violate such commitments;403 the lack of specific intent to derogate from 
 
397 See for example Hape, supra note 105; and see Libman, supra note 124, as the leading criminal law case that 
does not see the site of primary injury as a sine qua non for which territories a crime may occur in. 
398 Psychological distress caused by Canadian government action has long been accepted as a breach of one’s 
section 7 Charter right to be free of interference with security of the person: Blencoe v British Columbia (Human 
Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44; R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30; Chaoulli v Québec (Attorney General), 
2005 SCC 35. 
399 Kazemi, supra note 360 at para 86. 
400 Yousuf v Samantar, 699 F3d 763 (2012). 
401 Yousuf v Samantar, 575 US 13-1361 (2015) (Samantar was the former Prime Minister of Somalia who had, by 
his own admission, ordered the carrying out of war crimes against the civilian population. The court held under the 
US version of the SIA, that Samantar enjoyed no state immunity as his actions could not be contemplated as having 
been done in his official capacity.) 
402 Kazemi, supra note 360 at para 107. 
403 Hape, supra note 105 at para 53. 
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international commitments does not serve to limit courts but instead provides courts the 
flexibility to interpret legislation — to merge statutory interpretation with the common law 
process — in a manner that supports Canada’s commitments.  
A third theme is that a version of the facts may be chosen to the detriment of the plaintiff 
and to further the interests of strict state boundaries. For instance, LeBel J, upon finding, and 
accepting, the catch-22 that torture is by definition an act of state, and acts of state are immune 
from civil liability — thereby leading to the conclusion that there will never be redress for torture 
outside of the state in which it occurred — determined that there may be some rare exception in 
which the wilful blindness by the state to the activities of private individuals or groups on behalf 
of the state may meet the definition of torture and may not trigger state immunity. Despite this 
finding, he dismissed that the case before him would fall into such an exception. He does so 
despite the fact that the case was originally brought on a summary motion, through which the 
facts as pled by the plaintiff are deemed accurate. Those facts, being presumptively accurate, 
included evidence the Iranian government had itself initiated an investigation that identified 
several members of government or those in official positions that were, as LeBel J puts it, linked 
to the torture and death of Ms. Kazemi. While only one was put forward for prosecution, the fact 
that that was done suggests the members were acting beyond their official capacities, thus prima 
facie meeting this “exceptional” circumstance LeBel J identifies. Rather than engaging with this 
possibility, or sending the case back with leave to amend the pleadings, LeBel J simply states 
“that is not the case before us.”404 
The final theme is that rules of Canadian Charter interpretation — most often referred to 
as a living tree — should be limited to favour a restrictive view of state norms. While 
acknowledging that Canada actively barring Ms. Kazemi’s son from redress could result in a 
breach of his right to security of the person per section 7 of the Charter (psychological harm), 
LeBel J finds that to do so is not in breach of any principle of fundamental justice. To do so, he 
first rejects any suggestion that Art 14 of the Convention Against Torture — the requirement on 
the state to provide redress to victims of torture405 — is a principle of fundamental justice. In 
 
404 Kazemi, supra note 360 at para 97. 
405 Article 14: 1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress 
and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as 
possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his dependants shall be entitled to 
compensation. 2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other persons to compensation which 
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doing so, he employed a traditionalist state sovereignty-based analysis406 and by rejecting any 
reliance on the interpretation of that article by the UN Committee Against Torture,407 and found 
instead the nature of international law is diverse and every changing408 — though apparently not 
changing to favour victims of torture.  
Second, LeBel J addressed the suggestion made by an intervenor that the court could 
accept as a new principle of fundamental justice the legal maxim that “where there is a right 
there must be a remedy for its violation.”409 It is at this stage we see an unfortunate side-stepping 
of the clear need to find redress for Ms. Kazemi’s family. Justice LeBel held that while some 
rights exist, it is not correct to say that there must be a remedy for their violation as remedies are 
frequently limited by procedural measures. As examples, he cited mechanisms for determining 
real and substantial connection in international libel cases and limitation periods in others.410 
First, unlike the procedural barrier presented by the SIA which effectively completely eliminates 
any redress, the examples LeBel J cited merely limit remedies that otherwise exist. Further, it is 
not an exaggeration to suggest that the comparison of seeking a remedy for libel hardly offers an 
equivalent or meaningful comparison to that of torture, its use as comparator further confirming 
the lack of any real acknowledgment on the part of the Court of the heinous quality of violence 
suffered by Ms. Kazemi. But, rather than engage meaningfully with whether an “access to 
remedy” principle of fundamental justice may achieve justice, it is summarily dismissed on the 
grounds it is “not a manageable standard.” This dismissal failed to take into account the inherent 
flexibility and necessarily opaque quality of existing principles of fundamental justice.411 
 
may exist under national law: UNGA, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment of Punishment, 1981, UN Doc A/39/51. 
406 LeBel J finds the interpretation made by the Committee Against Torture holds no more and, if anything, less 
weight than the interpretation of the Convention by state courts or by regional human rights courts because the 
Committee is not a court and holds no binding decisional power and because the Convention was written by states, 
for states. In this way, Lebel J invoked the interpretations of (majorities of) the European Court of Human Rights 
and the UK House of Lords, which have largely been contrary to the position taken by the Committee: see Kazemi, 
supra note 360 at paras 142-148.  
407 Ibid at para 147. 
408 Ibid at para 150. 
409 Ibid at para 158. 
410 Ibid at para 160. 
411 See for example the principle of fundamental justice that a law cannot be overbroad. Overbreadth is defined by 
the equally ambiguous — and subjective/objective — standard of “grossly disproportionate:” R v Clay, 2003 SCC 
75.  
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Despite these themes, LeBel J consistently assured Ms. Kazemi’s family that the violence 
Ms. Kazemi faced was “nothing short of a tragedy,”412 that Canada does not condone torture,413 
and that the SIA — actually, his subjective interpretation of the SIA — is:  
…not a comment on the evils of torture, but rather an indication of what principles 
Parliament has chosen to promote given Canada’s role and that of its government in the 
international community. The SIA cannot be read as suggesting that Canada has abandoned 
its commitment to the universal prohibition of torture.414  
 
It is difficult to understand how the aggressively black-letter, state-territorialist 
interpretation of state immunity that followed does not belie and render such pronouncements 
hollow. The judges of the SCC are fundamentally law-makers, and they are not bound by stare 
decisis. Nor are they bound by unacceptable interpretations of statute or unconstitutional 
legislation. To suggest LeBel J and the majority of the SCC’s interpretation of the SIA was 
anything but subjective and thus steeped in the habitus of the participating members and their 
institution is to ignore the role and responsibilities of Canada’s highest court, and to be blind to 
the fact that when a majority of that Court wishes to harness law to its vision of justice, it does 
not hesitate. At every turn the Court made subjective and normative interpretations to the benefit 
of the field of power (nation state comity for the benefit of Canada-Iran state-relations — 
whether they be economic or political) while dismissing any interpretation of comity that would 
serve to uphold any international obligation to protect the global citizenry.  
Unfortunately, this hyper-sensitivity to traditional notions of comity is not an exception. 
In the realm of transnational tort and environmental civil actions, such inclinations have similarly 
served to undermine justice, leaving particularly those who suffer the negative byproducts of 
extraction activities without any real recourse. 
Hyper-comity informs transnational tort cases 
Few cases of project-specific human rights and environmental tort claims have been 
initiated in Canada and fewer have dealt primarily with the jurisdictional questions of forum non 
 
412 Kazemi, supra note 360 at para 1. 
413 Ibid at para 53. 
414 Ibid at para 46.  
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conveniens and forum of necessity. However, those that have present a mixed bag regarding what 
can be expected when Canadian courts are faced with jurisdictional issues involving human 
rights. We have already seen that in some instances — Tahoe, Nevsun, Hudbay, Bouzari — some 
Canadian courts have engaged thoughtfully with the tests for forum non conveniens and forum of 
necessity while, in other instances, we see the courts struggling and ultimately failing to break 
free of their traditionalist habitus. 
To begin, three cases out of Québec have demonstrated the way in which the tests for 
forum non conveniens and forum of necessity are being misinterpreted or conservatively applied, 
thereby denying plaintiffs justice against CanCorps. By way of preliminary comment, the 
outcomes in all three cases — favouring a strict interpretation of jurisdiction to the detriment of 
human rights victims — represent a profound irony given that Québec’s law is the only one that 
stipulates that forum non conveniens stays must be “exceptional” and was the first forum in 
Canada to recognize a forum of necessity doctrine. 
Recherches internationales Québec v Cambior inc. 
In 1998, the Québec Superior Court heard a preliminary motion from Cambior Inc, the 
defendant in a potential class action lawsuit relating to the breach of an effluent treatment plant 
at a mine in Guyana that sent 2.3 billion litres of liquid containing cyanide, heavy metals and 
other pollutants flooding into two rivers, including Guyana’s main waterway.415 The hearings 
judge found the Court had jurisdiction simpliciter over the claim pursuant to Arts 3134 and 3148 
of the Civil Code; notably, Cambior was a Québec-domiciled company and the claim was 
advanced against Cambior as a personal action of a patrimonial nature. Further, Cambior was the 
majority shareholder of, and was involved in decision making related to, the Guyana-based 
corporation operating the mine: Omai. In other words, the corporation operating Omai was 
Cambior’s controlled subsidiary. However, after finding it had jurisdiction, the Court then turned 
to the determination on forum non conveniens.  
The Court began by laying out the test and noting its exceptional nature. It went on to cite 
at length Sopinka J’s judgment in Amchem and the development of the common law test of forum 
 
415 Cambior, supra note 83. 
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non conveniens in Canada. Through this discussion, the judge did not appear to recognize that 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Amchem (1) had not adopted the two-step United Kingdom test 
and (2) that the Canadian test placed the burden entirely on the defendant. With respect to the 
residence of the parties, while the Court appeared to engage with the plaintiff’s arguments 
suggesting Québec is the more appropriate forum, it fervently declined any suggestion that the 
domicile of the defendant is a more important factor than others. Instead it held that Guyana was 
the preferred forum based on the domicile of the parties; the Court clearly placed increased 
weight on the domicile of the plaintiffs, having immediately before suggested there was no one 
determinative factor. In doing so, the judge accepted the fiction of Omai as a truly separate entity 
from Cambior – otherwise, it made no sense to speak of Guyana as the defendant’s domicile, not 
just the domicile of the plaintiffs. 
Next, despite accepting that, of the witnesses listed by the plaintiff, the preferred forum 
was Québec due to the reduced cost of hearing witnesses in Québec, the Court then explained 
that, in effect, it didn’t believe the plaintiff had listed all witnesses. The Court then created its 
own list of appropriate witnesses — a process of fact-creation — and then found, based on that 
list, that Guyana was the preferred forum.416 This action, described by Sara Seck as a 
“paternalistic twist” revealed the Court purporting to understand the best interests of the plaintiff 
better than the plaintiff itself.417 
The Court accepted the defendant’s argument that the necessary documentary evidence 
was in Guyana, the fault occurred in Guyana, and the governing law would be that of Guyana,418 
making Guyana the more appropriate forum. Despite applying a relatively low bar to the 
preceding factors (often finding Guyana the preferred place on its own initiative), the Court 
stressed the plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate it would lose juridicial 
advantage in the availability of class action in Québec – a complete error of law in that such a 
second-stage burden is not the law in Canada.419 While the Court found, contrary to Cambior’s 
suggestion, the Québec class action process was significantly different and more advantageous to 
 
416 Ibid at para 43-49. 
417 Sara L Seck, “Environmental Harm in Developing Countries Caused by Subsidiaries of Canadian Mining 
Corporations: The Interface of Public and Private International Law” (1999) 37 Can YB Int’l L 139 [Seck 1999]. 
418 Cambior, supra note 83 at para 60; CCQ at Art 3126. 
419 Ibid at para 71. 
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the plaintiffs, it found this factor should be given limited weight.  
In engaging in this fact-finding, as discussed earlier, the Court in Cambior preferred the 
testimony of three Guyanese judges and a former judge of the Québec Court of Appeal, over a 
Canadian professor and international law expert, despite the fact that at least one of the Guyanese 
judges stated the courts of Guyana had always been fair and impartial, even under dictatorial 
rule. In a circumstance weighing progressive human rights values against loyalty to judicial 
brethren, easily supported through a traditional comity-based territorialist analysis, it is not 
surprising the court found Guyana to be the “natural forum” for the litigation.420  
In so finding, the Court concluded by doing two things that created a chilling effect for 
such future cases. First, the Court ordered normal (rather than decreased or no) costs against the 
plaintiff, Recherches internationales, despite the plaintiff representing poor foreign victims of 
corporate misbehaver. Second, despite finding Guyana to be the forum conveniens the Court did 
not even follow Judge Keenan’s lead in Bhopal by requiring Cambior to attorn to the courts of 
Guyana; the Court simply required Cambior not to raise arguments in Guyana related to forum 
non conveniens. The plaintiffs did attempt to carry on with the action in Guyana but their 
attempts were vigorously defended by Cambior and twice struck by the High Court of the 
Supreme Court of Judicature of Guyana, first in 2002, then in 2006.421  
In dismissing the plaintiffs in Québec, the Court repeatedly subjectively interpreted 
elements of the test for forum non conveniens to the benefit of only the corporate defendant: it 
side-stepped the “exceptional” bar required (effectively reading it down); it weighed the 
plaintiff’s residence more heavily than that of the defendant; it favoured facts — even those that 
are prima facie incredible — when delivered by judicial brethren; and it remained blind to the 
reality and likelihood of Guyanese justice. Throughout the judgment, the Court stressed no one 
factor is determinative, but appeared to favour certain factors over others, often suggesting it was 
the plaintiff that had not presented enough evidence – contrary to the burden laying with the 
defendant – in coming to its conclusion. Finally, in accepting the facts as presented by Cambior’s 
experts, the Court engaged in a form of fact-creation and world-making in which Guyana’s 
 
420 Ibid at para 69. 
421 Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, “Cambior lawsuit (re Guyana)” online: <https://www.business-
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justice system was and was always entirely up to the task of holding foreign corporate 
wrongdoers responsible for their actions. While at the time the Québec Court would not yet have 
notice that Guyana’s courts would not favour the plaintiffs, the Québec Court’s finding certainly 
assisted in reinforcing Canada’s status both as an industry-friendly nation, one that is keen to 
support its corporations, and as a nation resistant to exercising jurisdiction over a foreign state. In 
doing so, the Court’s decision-making process remains framed by its habitus, rather than the 
evidence. 
Bil’In (Village Council) v Green Park International Inc. 
Similar to Cambior, in 2010 the Québec Court of Appeal heard an appeal from a decision 
to reject jurisdiction on the basis of Art 3135 of the Civil Code: forum non conveniens. In Green 
Park,422 a group of individuals representing Bil’in, a village on the West Bank of the River 
Jordan in the territories that have been occupied by Israel since 1967, sued two corporations in 
Québec for civil liability for alleged war crimes. Green Park International Ltd and Green Mount 
International Ltd were Québec-registered corporations with head offices in Montreal. Under 
contract with the State of Israel, Green Park and Green Mount began constructing residential and 
other buildings on lands in Bil’in allegedly contrary to Art 49(6) of the Convention (IV) relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War (“Fourth Geneva Convention”) dated 
August 12, 1949.  
Despite dismissing many of the defendant’s initial motions, one of the main issues before 
the motions judge was whether Québec was the appropriate forum. In this analysis, the motions 
judge dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims that the matter would not be heard in Israel because Israeli 
courts had found issues regarding the Fourth Geneva Convention to be non-justiciable; indeed, 
the Court heard evidence from Israeli scholars that suggested the Israeli High Court of Justice 
refused to hear matters relating to the Fourth Geneva Convention for that reason. In what appears 
to be another misapplication of the test for forum non conveniens, the judge accepted the 
interpretation of the defendant’s expert over that of the plaintiffs to suggest the plaintiffs had not 
proven the courts of Israel would not find the claim justiciable, thus overlooking that the burden 
 
422 Though not discussed in the Appeal, the Court had jurisdiction simpliciter over the defendant Green Park as the 
defendant was incorporated in Québec. 
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fell to the defendant, not the plaintiff, and at the same time making the burden one of proving a 
negative. 
Furthermore, as James Yap — who observed the trial — suggested, it is questionable 
whether Israel could even have been considered an available forum at all.423 While the forum non 
conveniens test is grounded in the comparison of the plaintiff’s chosen forum to another, 
preferred by the defendant, there must in fact actually exist an alternative forum,424 the proof of 
which a court may conclude on the evidence before it. Where the putative alternative forum does 
not recognize the cause of action as it is brought — here, a claim framed in terms of civil liability 
for war crimes425 — or arguably has no jurisdiction simpliciter over the matter,426 then it is a 
stretch to suggest that forum does in fact exist for the purposes of even initiating a forum non 
conveniens analysis. In any event, the Court clearly preferred to see the courts of the state that 
allegedly inflicted war crimes on the plaintiffs hear the case rather than keep jurisdiction, and so 
found the juridical advantage of the Québec courts — as Canada has incorporated the Fourth 
Geneva Convention through domestic legislation which the Québec Civil Code’s liability 
provisions piggyback onto — did not weigh heavily enough in the forum non conveniens 
analysis to lead to Québec retaining jurisdiction over the matter.  
The plaintiffs appealed to the Québec Court of Appeal and were met with a similarly 
disconnected panel showing a “complete lack of human rights consciousness.”427 The Court of 
 
423 James Yap, “Corporate Civil Liability for War Crimes in Canadian Courts” (2010) 8 J of Int Criminal J 631 [Yap 
2010] at 637 
424 Anne C McConville, “Taking Jurisdiction in Transnational Human Rights Tort Litigation: Universality 
Jurisdictions’s Relationship to Ex Juris Service, Forum Non Conveniens and the Presumption of Territoriality” in 
Craig Scott, ed, Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on the Development of Transnational Human Rights 
Litigation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) at 189. 
425 The High Court of Justice had repeatedly held that Article 49(6) was inapplicable, however the trial judge found 
given the time that had passed between the Israeli Court’s last judgement and the present day, it was open to the 
plaintiffs to argue Article 49(6) had now become customary international law. In so doing, the judge placed a 
significant and unsupportable burden on the plaintiffs. Further, the judge failed to consider whether Israel’s 
continued international objection to the Article at issue would deem Israel a persistent objector and thus not bound 
by that customary international law.   
426 No traditional bases were available to ground Israel’s jurisdiction simpliciter over the matter: neither the 
plaintiffs nor the defendants were domiciled in Israel; the events “took place” in the West Bank and not in Israel; no 
evidence was presented to prove where the two corporate defendants maintained operational (rather than corporate) 
headquarters; and the Israeli High Court of Justice has no express jurisdiction in civil matters. As James Yap notes, 
“it is questionable whether it is appropriate for a Québec court to declare itself forum non conveniens in favour of a 
tribunal in whose stead it would not itself assert jurisdiction:” James Yap, “Corporate Civil Liability for War Crimes 
in Canadian Courts” (2010) 8 JICJ 631 [Yap 2010] at 642. 
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Appeal acknowledged that it could not decline to keep jurisdiction except in an exceptional case 
and noted the motions judge could certainly not have declined jurisdiction on the basis of 
jurisdiction simpliciter. And yet, the Court of Appeal erroneously found it was open to the 
motions judge to look to the plaintiff to prove the foreign jurisdiction was not appropriate. The 
Court found the appellants had not proved the motions judge had erred in such finding using 
what appeared to be the appellate standard of review on findings of fact “palpable and overriding 
error” rather than the less deferential standard of “correctness” to apply to misstatements of the 
law. Similarly, in applying the factors related to forum non conveniens outlined with respect to 
the Civil Code by the SCC in Spar Aerospace, the Court held, despite the burden being on the 
defendant which had not, on the facts, proven it to be so, that it was “in the interest of the 
parties” to have the case heard before a court in Israel.428 Like Cambior, the Court in Green Park 
appeared to look to the plaintiff to defend why the claim should not be heard in Israel, rather than 
holding the defendant to task on why it shouldn’t be heard in Canada.  
The test for forum non conveniens is highly fact-specific and engages the heart of judicial 
decision making: the weighing of facts in a manner aligned with the purpose of the common law 
mechanism or legislative framework. Courts, especially ones of first instance, are engaged in 
fact-determination which in turn creates a legitimized factual story. In Green Park, the motions 
judge defined and made fact the present and imagined future of the Israeli High Court of Justice; 
in finding that justice would be done in Israel, the Canadian Court created a fact that, while 
legitimized in the ceremony of judgment writing, did not translate to the reality on the ground in 
Israel. If anything, such world-making and subjective interpretation acts only to justify the 
dismissal of responsibility in favour of an arbitrarily imagined alternative. The approach taken by 
the Québec courts in Cambior and in Green Park — fuelled by a habitus of non-intervention —
served to later inspire the stunning concluding comments of the Québec Court of Appeal in Anvil 
Mining Ltd c Association canadienne contre l’impunité.429  
Anvil Mining Ltd c Association canadienne contre l’impunité 
While the conclusion in Anvil Mining was determined on jurisdiction simpliciter and 
 
428 Green Park CA, supra note 83 at para 88. 
429 Note, the following citations refer to a translation, though not official, which was accepted by all parties. 
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forum of necessity, the Court’s failure to situate the case in a reality of international business — 
corporate-state power dynamics and the real (and likely) potential of corporate wrongdoers 
skirting justice through legal gaps/cracks — is consistent with the forum non conveniens 
analyses in Green Park and Cambior.  
In Anvil Mining, a Canadian-incorporated mining company operating in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) allegedly assisted the DRC government in subduing a small group of 
armed individuals who had entered the DRC town of Kilwa and declared liberation of Katanga. 
In pushing back the small group, the DRC government forces (FARDC) allegedly engaged “in a 
slaughter by summarily executing people and plundering the property of the inhabitants…about 
70 or 80 civilians were killed.”430 After a series of in-country military Courts Martial, in which 
seven members of the military and three Anvil executives were tried for war crimes, five military 
members and all accused Anvil executives were cleared of charges.431 The Courts Martial 
concluded the deaths were the accidental result of fighting.432 Of the two members of the military 
who were convicted, both saw their sentences reduced and were reintegrated into the army.433 
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights observed: “[T]he judicial decisions 
made during the Kilwa case are an illustration of the lack of impartiality and independence 
within the military justice system…[T]hroughout this case, political interference, a lack of co-
operation on the part of the military authorities and many irregularities were observed.”434 
The Québec Superior Court judge held it had jurisdiction simpliciter over the action and 
that Anvil had not proved that a foreign jurisdiction was clearly more appropriate than 
Québec.435 Anvil appealed. The Québec Court of Appeal found the hearings judge had 
misinterpreted jurisdiction under Art 3148(2) of the Civil Code, finding Québec had no 
jurisdiction simpliciter — despite Anvil having incorporated in Canada (Northwest Territories) 
and maintaining a small office in Montreal.436 The motions judge had found Anvil’s employee 
was sufficiently connected to the activities of Anvil in the DRC; indeed, the Anvil mine in the 
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DRC was Anvil’s only project. However, rather than apply the appellate test for findings of fact 
— again, palpable and overriding error — the Court of Appeal simply found, on its own accord, 
Anvil’s activities in Québec had “absolutely nothing to do with ‘complicity’ to commit ‘war 
crimes’ or ‘crimes against humanity’ while operating a mine.”437 This finding was made despite 
the Court immediately thereafter acknowledging that the Montreal employee was engaged in 
events that could be described as “crisis management.”438 Further, in order to overturn the 
motions judge who had found Anvil had a connection to Québec, the Court of Appeal held that 
rather than having to find an error of fact (a high bar), it need only find the motions judge made 
an error in law by not connecting the actions of the Montreal office to the events.439 In other 
words, if the motions judge had applied the wrong test (by not finding the Montreal employee 
was connected to the actions in the DRC) the Court of Appeal figured it could step in, and apply 
the facts presented to the motions judge to their properly enumerated test. While this approach 
may have been open to the Court of Appeal, either way there was clear connection between 
Montreal and the DRC and such an approach should not have led to their ultimate finding. 
Earlier in the same judgment, the Court of Appeal cites a translation from the motions judge’s 
ruling wherein that judge stated: “[I]t appears that the role of [Montreal employee] was 
necessarily connected to the Dikulshi mining operation in Congo…[Montreal employee]’s 
activities were necessarily connected to the Congolese mining operation in October of 2004 
when local employees, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, allegedly provided logistical support 
to the army to counter the insurrection in Kilwa.”440 Such statements clearly demonstrate the 
motions judge had indeed turned his mind to the connection between the Montreal office and the 
actions in the DRC, thus clearly engaging in the “sufficient connection” analysis. The Court of 
Appeal’s decision to ignore the motion judge’s written findings demonstrates the mental 
gymnastics and wilful blindness some courts are willing to entertain in order to maintain a strict 
interpretation of territoriality; there was clearly no context in which the Court of Appeal was 
finding it had jurisdiction.  
In finding the it did not have jurisdiction simpliciter the Court did not have to determine 
the forum non conveniens application. However, notably, the Court did go on to apply Art 3136 
 
437 Ibid at para 85. 
438 Ibid at para 86. 
439 Ibid at para 91. 
440 Ibid at para 45 citing Anvil Mining CS, supra note 435 at para 29 [Emphasis added]. 
 106 
 
of the Civil Code: forum of necessity. Despite having been presented with evidence of the 
international community’s findings regarding the corruption in the DRC judicial system,441 and 
despite having had explained how the victims were prevented from moving ahead in Australia,442 
the court determined it would not be “impossible” to gain access to a foreign court. After 
purporting to apply the highly discretionary and fact-based tests for jurisdiction (simpliciter and 
necessity), and after claiming sympathy for the plaintiffs, the Court stated: “the law prevents us 
from recognizing that Québec has jurisdiction to hear this class action.”443 While the Court’s 
chosen interpretation of the facts may have led it to that conclusion, it certainly was not the black 
letter law that prevented it from assisting the plaintiffs. Leave to appeal to the SCC was 
denied,444 thus suggesting the highest court’s agreement with the decision. 
While the Québec courts have been found wanting, it would be a mistake – however 
tempting – to chalk these decisions up to either incompetence, to a series of unusually poorly 
reasoned judgments, or to a combination of the two.  Rather, a fixation on comity and non-
intervention is pervasive — the nomos informing the Field’s habitus. In these cases, we see the 
above-noted hallmarks of the Field’s non-intervention habitus through discomfort in being seen 
to undermine judicial brethren (Cambior), through heightened respect given to democratic allies 
(Cambior, Green Park, Anvil Mining), and through rigid adherence to traditional definitions of 
the state and its powers (Green Park and Anvil Mining). This habitus is strong even where the 
court ultimately takes jurisdiction. For instance, in Tahoe, discussed above, while the BC Court 
of Appeal held there is some measurable risk that the appellants would encounter difficulty in 
receiving a fair trial “against a powerful international company whose mining interests in 
Guatemala align with the political interests of the Guatemalan state,”445 the Court chose not 
conclude whether there actually was widespread corruption in the Guatemalan legal system, 
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presumably keen to avoid being seen to comment on its international brethren.446 
In the Québec cases, the traditional field doxa of hesitancy in legal development and 
reliance on judicial independence (thus informing judicial belief that foreign judges share the 
same independence) informed judicial logic along with decades of province-centred precedent 
and state-centred traditions of comity and territoriality.  
Perhaps particularly influential in the Québec cases was the nomos of field norm-
signalling from the field of power. Notably, in none of these cases was a Canadian entity or 
individual harmed; in fact the Canadian “citizens” involved (CanCorps) — i.e. those that vote (or 
that employ people who vote) and participate in the Canadian political process — were 
protected, arguably in a way that supports the Canadian state’s (meta-field of power) interests. 
While it is certainly not obvious on the face of such cases, nor is it likely to be, it is likely not 
irrelevant that, for example, Canadian judges chose not to assert jurisdiction and in turn (1) 
potentially create discomfort in Canada’s relationship with its close political ally, Israel; (2) 
suggest CanCorps should be made responsible for environmental harms abroad (if at all) thus 
making them less profitable or less able to compete internationally;447 or (3) make findings of 
fact related to the actions of the FARDC contrary to the position/non-position taken by the then 
federal government.448  
This traditionalist approach is mirrored in other ways the Field has handled human rights 
more broadly. Specifically, in the context of transnational state and corporate action, the Field 
generally prefers the rights of the corporation and its activities (economic field) to that of those 
of the individual. This is done on a buffet-approach, the court preferring the bricks and mortar of 
 
446 Further, while the Court in Tahoe found the defendant had not proven Canada was forum non conveniens, the 
failure of the Court to discuss whether Guatemala could even have been considered an available alternative forum is 
concerning. As noted above, a forum cannot truly be considered alternative if it is not, by reason of corruption, 
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447 Guyana’s economic dependency on the Omai mine created significant incentive for the government to keep it 
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either comity or of “globalization,” whichever assists the field of power on the particular facts. 
Two examples are instructive.  
State Immunity Act 
The first example is the way in which courts in Canada have interpreted exceptions to 
state immunity as prescribed in the SIA. We have already seen the approach taken by the SCC in 
Kazemi, discussed above, but it is in these additional examples that the hyper-traditionalist 
approach in Kazemi can be understood as reflective, rather than exceptional to its context. I will 
begin with section 5 of the SIA, the commercial exception.  
While foreign states are generally immune from suit in Canadian courts due to the 
principles of state sovereignty, injured plaintiffs may take advantage of the misleadingly broad 
commercial exception that allows suits for financial injury resulting from commercial 
relationships between a private party and a foreign state. In reality, Canadian courts have taken a 
parochial approach to such suits, defining “commercial” narrowly to the benefit of Canadian 
corporations rather than private individuals. Indeed, such provisions, as described by Robert 
Wai, are designed to benefit the home state — Canada — by ensuring its corporations may seek 
damages when operating abroad and have as their primary beneficiaries private parties from the 
West who are contracting with sovereign authorities of other states, particularly those of the 
developing world.449 While, as Wai argues, there is no significant or coherent justification to 
make an exception for commercial enterprise and not tort — other than the lack of obvious 
commercial or state pecuniary interests at stake450 — courts have facilitated the expansion of this 
once purely common law theory of restrictive, rather than absolute, sovereignty, but only to the 
benefit of commercial interests.  
There appears to be no movement toward recognition of harms felt by private individuals 
by foreign state actors, even where there are clear commercial elements at stake. Compare, for 
example, representative cases from the Supreme Court of Canada: the decisions in Re Canada 
Labour Code451 and Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraq.452 In the first, the affected party included 
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private Canadian workers while in the second, the affected party was a domestic airline 
corporation. In the first, the Court held labour relations related to the protection of Canadian 
workers at a US Navy base in Newfoundland were not “commercial,” a decision that favoured a 
significant Canadian state ally (US), while dismissing the interests of Canadian citizens. 
However, in relation to Kuwait Airlines, the Court found the appropriation of the Kuwait 
Airways fleet by the national Iraq airline was indeed “commercial” in nature, the finding thus 
benefiting a Canadian corporation.453 The operation of the commercial exception in Canada has 
created preferentialism in the way it facilitates litigation by commercial plaintiffs when 
compared to individuals; plaintiffs, more likely to suffer tort losses at the hands of another state 
rather than losses associated with contract, are defeated by sovereign immunity.454 Wai argues 
that national courts ought to consider carefully why they should refuse to take jurisdiction over 
individual claims based on “problematic ethics of parochialism and bounded responsibilities.”455 
In Wai’s construction of restricted immunity, there is a need for a reality frame in which courts 
look beyond antiquated and stiff constructions of “commercial” and observe the way in which 
the commercial exception — a significant and constructed tear in the classical state sovereignty 
formulation — has evolved only to the benefit of, realistically, western-allied corporations 
exerting their unequal might and bargaining power on states unable to contract free of duress.456  
The commercial exception, however broadly it is read for the benefit of the corporation, 
is not some easily ignored anomaly. The same subordination of the rights of the individual is 
seen in the Field’s interpretation of section 6 of the SIA. Section 6 exempts foreign states from 
immunity where the action relates to death, personal injury or damage to property that occurred 
in Canada.457 In interpreting this section, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bouzari v Iran458 ruled 
that Mr. Bouzari had not suffered personal injury in Canada despite continuing to suffer from his 
injuries of having been tortured and abused in Iran after returning to Canada, thereby arguably 
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unduly restricting the otherwise broad provision. The same narrowing is seen, as discussed 
above, in the SCC’s conclusions related to the harm suffered by Mr. Kazemi’s son in Kazemi.  
As Coughlan et al note, section 6 could be arguably read to include a “continuing” injury 
where the effects of an initial course of abuse abroad are further experienced in Canada. While 
such an interpretation is arguable, and while there is no guidance made explicit within the SIA, 
the international human rights law binding on Canada — specifically Canada’s commitment to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)459 — provides “strong 
contextual support...that would favour the [latter] conclusion and would sustain the court’s 
jurisdiction over the suit.”460 Given Canadian courts and lawmakers are presumed to act in 
accordance with Canada’s international obligations unless clearly legislating in conflict with 
those obligations, where two interpretations exist, as they do here, one could reasonably assume 
the court would choose that which upholds individual human rights (thus acting in accordance 
with international obligations) rather than that which leans on a restrictive and clearly statist 
comity-based approach. In interpreting the SIA, particularly those provisions of the Act that are 
ambiguous and require interpretation — namely what constitutes “commercial activity” and 
“harm in Canada” — we see the territorialist habitus of the Field restraining purposive, modern, 
and reality-framed interpretations to benefit the advancement and changing face only of, what 
Bourdieu calls, the field of power (generally corporate and state interest).  
Das v George Weston Limited 
The second example of the court’s wilful blindness to the reality of international 
corporate action and economic dynamic is the recent analysis of the legal concept of proximity 
with respect to the harms suffered by the victims of the Rana Plaza disaster in Bangladesh.  
In 2013 Rana Plaza, a poorly constructed commercial building, housing thousands of 
garment workers, collapsed killing 1130 people and injuring 2520 others. Alongside other legal 
avenues, a number of individuals launched a proposed class action in Ontario against the group 
 
459 ICCPR, supra note 364. 
460 Coughlan 2014, supra note 18 at 207. Article 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR states that “any person whose rights or 
freedoms are herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy…” Though the text goes on to outline 
specific requirements (eg. competence) related to state legal systems in reference to certain articles, nothing in the 
ICCPR limits Article 2(3)(a) to in-jurisdiction human rights abuses, i.e. it is arguable that the ICCPR requires every 
state to ensure an effective remedy is available to all persons, not simply their own nationals. 
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of companies responsible for Joe Fresh apparel (Loblaws) and the group of companies that made 
up Bureau Veritas Consulting services (Veritas). Loblaws had contracted with a subsidiary, 
which then further contracted with another company, to make garments for its “Joe Fresh” label. 
Veritas had been hired by Loblaws to conduct social safety audits on the factories used to 
manufacture Joe Fresh apparel. The plaintiffs pleaded Loblaws had caused their injuries through 
negligence, vicarious liability, and breach of fiduciary duty. The plaintiffs pleaded Veritas had 
caused their injuries through negligence. Loblaws and Veritas filed a motion to strike on the 
basis that (1) the time limitation under Bangladeshi law had run out and that (2) there was no 
cause of action.  
The motions judge at the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found he had jurisdiction 
simpliciter, but allowed the motions brought by Loblaws and Veritas.461 His judgment was 
recently upheld on appeal.462 Fundamental to both the judgments of the Superior Court and the 
Court of Appeal was a limited and traditional interpretation of control. While the courts both 
arguably applied the black letter law on control within a range of reasonable possible outcomes, 
where that law called for subjective or context-based interpretation or the analysis of global and 
national policy considerations, the courts leaned into their conservative habitus. 
The first example of such preference comes from the discussion of whether the law of 
Canada or the law of Bangladesh would apply. This finding was particularly important as the 
general limitation period in Bangladesh is one year (excluding minors), thus potentially 
eliminating most plaintiffs. The Superior Court walked through the analysis laid down in 
Tolofson, which led to a determination that the law of the forum where the injury was felt would 
be appropriate. However, in doing so, the Court dismissed any argument suggesting where the 
injury was done was more nuanced and appropriate. Loblaws had contracted with its subsidiary 
in Canada and the relationship between Loblaws and Veritas — i.e. the decision making with 
respect to inspections and whether to follow up on breaches in its (Loblaws) corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) policy — was similarly done in Canada. Thus, the plaintiffs argued, there 
was a reasonable argument to be made that the Tolofson test may be read to accommodate a 
broadened understanding of where an action is “done.”  
 
461 Das SC, supra note 284. 
462 Das CA, supra note 287. 
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Further, when it came to assessing whether any of the exceptions to lex loci delicti would 
apply, the motions judge took a restrictive approach — perhaps reflective of the inter-provincial 
approach taken in Tolofson (rather than an international approach arguably more suited to the 
case at hand) — and came to the defence of his brethren making clear he would not accept any 
suggestion that applying the tort law of Bangladesh would be unjust due to its nascent stage of 
development and lack of experience with class actions. He noted he need “not dignify the 
argument” as it “insults the courts and judges of Bangladesh”463 and is an “insulting 
proposition.”464 The fact that Sharia law would distinguish between men and women in any 
resulting damage awards was apparently not incompatible with Canadian values because not that 
many women would be affected. The trial court could simply, the judge held, sever the parts of 
the law that so discriminated.465 This finding was upheld by the Court of Appeal. Where the 
courts had an opportunity to meaningfully assess the locus of harm and the impact to the 
plaintiffs in relying on discriminatory law, the Court chose instead to honour concepts of state 
equality — specifically judicial equality — and non-intervention.  
The second example concerns the Court’s discussion of whether the plaintiffs had a cause 
of action. At both levels of court this discussion is lengthy and engages the laws of Bangladesh, 
the UK, and Canada. However, two points are notable. First, in determining whether Loblaws 
had sufficient control over its subsidiaries to create the necessary proximity to found a new duty 
of care, at no point does the Court recognize the reality of the international power dynamics at 
play between major global brands engaging in one of the most abusive and environmentally 
destructive industries in the world, and their often-poor host states. The Court instead suggests 
Loblaws (a retail giant) didn’t have control over its subsidiaries (local companies in Bangladesh) 
because contractually it could not impact the actions of such companies. There is no 
acknowledgment (reality-frame) that Loblaws has enormous, though perhaps unwritten, power 
over such manufacturers.  
The second point is that where convenient, the Court of Appeal imagines — and 
effectively dictates — a future in which the Bangladeshi court would not entertain any new duty 
 
463 Das SC, supra note 284 at paras 274-277. 
464 Ibid at para 288. 
465 Ibid at para 297. It is important to recognize that this conclusion is not limited to a future in which a trial judge 
actually does sever problematic areas of law; it is a conclusion in any event. 
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of care as defined by the plaintiffs. It does so on the basis that it determined the court in 
Bangladesh would follow the authorities in the UK rather than the authorities in India despite 
evidence the Bangladesh court relies equally on both.466 This is particularly problematic given 
recent authority from the Indian Supreme Court which had held India would take a liberal 
approach to tort law and would not be held back where the UK had not yet moved forward. In 
particular, in the case cited, the Indian court had held the social costs of conducting hazardous 
activities should be borne by the profit-maker and not by the community.467 
Despite engaging in speculation itself — indeed, speculation that whispers of modern 
imperialism even as the same judge castigates the Bangladeshi plaintiffs’ lawyers for themselves 
being so imperialist as to cast doubt on the Bangladeshi tort law’s preparedness — the Court held 
that to argue Bangladesh would follow the lead of the Supreme Court of India rather than that of 
the UK was “pure speculation,” and rejected the argument.468 To be clear, the Ontario courts 
hearing this case (1) first, through a strict construction of Tolofson, denied Ontario law would 
apply in favour of Bangladeshi law, then (2) denied any suggestion — despite evidence to the 
contrary — that Bangladeshi law would reflect Indian law, (3) instead found novel Bangladeshi 
law would reflect British law, (4) found British law would not allow recovery and (5) granted the 
defendants’ motion. This string of logic was accomplished while remaining shrouded by the 
Courts’ insistence it was rejecting the plaintiffs’ imperialist logic. 
In Das, the Court determined Loblaws — a giant multinational company — would not 
(and should not) be held responsible for the CSR standards it itself had promoted despite: 
knowing such standards were being breached;469 knowing Bangladesh has “an abysmal record of 
enforcing safety standards,”470 and choosing to do business there in any event. The judgment, 
where it benefits Loblaws (a CanCorp), upholds traditional concepts of state and judicial equality 
either by rejecting any suggestion the foreign state is unable to deliver justice, or by assuming 
the foreign state’s judiciary will apply traditional and corporation-favouring, western, black letter 
conceptions of the law.  
 
466 Das CA, supra note 287 at para 188. 
467 Ibid at para 184. 
468 Ibid at para 192. 
469 Das SC, supra note 284 at para 122. 
470 Das SC, supra note 284 at para 36. 
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In being forced to engage with the modern experience of transnational corporate activity, 
such as modern ideas of control and the impact of CSR standards, the Courts chose to apply 
traditional and dated territorialist notions of comity, tailored deference, and subjective fact-
finding, all to the benefit of the corporate interest. In this case, like many of the others noted 
above, in the act of naming and defining what is meant by “control” and the impact of CSR 
standards, the Courts engaged not only in self-referenced fact-finding but also in norm creation 
for the Field itself. It defined for the agents in the Field and those in interacting fields (economic, 
political) what will be expected of them. In this case, the Courts legitimized a corporate-power-
benefiting interpretation of obligations and control, rather than looking to international human 
rights obligations (or comparative tort law such as the Indian Supreme Court, for that matter) for 
normative inspiration, and legitimized the continued use of CSR standards and complicated 
corporate structures with no resulting responsibility. At the same time, the judge aggressively 
layers a deference-to-foreign-states rationale onto the reasoning, for good measure. 
Territorialist application of comity leads to injustice 
Using Bourdieu’s field framework as an interpretive lens, we may understand some of the 
sociological reasons why Canadian justices are continuously, despite the actual black letter 
wording of private international law jurisdiction tests, pulled towards state non-intervention in 
cases of alleged human rights abuses. They include: the comfort and familiarity of the federalist 
context; frequent judicial reference to historical notions of comity paired with the influence of 
the field of power over the juridical field; and the doxa of incremental development, stare 
decisis, and independence of the judiciary. These “inputs,” or drivers, feed and enhance a hyper-
comity, state non-intervention Field habitus that colours resulting judicial decisions. This Field 
habitus tends toward the traditional and away from change. Such change would be in the real 
acceptance by the Field of the modern power disparities existing between states, between 
corporations and states, and between corporations and individuals. This acceptance would create 
a reality frame that would further recognize that such power disparities must be “read in” or used 
to inform the tests for jurisdiction.   
In point of fact, the tests available for and created by Canadian courts to determine 
whether to assert jurisdiction over parties to an action in cases involving human rights or 
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environmental abuses — particularly where the defendant is a Canadian national — already 
favour the assertion of jurisdiction through reference to a sort of reality frame (through, for 
example, analysis of juridical advantage). Additionally, a modern reading of the already-flexible 
concept of comity assumes some abandonment of non-intervention principles in contexts 
involving human rights abuses. However, what we have seen is that a territorialist approach to 
comity and to private international law, informed by the habitus of judges, continues to lead to 
some results which frequently do not align with fundamental concepts of justice. Even in a 
black-letter interpretation of the law, this ought not be the case. In other words, it is not the law 
that binds the hands of Canadian justices; rather, it is – or may well be – the habitus of their 
Field. 
The reality is that some CanCorps operating in developing states are responsible for 
subjecting locals to human rights and environmental abuses. In 2009 the Canadian Centre for the 
Study of Resource Conflict completed a report for the Prospectors and Developers Association of 
Canada, which found Canadian mining companies were the worst offenders of environmental 
and human rights abuses around the world.471 CanCorps, detailed the report, were more likely to 
be engaged in community conflict, environmental abuses, and unlawful or unethical behaviour. 
Seven years later, in 2016 (as noted above in the introduction) JCAP released a report entitled 
“The ‘Canada Brand’: Violence and Canadian Mining Companies in Latin America” in which the 
organization documented 100 incidences of violence associated with Canadian extractive 
companies operating in Latin-America.472 Such incidents involved 28 Canadian companies and 
involved injury — disappearance, battery, sexual violence, and death — to 403 people. At the 
time, over 40% of the mining companies present in Latin America were Canadian.473 While 
mining is certainly not the only sector in which CanCorps have behaved badly, such figures offer 
some insight into the realities of those subjected to the presence of CanCorps abroad. Were the 
victims of the above-mentioned abuses domiciled in Canada, they would have the option of 
claiming against the CanCorp for damages in Canadian courts. However, being nationals of 
developing nations, often such victims have no redress as the courts of their states can often be 
 
471 The Canadian Centre for the Study of Resources Conflict. Corporate Social Responsibility: Movements and 
Footprints of Canadian Mining and Exploration Firms in the Developing World. (2009) online: <https://mining 
watch.ca/sites/default/files/CSR_Movements_and_Footprints.pdf>. 
472 JCAP Report, supra note 7. 
473 Ibid at 5. 
 116 
 
corrupt, ineffective, or unable to enforce against a CanCorp (for various reasons, including 
politics and economic incentive created by the CanCorp’s presence). It is for this reason 
Canadian courts become so important an avenue for justice and why it is important for Canadian 
judges to begin to critically observe their own conditioned assumptions and the way in which 
their habitus as Field agents is standing in the way of justice for vulnerable people. As it stands, 
however, there appears to be a lack of redress not only in host states but in Canada, which is 
made clear in cases such as Anvil Mining, Cambior, Das, and Green Park. 
Even if the disparity between what the law intends for or requires of Canadian justices 
and the influence of the field habitus — thus calling into question the effective independence of 
the Canadian judiciary — is unpersuasive on its own as a call for change, another line of analysis 
(taken up in the next section) may help make the cumulative case. A careful, even if only 
preliminary, analysis of the benefits CanCorps receive by virtue of being Canadian nationals may 
spark greater understanding as to why, as one dimension of fairness, such corporations should be 
held responsible for their actions in Canada rather than being able to hide at home from their 
poor or callous decisions. Where the preceding two sections introduced the effective conflict 
between the law and the way in which it is applied with respect to private international law, the 
following section introduces a fairness argument as to why self-critical Field agents should — 
despite their habitus — favour a modern and reality-framed interpretation of the law to ensure 
CanCorps face justice in Canada. As we shall see, one — not even powerful multinational 
corporations — cannot eat their cake and have it too. 
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Chapter 3: Fairness dictates Canadian courts take jurisdiction  
A: Fairness as a set-off against sovereignty 
Framing 
As we have seen, in Canadian private international law foreign plaintiffs face barriers at 
the stage of jurisdiction. As a preliminary stage in civil procedure, jurisdiction has become a 
gatekeeper in access to meaningful justice.474 A cursory read of the cases already decided (and 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2) could lead a reviewer to conclude the law in Canada simply is not 
positioned to handle or adapt to the globalized world. However, when searching for the reasons 
that the courts in Canada have stumbled, we see a more complicated issue than perhaps initially 
assumed.  
The law itself — the “black letter” that was created both judicially and legislatively —
actually favours the taking of jurisdiction in transnational human rights tort cases. Even the 
current understanding of comity — as explained by the SCC — reveals a shape-shifting, 
adaptable concept primed for reality-framing. As noted above, in some cases, courts appear to be 
applying a law of jurisdiction that aligns both with the purposes of private international law — 
namely the ordered and fair resolution of cross-border disputes — and with Canada’s 
commitments internationally with respect in particular to human rights. Nevertheless, we still see 
other courts failing to account for modern principles of interpretation by analyzing jurisdictional 
questions in a way that reveals a bias towards strict comity and a preoccupation with Canada’s 
primary role as a state among a community of states in what amounts to a throwback to a late 
19th century high-positivist construction of statehood and territoriality.  
A way of understanding this bias is to draw on Bourdieu and his field theory to examine 
why judges continue to be mired in this traditional idea of territoriality. If we understand the 
problem through this lens, we are left with the following dilemma: while the law is primed for 
adaptive and modern use, the habitus of the Field — shaped by the experience of its agents, by 
the history and doxa of the Field, and by the overarching input of the field of power — prevents 
 
474 Trevor C W Farrow, “Globalization, International Human Rights, and Civil Procedure” (2003) 41 Alta L Rev 671 
at 673 [Farrow 2003]. 
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some agents (judges) from seeing beyond territorialism and statehood. Provided we accept this 
understanding of the problem, we must also accept that the habitus of the Field is not easily 
shaken, the doxa, nomos, and structures of the Field being relatively stable. To ignore the habitus 
of the Field, I argue, is to ignore the elephant in the room; no real change can happen without 
addressing it.  
Thus, rather than ignoring the reality of traditionalist notions, we may approach the 
problem by leaning into them. A practitioner, in presenting her private international law case to a 
Canadian court, may “reality-frame” or “ground”475 an underlying conflict by catering to 
additional (or, alternative) Field doxa whose tradition and longevity are undeniable and even 
longer lasting than statehood, most notably among them, fairness. Through bringing fairness to 
the fore, we may shift the Field’s attention to the reality of Canadian civil procedure itself and 
the reality of international corporate accountability. Such ideas can, I will argue, be used to “set 
off” (to balance or even outweigh) preferences for territoriality within the current Field habitus.  
Fairness as equality 
That the concept of fairness is foundational to justice is generally accepted.  However, the 
makeup or content of fairness is forever at issue. A veteran philosophy of justice sees fairness in 
like-actors being treated equally – where one understands “equally” in the sense of formal 
equality only (likes being treated the same). Indeed, from Glaucon’s speeches in Plato’s 
Republic476 and the Melian dialogue,477 through Hobbes’ Leviathan, justice — a pact between 
“rational egoists” — as equality leads to fairness because of an underlying balance of power.478 
Justice, in other words, required only that parties with similar power be treated equally, read 
fairly. John Rawls extended this concept of equality by arguing that actors deprived of 
knowledge about their current social position (i.e., for our purpose, their place in power 
 
475 See Laverne Jacobs’ related argument for a “grounded” impartiality for the review of administrative decision 
making based on schools of critique of Rawls: Laverne Jacobs, “From Rawls to Habermas: Toward a Theory of 
Grounded Impartiality in Canadian Administrative Law” (2014) 51 Osgoode Hall L J 543 [Jacobs 2014] at 566-567. 
476 Plato, The Republic, trans by Desmond Lee (New York: Penguin Classics, 2003) at Book 2. 
477 Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, trans by Richard Crawley (New York: Barnes and Noble 
Classics, 2006) at 89, 105, and 111 (where actors are not equal, the Athenians argued, the powerful would “do what 
they can and the weak suffer what they must.”)  
478 John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness” in Samuel Freeman, ed, John Rawls: Collected Papers (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1999) [Rawls 1999a] at 56. 
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constellations) would choose fairly equal distribution of goods and power as the basis of state 
institutions and decision making as they could not be sure where in society they would fall.479 By 
shielding a decision maker behind what Rawls referred to as a “veil of ignorance” the decision 
maker is imagined as disembodied; she is no one, and everyone.480 This veiled decision-maker, 
not knowing whether she would benefit from any given set of rules, will act in accordance with a 
contemporary version of a golden rule (or, Kantian categorical imperative) so as to select rules 
that reflect certain overarching disinterested principles of justice. In Rawls’ rendering of justice 
as fairness, political morality was de-coupled from an actor’s corporeal relationships and 
imagined as a universalist enterprise in which even unequally situated actors could strive to 
engage.481 In other words, the Rawlsian approach treats all veiled decision makers as effectively 
the same, rather than accounting for how the differences in their social contexts may impact their 
versions of “true impartiality.” Thus, a Rawlsian approach to fairness in private international law 
would see the equal application and development of the law by the Field and would have as a 
necessary starting point the optimal benefit of the law to all “users” of such law.482 For instance, 
it is difficult to imagine a veiled decision-maker not requiring the integration of the reality of 
globalism and transnational movement of goods and peoples within private international law in 
such a way as to benefit of victims of tortious conduct rather than only to the benefit of the 
corporate tortfeasors.  
In the context of private international law, this approach may engender some resistance. 
For instance, critics of Rawls’ theories may question the provenance of equal treatment or even 
the act of conceiving the content of equal treatment as such exercises fundamentally ignore a 
contextualized understanding of Field actors or circumstances.483 In other words, equal treatment 
 
479 John Rawls, Theory of Justice, rev (Cambridge: Belknap, 1999) [Rawls 1999b]. 
480 Seyla Benhabib, “The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist 
Theory” in Seyla Benhabib & Drucilla Cornell, eds, Feminism as Critique: On the Politics of Gender (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1987) 77 at 89. 
481 Rawls is supported in this approach through the concept of the impartial, disinterested and objective, “Herculean” 
judge imagined by Ronald Dworkin: Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1986). 
482 Those developing the law (judges, counsel bringing cases, the legislature) would recognize that from behind the 
veil, they could equally profit or be subject to unequal treatment.  
483 See for instance the communitarian critique of Michael J Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd ed 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); the contextual critique of Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A 
defence of Pluralism & Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983); the discourse theory critique by Jürgen Habermas, 
Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, translated by William 
Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998); and the discussion of the Marxist critique by Trevor Farrow, Civil Justice, 
Privatization, and Democracy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) [Farrow 2014] at 38. 
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ignores the inherent differences between actors before they engage in the veiled choice exercise. 
This divergence in political theory is certainly important. For instance, in the context of private 
international law, this divergence leads to arguments grounded in the fundamental power 
imbalance between CanCorps and plaintiffs (including developing states) as a basis for equity in 
treatment (equality through different treatment) before the courts. This argument — that courts 
ought to base their decision making (their application of the tests for jurisdiction) with an eye to 
the reality of the power of the CanCorp over the plaintiff— is frequently made and is, to some, 
ethically powerful.484 Rather than suggesting these positions are without merit — an argument 
that I would oppose — for the purpose of this analysis, I propose to, instead, evaluate equality 
(rather than equity) of treatment not between parties, but as between the Canadian treatment of 
the CanCorp itself, comparing the benefits and liabilities experienced by the CanCorp that are 
embedded in the Field. By doing so, we may conceive of the problem — whether courts ought to 
take jurisdiction over their own nationals — without reference to agent-relational equality, and 
may focus solely on equality in the corporation’s relationship with the Field itself. Such a single-
agent approach is part of Rawls’ own understanding of one dimension of how justice as fairness 
works. As Rawls explained in his 1958 paper “Justice as Fairness,” in relation to “fair play,” a 
societal agent acts unfairly where they take advantage of a system without being responsible to 
it: 
Usually acting unfairly is not so much the breaking of any particular rule, even if the 
infraction is difficult to detect (cheating), but taking advantage of loopholes or ambiguities 
in rules, availing oneself of unexpected or special circumstances which make it impossible 
to enforce them, insisting that rules be enforced to one’s advantage when they should be 
suspended, and more generally, acting contrary to the intention of a practice. It is for this 
reason that one speaks of the sense of fair play: acting fairly requires more than simply being 
able to follow rules; what is fair must often be felt or perceived, one wants to say. It is not, 
however, an unnatural extension of the duty of fair play to have it include the obligation 
which participants who have knowingly accepted the benefits of their common practice owe 
to each other to act in accordance with it when their performance falls due; for it is usually 
considered unfair if someone accepts the benefits of a practice but refuses to do his part in 
maintaining it.485 
 
 
484 Stephens 2002, supra note 11 at 85; Thomas Boudreau & Brittany Foutz, “A Minimalist International Legal 
Order: Enforcing Jus Cogens Norms through the Fiduciary Jurisdiction of National Courts” (2018) 36 J Juris 111.   
485 Rawls 1999a, supra note 478 at 60-61 [Emphasis added]. 
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Just as some judges in Canada have used the elements of the test for jurisdiction to 
support a reality frame — one that takes into account the power differential and economic 
dynamics of transnational corporate activity — one may use a parallel reality frame to focus 
judicial attention on fairness in the equality of treatment provided to the CanCorp in and by the 
Canadian state. This analysis is contextual — or grounded, as Laverne Jacobs terms it — to the 
Canadian Field while avoiding the many challenges of arguing whether fairness within the Field 
must consider those who are subject to, but not immediate or repeat participants in the Field, 
namely foreign plaintiffs.  
Thus, ideas of fairness as it relates to the conduct of CanCorps within the Field could be 
grounded in the idea that a corporation should be held responsible for the burdens of 
accountability wherever it derives benefit, i.e. equal treatment in both gain and responsibility. 
Traditionally the question of benefit is framed to bind the victims of tortious (or criminal) 
corporate behaviour to the benefits that corporations get through operating in developing 
nations;486 an ethical (if not legal) duty arises to ensure benefit for the victims of such abuse.487 
This way of framing fairness, like the approach used by those critical of John Rawls, calls for 
embodied decision-makers who take into account the inherent social/economic/political power 
dynamic between plaintiffs and corporations. However, for our purposes, one can flip this 
concept to focus instead on benefits corporations derive by virtue of operating from Canada as a 
home state. Such benefits fairly lead to taking responsibility in the same home state for civil 
actions initiated against the CanCorp. 
By contrasting the benefits CanCorps receive by virtue of being Canadian nationals, we 
are able to encourage the Field to ground and justify purposive interpretations of the tests for 
jurisdiction in the doxic concept of fairness rather than in the contending doxic concept of 
territoriality without using principles of globalized moral equity (i.e. Canada owing as much by 
way of equal treatment to foreigners as to Canadians) or straying far beyond the current Field 
habitus (i.e. of Canadian law’s treatment of corporations, including Canadian private 
international law). In such a frame, the first step is to analyze what benefits the CanCorp enjoys; 
 
486 Developing nations provide economic benefit and competitive advantage for multinational corporations because 
they offer low-cost access to markets, labour, and environmental resources.  
487 Jamie Cassels, The Uncertain Promise of Law: Lessons from Bhopal (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) 
at 279; Farrow 2003, supra note 474 at 686, 704. 
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the next section provides core examples of the financial, regulatory, and reputational benefits a 
CanCorp receives through their Canadian nationality. 
B: Corporations as Canadian nationals: the benefits 
CanCorps receive a number of advantages by virtue of being “Canadian,” whether 
incorporated nationally or provincially. As an example, this section will explore some of the 
benefits enjoyed, as a representative example, by Canadian mining companies operating abroad 
accrued through their status as Canadian “nationals.” Such benefits include financial benefits —
tax benefits, increased access to capital, increased access to intellectual capital, access to credit 
insurance, subjection to less aggressive securities regimes, access to Canada’s international trade 
agreements — and non-financial benefits488 — weaker criminal law, lessened regulatory 
oversight,  and finally, the benefit of the “Canada brand” to a CanCorp’s reputation. 
1. Financial benefits 
Tax perks 
Taxation of Canadian companies (as with individuals) begins with a taxable event 
occurring in a corporation’s taxation year. Determination of how much a corporation actually 
“owes” is based on a determination of that corporation’s “taxable income.”489 Thus, it is only 
once “taxable income” is calculated that the corporate income tax rate, both federal and 
provincial, is attached. For reference, the federal corporate tax rate is 15%. This rate is added to 
the variable provincial tax rates that range from 11.5% (Ontario, Northwest Territories) to 16% 
(Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island). While Canada’s corporate tax rate is relatively moderate 
among developed nations,490 Canada’s corporate tax rate has dropped significantly from (using 
Ontario as an example) 36.6% to 26.5% since 2003. Corporations based in Canada but operating 
 
488 This is not to say that non-financial benefits that are immediately non-financial do not have resulting financial 
benefits for a CanCorp through, for example, increased competitiveness. 
489 Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) [ITA]. 
490 Compare, for example: Denmark (22%), Finland (20%), France (33%), Germany (30%), Japan (30.86%), New 
Zealand (28%), Norway (23%), UK (19%), EU Average (19.48), USA (27%): KPMG, “Corporate tax rates table”, 
(23 February 2018), online: <https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/tax-rates-
online/corporate-tax-rates-table.html>. 
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abroad are provided many of the same tax benefits given to Canadian corporations, and indeed 
some benefits that are not. What follows does not purport to be an extensive review of the 
benefits CanCorps get through the Income Tax Act (ITA), but an overview of some of those 
benefits provided by some of the most basic corporate structures.  
Taxable income of, for example, Canadian mining companies operating abroad depends 
mostly on whether the CanCorp is conducting mining directly, or whether it is doing so through 
subsidiaries.491 Either way, the CanCorp benefits by being in Canada. 
Where the CanCorp is doing business directly in the foreign jurisdiction, expenditures for 
the mining operation will be deducted from the CanCorp’s income as “foreign exploration and 
development expenses” (FEDEs).492 FEDEs include prospecting, surveys, drilling, trenching, the 
cost of (non-depreciable) property, or any annual payment to preserve the foreign resource.493 In 
this way, FEDEs operate like Canadian exploration (CEE) and development expenses (CDE) per 
section 66(1) of the ITA. However, unlike CEEs and CDEs, FEDEs are calculated on a country-
by-country basis494 and can be between 10% to 30% of gross income. By deducting FEDEs, a 
CanCorp can reduce its taxable income thus resulting in less tax owing.    
Additionally, the CanCorp may claim capital cost allowances (CCA) for any depreciable 
property. Most capital assets acquired by mining and oil and gas companies qualify for a 
depreciation rate of 25% of a declining balance. Currently, some companies qualify for 
accelerated capital cost allowances which can provide up to 100% depreciation of the asset 
cost.495 These CCAs, like FEDEs, allows CanCorps to further reduce their taxable income. That 
a CanCorp may deduct expenses such as FEDEs and CCAs is not unusual; indeed, Canadian 
corporations operating in Canada are eligible for similar deductions. The interesting part, though, 
is that deductions for operating costs and land devaluation, for example, for a Canadian-
operating corporation involve Canadian land and an interaction with the Canadian economy 
through local workers, local suppliers etc. While the corporation is saved some money in the 
 
491 Specific taxation of mining companies operating abroad is dealt with in the ITA and through the general 
corporate taxation rates in provincial income tax acts. While the provinces each have versions of legislation that 
specifically deal with mining, that legislation is limited to mining conducted in their jurisdictions (rather than mining 
conducted by a corporation headquartered in their jurisdiction but operating a mine internationally).  
492 ITA, supra note 489 at s 66.1(4). 
493 Ibid at s 66(15). 
494 Ibid at s 66.1(4.1). 
495 Though this accelerated allowance is being phased out. 
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calculation of its taxable income, it has otherwise directly contributed to the Canadian economy. 
The same cannot generally be said of a CanCorp operating abroad.  
Where the CanCorp must eventually pay tax in Canada on its foreign-sourced income 
(income minus the FEDEs and CCAs), it may be further granted a “foreign tax credit”496 which 
reduces the amount of tax otherwise payable by the CanCorp to Canada so that the total of tax 
paid to the foreign state and to Canada does not exceed the tax the CanCorp would pay if only 
paying in Canada. Where the foreign taxation rate in the operating country is higher or the same 
as in Canada, this may mean reducing the tax payable to the Canadian government by the 
CanCorp to zero. For example, if the CanCorp’s tax bill in the foreign state is $1 million and the 
calculated taxes due in Canada are $1.5 million (after having taken into account FEDEs and 
CCAs), the CanCorp will get “credit” for the $1 million paid in the foreign state and only be 
responsible to pay $500,000 to the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). If, as in the last example, 
the tax bill in the foreign state is $1 million and it is the same in Canada, the CanCorp will owe 
no taxes in Canada. The key here in this example is that a CanCorp is granted tax deductions and 
credits (on non-Canadian property and trade), thus decreasing its contribution to Canadian 
coffers, but having contributed far less to the Canadian economy than a Canadian-operating 
corporation. While this allowance seems of little consequence, the impact of a CanCorp offering 
little to the Canadian economy will be revealed in the review (below) of the extensive public 
loans, grants, and insurance provided to CanCorps operating abroad.  
Many CanCorps choose to do business abroad through either shell companies or 
subsidiaries — the CanCorp being the majority or only shareholder of the foreign company’s 
shares. These foreign companies are referred to in the ITA as “foreign affiliates.”497 Where a 
CanCorp carries on mining through a foreign affiliate, the CanCorp is subject to the “foreign 
affiliate” rules under the ITA.498 Under the ITA, income generated for the CanCorp shareholder 
of a foreign affiliate is taxed on two general bases: the foreign accrual property income (FAPI) 
system and the surplus system. The FAPI system generally attaches to income derived from 
passive investing sources (investment property, capital gains, non-active business, rents, 
 
496 ITA, supra note 489 at s 126. 
497 Foreign affiliates must be non-resident corporations in which the CanCorp holds a requisite equity percentage. 
For requirements of foreign affiliates see ITA, supra note 489 at ss 250, 95(1), 95(2.01-2.02), 95(4), 251, 94.2(2). 
498 Ibid at ss 90-96. 
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royalties, interest etc.) while the surplus system attaches to income generated from active 
earnings. This distinction is important because, while the FAPI system is taxation without credits 
or deferrals, the surplus system allows for significant if not complete deduction based on where 
the affiliate is located and on how the CanCorp categorizes its foreign affiliate’s earnings. 
Under the FAPI system, a CanCorp may deduct losses on property, certain allowable 
capital losses and foreign taxes paid (or deemed paid) on the income.499 Tax is paid on a current 
basis, i.e. taxed in the year it is earned. The surplus system, however, is more lucrative. For 
policy reasons, the Canadian government has structured international tax instruments so that if a 
CanCorp is conducting active business in a treaty country — say, Ecuador — Canada wants to 
ensure the CanCorp competes with companies headquartered in other states on a level playing 
field. So, for instance, the CanCorp subsidiary would pay its corporate taxes in Ecuador. Then, 
the CanCorp subsidiary, out of its “exempt surplus” — which includes net earnings in a 
designated treaty country and certain business activity — would pay dividends to the CanCorp. 
While dividends are generally taxable income in Canada,500 under the surplus system, the 
CanCorp can repatriate its dividends without paying any Canadian tax. Thus, even though the tax 
rate in Ecuador is lower than the total corporate income tax payable in some Canadian provinces, 
the CanCorp’s subsidiary will pay the Ecuadorean rate, and the Canadian tax rate will never be 
applied. In other words, where the subsidiary is operating in a tax treaty state, and where 
dividends are paid to the CanCorp out of the foreign affiliates’ exempt surplus, the CanCorp pays 
no tax in Canada on those foreign earnings.501 
As for any corporate concerns about the risk of future amendments to the ITA to increase 
taxation, CanCorps are assured that the Canadian government has their best interests in mind. 
Natural Resources Canada states Canada’s mining taxation regimes are “flexible enough to keep 
 
499 A deduction for taxes paid is calculated by multiplying the taxes paid in the foreign state (Foreign Accrual Tax) x 
the CanCorp’s relevant tax factor (RTF) which reflects Canadian tax rates. If a corporation’s tax rate in Canada is 
25%, then its RTF is 1/0.25 = 4. This amount is subtracted from the gross FAPI income and then declared as income 
to be taxed in Canada.  
500 ITA, supra note 489 at s 90(1). 
501 See Ibid at s 113(1) and for definitions of “exempt surplus,” “hybrid surplus,” and “taxable surplus,” see 
Regulation 5907; also see www.fin.gc.ca for list of Tax Treaties and Tax Information Exchange Agreement 
countries. 
 126 
 
pace with industry trends” and that “changes are implemented transparently and are based on 
industry consultation” so companies can make informed decisions about investment.502  
 On its face, assuming corporations act within the spirit of the law, the Canadian tax 
framework — including a beneficial tax rate, operating deductions, and the exempt surplus rule 
— is highly attractive to extraction companies. CanCorps are provided with tax incentives and 
credits without having to contribute directly to the Canadian economy.503 The scenarios I have 
reviewed above assume all deductions made by the CanCorp are legitimate (that they happened 
and they were valued accurately), and that the CanCorp actually paid taxes in the foreign state. 
However, these scenarios do not yet account for more creative tax-minimization schemes. One 
such example is strategic base erosion and profit sharing (BEPS),504 a process by which 
companies shift profits from higher-tax jurisdictions to lower-tax jurisdictions (tax havens such 
as the Cayman Islands or Barbados) to avoid paying taxes either in the operating state or in 
Canada, a CanCorp’s home state.  
BEPS is a major issue in Canada,505 both with respect to CanCorps operating in Canada 
and those operating abroad. With the release of the “Panama Papers”506 and the subsequent 
“Paradise Papers,”507 Canadians have been made significantly more aware of Canada’s lax 
taxation framework and the so-called “snow washing”508 of billions of dollars in potential tax 
revenue. Canadians for Tax Fairness, a Canadian non-profit organization, estimates the annual 
 
502 Natural Resources Canada, “Mining Taxation in Canada” online at: <https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/mining-
materials/taxation/8876>. 
503 Compare requirements for CanCorps to, for instance, the requirement that Canadian-operating corporations hire 
Canadian workers and the resulting limitations placed on hiring foreign temporary workers in Canada: Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227. 
504 See for example the OECD, Inclusive Framework on BEPS, 2016, to which Canada is a participating country. 
505 For an example of BEPS in action, see the recent report of the Dutch not-for-profit “SOMO”, on Canadian 
mining company Turquoise Hill Resources (subsidiary to Rio Tinto) which operates a copper mine in Mongolia. 
According to the SOMO report, Turquoise Hill has avoided paying $470 million in Canadian taxes through 
favourable tax-avoidance schemes: Vincent Kiezebrink, Rhodante Ahlers & Sukhgerel Dugersuren, Mining Taxes: 
The Case of Oyu Tolgoi and profitable tax avoidance by Rio Tinto in Mongolia (Netherlands: SOMO, 2018). 
506 See for example, Robert Cribb, “How offshore banking is costing Canada billions of dollars a year,” The Toronto 
Star (4 April 2016), online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2016/04/04/how-offshore-tax-havens-are-costing-
canada-billions-of-dollars-a-year.html>. 
507 See International Consortium for Investigative Journalists and reporting on Paradise Papers. Specifically, see: 
Will Fitzgibbon, “Tax wars, follow-up investigations and who was actually in the Paradise Papers?” ICIJ (5 
November 2018), online: <https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/tax-wars-follow-up-investigations-
and-who-was-actually-in-the-paradise-papers/>. 
508 Robert Cribb & Marco Chown Oved, “Snow Washing: Canada is the world’s newest tax haven,” The Toronto 
Star (25 January 2017), online: <http://projects.thestar.com/panama-papers/canada-is-the-worlds-newest-tax-
haven/> [Cribb & Chown Oved 2017]. 
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tax income lost to the Canadian government per year as a result of BEPS is between $10-$15 
billion.509 While not all corporate tax-minimizing structures are illegal (i.e. they involve lawful 
avoidance of tax versus unlawful evasion of tax), legality is not the essential point; such tax 
minimization, made possible by the ITA, creates a highly advantageous situation for Canadian 
corporations. As Peter Dent, a forensic accountant and past chair of the a non-governmental, 
anti-corruption organization, Transparency International Canada, observes: “Canada is one of the 
most opaque jurisdictions, globally, in terms of identifying corporate ownership…Canada is 
increasingly becoming an attractive jurisdiction for individuals who want to hide their money or 
their assets.”510 Following the release of the Panama and Paradise Papers, the CRA has initiated 
audits into many of the corporations and individuals therein named. However, this action may be 
for naught. In the recent decision of Cameco Corp v the Queen,511 the Tax Court of Canada 
upheld as legal Cameco’s transfer pricing scheme to move profits from a uranium mine out of 
Canada thereby denying Canada $8.4 billion between 2003 and 2017. Without a major overhaul 
of Canada’s ITA, moral incentive alone will not be enough to rein in technical readings of ITA 
requirements, which continue to be possible under the flexibility of the current law (as 
interpreted by our current courts). This flexibility is not lost on CanCorps.  
Each ITA provision allowing for tax advantage to a CanCorp creates benefit. However, 
the real benefit comes from the combination of such provisions along with organizational and 
operating structures designed to take advantage of the differences and interaction of tax rules 
amongst different state jurisdictions. Such tax planning allows an overall diminution of tax paid 
not just to Canada but across the board – even as that corporation may still be receiving a wide 
range of financial benefits from the Canadian legal system, whether through tax law deductions 
and credits or through other forms of financial support. 
 
 
509 Canadians for Tax Fairness, “Tackle the Tax Havens,” online: <https://www.taxfairness.ca/en/campaign/tackle-
tax-havens>. 
510 Cribb & Chown Oved 2017, supra note 508. 
511 Cameco Corporation v The Queen, 2018 TCC 195; Note on October 25, 2018, the Crown filed a notice to appeal 
the Tax Court decision to the Federal Court of Appeal. It is interesting to note Cameco is no stranger to international 
human rights and environmental torts. In 1998, 2000 people were injured, and thousands of fish died when a truck 
carrying mine waste from the Kumtor mine in Kyrgyzstan rolled into the Barksuan River. The Kumtor mine was 
one-third owned by Cameco (and two thirds by the government of Kyrgyzstan): Seck 1999, supra note 417 at 140. 
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Access to capital 
Beyond taxation, one of the most important reasons to headquarter a mining company in 
Canada is the access to investment and to institutional knowledge available in the Canadian 
market. 
Export Development Canada (EDC), Canada’s export credit agency, is the most 
significant source of funding for a CanCorp.512 EDC is a crown corporation that reports to 
Parliament through the Minister of International Trade.513 Despite being generally self-funded, 
since 1944, EDC has been advanced over $1 billion in taxpayer dollars to assist in the expansion 
of its insurance and lending operations. Through various funding programs, in 2017 alone, EDC 
facilitated nearly $14 billion in mining business worldwide.514 EDC, in assets at $69.4 billion is 
more than twice the size of the Export-Import Bank of the United States. In January 2018, EDC 
opened a wholly owned subsidiary, called “Development Finance Institute Canada” (FinDev). 
FinDev is guided by a development-focused mandate — as compared to EDC’s export-focused 
mandate — and seeks to support CanCorps doing business in developing countries (Latin 
America, the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa) specifically in “green growth” (renewable energy, 
energy infrastructure, energy efficiency, water supply, water management, waste management, 
waste water management, bio-refinery products, green industrial production), agribusiness, or 
financial services.515 FinDev was capitalized in 2017 with $300 million. 
EDC works with several other crown corporations and crown departments to support 
CanCorps doing business abroad. Such examples include: The Trade Commissioner Service 
(TCS),516 Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC),517 Sustainable Development Technology 
 
512 Total assets in 2017 were $60 Billion: EDC, “Annual Report 2017” (2017) online: 
<https://ar2017ra.edc.ca/highlights/>. 
513 Pursuant to the Export Development Act, RSC 1985, c E-20 [EDA] at s 22, EDC pays no income tax, making it 
significantly more competitive when compared to private financial institutions either in Canada or other countries. 
514 EDC, “Coming of Age: The Canada Brand as Exporting Advantage,” (26 April 2017), online: 
<https://edc.trade/canada-brand-exporting-advantage/> [Canada Brand]. 
515 Development Finance Institute Canada, “Homepage,” online: <https://www.findevcanada.ca/en/homepage>. 
516 The TCS forms part of Global Affairs Canada and helps CanCorps operate successfully on a global scale. The 
TCS has offices in 161 countries around the world providing CanCorps with on-the-ground intelligence, contacts, 
partnership opportunities and advice on foreign markets: TCS, “About the Trade Commissioner Service,” online: 
<https://tradecommissioner.gc.ca/trade_commissioners-delegues_commerciaux/about-a_propos.aspx?lang=eng>. 
517 The CCC is a crown corporation established in 1946 accountable to the Minister of International Trade. The CCC 
assists CanCorps in procuring foreign government contracts, thereby increasing access to foreign markets, speeding 
up sales, gaining a competitive advantage, and minimizing political and business risk: Canadian Commercial 
 129 
 
Canada (SDTC),518 and the Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC).519 As with the EDC, 
each partner organization is similarly endowed and keen to provide significant funding and 
assistance opportunities to CanCorps. For instance, as of 2018, the Export Diversification 
Strategy will invest $1.1 billion over six years to help CanCorps access new markets, and in 
doing so triple the Canadian TCS CanExport program.520 If a CanCorp is able to market its mine 
as one focused on research and development, then a number of additional funding sources 
become available, such as the Strategic Innovation Fund,521 or the $155 million Clean Growth 
Program.522 Similarly, in 2017, the EDC launched two “green bonds,” one CAD$500 million and 
one for US$500 million, and provided $1.5 billion in support for clean tech companies.523 The 
EDC does not define what is meant by “clean tech,” making it difficult to discern whether clean 
tech will include more controversial “sustainability” options like “clean coal.”  
Canadian embassies in host states may provide additional assistance to CanCorps in 
facilitating negotiations and contracts. For instance, according to MiningWatch Canada, which 
obtained documents through access to information requests, the Canadian Embassy in Mexico 
assisted Toronto-based Excellon Resources in their efforts to avoid addressing violations of its 
land-use contract with the local agricultural community on whose land it operates its La Platosa 
mine by lobbying Mexican officials, failing to encourage peaceful dialogue with the local 
 
Corporation, “Homepage,” online: <https://www.ccc.ca/en/canadian-exporters>. 
518 SDTC is a foundation created by the Government of Canada to support CanCorps working towards clean 
technology. The foundation was provided $400 million in 2017 over 5 years to re-capitalize the “Sustainable 
Development Tech Fund.” Since 2001 the Government of Canada has committed $1.364 billion to SDTC: 
Sustainable Development Technology Canada, “Homepage,” online: <https://www.sdtc.ca/en/>. 
519 The BDC is an agency of the Federal Crown whose purpose is to support Canadian entrepreneurship by 
providing financial and management services to CanCorps: Business Development Bank of Canada Act, SC 1995, c 
28; with respect to mining, the BDC offers financing and advisory services to fund growth and boost performance, 
respectively. For new businesses, BDC offers loans to purchase a business, loans to start a business, and BDC small 
business loans. In addition, the BDC offers expert business advice. 
520 Minister of Finance, “Investing in Middle Class Jobs: Fall Economic Statement 2018,” online: <www.fin.gc.ca> 
at 67. 
521 A fund of the Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development, as of fall 2018, the Canadian 
government proposed adding an additional $800 million over five years to the Strategic Innovation Fund to support 
innovation across all sectors of Canadian industry. The Fund lists as one of its goals to “accelerate areas of economic 
strength and strengthen and expand the role of Canadian Firms in Regional and global supply chains.” 
522 The Clean Growth Program is funded through Natural Resources Canada. Note, the Clean Growth Program semi-
finalists in 2017 included Barrick Gold and GoldCorp Canada: Natural Resources Canada, “Congratulations to the 
Clean Growth Program semi-finalists!” (27 June 2018), online: <https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/cleangrowth/21182>. 
523 EDC, “2017 Corporate Social Responsibility Report: Doing Business Better,” (2017) online: 
<http://www1.edc.ca/publications/2018/2017csr/en/> [EDC 2017 CSR Report]. 
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protesters, and sharing information gathered from locals with the company without the consent 
of such locals.524  
Many of the above-noted programs have instituted requirements that CanCorps seeking 
funding demonstrate they have identified and planned for any social and environmental impacts 
that may be caused by a proposed project. Despite these goals, the de facto impact of such 
policies is less certain. The EDC provides a prominent example.  
For a CanCorp to be provided with general corporate support from EDC — such as 
insurance and financing for day-today operations — the CanCorp must submit declarations that 
it is “not aware of any significant environmental consequences of their transactions and/or 
business.” Upon receipt of an application for such funding, an EDC financial officer conducts an 
initial screening to look for activities that might be high risk to the local peoples or the 
environment. If activities are flagged as high risk, the CanCorp is forwarded to the 
environmental advisory services team (EAS) for further assessment. As an example, the EDC 
stated that in 2017, 170 projects underwent “human rights screening” which reflects “human 
rights flags from business pre-screening that were assessed, not only those completed.”525 It is 
not made clear how many funding requests were granted despite having been flagged for human 
rights risks.  
CanCorps seeking EDC funding for large infrastructure projects must follow further 
requirements outlined in the EDC Environmental and Social Review Directive and provide 
quarterly status reports to the EDC board of directors. For a project to be considered for support, 
it must meet international standards which include International Finance Corporation’s 
Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability and the OECD’s Common 
Approaches and the Equator Principles. Projects must also be subject to an environmental and 
social impact assessment; such assessments are conducted by the CanCorp. For the largest 
projects, the EAS team visits project sites and works with independent reviewers.  
The EDC publishes a list of projects that have received financing approval, divided 
among projects that have potential significant adverse environmental or social effects (Category 
 
524 Jen Moore, “Unearthing Canadian Complicity: Excellon Resources, the Canadian Embassy and the Violation of 
Land and Labour Rights in Durango, Mexico” (25 February 2015) MiningWatch Canada Report.  
525 EDC 2017 CSR Report, supra note 523. 
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A), those with less impact (Category B), and those with no impact (Category C). EDC provides 
some information regarding the basis of expected compliance such as “host country standards” 
or “IFC Performance Standards” and, in recent cases, provides a short project review 
summary.526 Pursuant to the EDC’s policy, the EDC states that it monitors projects over the 
long-term and will suspend disbursements or funds or stop them entirely if it is unsatisfied the 
terms of the agreement are being met.527 However, managing environmental and social risk, 
according to the EDC, is the responsibility of the EDC client. While the EDC monitors funded 
projects, it outlines no clear process for non-compliance; the EDC does not publish decisions 
related to non-compliance with environmental or social standards and when/how the EDC has 
suspended such funds and upon what basis. Indeed, the EDC’s disclosure policy does not require 
EDC to disclose such information. Disclosure with respect to CSR standards is limited to 
approval stage, and even then, is limited in its depth.528 
The latest EDC report available at the time of writing, the 2017 Report, was prepared 
with reference to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standards529 and promoted “great 
progress in both environmental and social realms.” The Report features a “3-Year Scorecard” in 
which the EDC provided the values associated with total export and investment ($29.9 billion) as 
well as projects assessed under the Equator Principles and “other guidelines” (nine and nine, 
respectively). The EDC heard 42 “CSR-related public inquiries.” Five project sites were visited 
by the EAS team to meet with EDC customers, civil society organizations, government 
organization and other lenders. With respect to none of the assessments it conducted — on the 
 
526 Pursuant to section 68 of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, SC 2012, c 19, s 52 (CEAA 2012), 
a federal authority must not provide financial assistance to any person for the purpose of enabling a project to be 
carried on outside Canada unless the project is not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects or, if so, 
those effects are justified in the circumstances. Projects likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects are 
subject to the Projects Outside Canada Environmental Assessment Regulations (SOR/96-491). The Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency does not list a single out-of-country project in its project registry, despite there 
being a number of Category A projects currently funded. This is likely because section 24.1 of the EDA notes 
section 68 of CEAA 2012 does not apply “when the Minister or the Minister of Finance exercises a power or 
performs a duty or function under this Act or any regulation made under it, or exercises a power of authorization or 
approval with respect to the Corporation under any other Act of Parliament or any regulation made under it.” 
527 EDC, “Understanding EDC’s Project Review Process,” online: <https://www.edc.ca/content/dam/edc/en/non-
premium/project-review-booklet.pdf>. 
528 EDC, “Disclosure Policy,” online: <https://www.edc.ca/content/dam/edc/en/non-premium/disclosure-policy.pdf>. 
529 The GRI is a voluntary multi-stakeholder framework for environmental and social governance which has 
emerged as a benchmark for CSR reporting: Cynthia A Williams, “Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate 
Governance” in Jeff Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe, eds, Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) [Williams 2018]. 
 132 
 
Equator Principles, the CSR inquiries, or the site visits — does the EDC release its findings or 
any corrective action it may have taken. While the trappings of environmental and social 
sustainability have been adopted, follow-through and effective monitoring is less certain by 
virtue of a near-total lack of real transparency.530  
This lack of transparency was recently highlighted in a 2018-2019 investigation done by 
the Globe and Mail which, after studying the practices of the EDC over a one-year period, found 
the EDC continues to do business with and provide significant financial loans to CanCorps and 
foreign corporations that are embroiled in human rights and financial scandals.531 For instance, 
EDC approved a loan guarantee to the Royal Bank of Canada to finance the sale of a CanCorp’s 
(Netsweeper Inc) technology to the Bahraini government, which has been accused of using the 
technology to censor political opposition movements, human rights groups, gay and lesbian 
advocacy groups and news organizations such as Al Jazeera.532 On numerous occasions, EDC 
has continued to support its clients despite banks and international organizations such as the 
World Bank halting any such support. For instance, while the World Bank stopped any further 
loans to Canada’s SNC-Lavalin (SNC) following widespread allegations of bribery, EDC 
continued its support of the company to the tune of between $50-$100 million. EDC eventually 
distanced itself from SNC in 2014 only to re-partner with the company in 2017, providing the 
company with three more loans with a maximum possible value of $1.25 billion. This, despite 
criminal charges laid in Canada against the company for bribing Libyan dictator Muammar 
Gaddafi (discussed in further detail below). Today, following allegations CanCorp Bombardier 
engaged in significant bribery involving South Africa’s notorious Gupta brothers, EDC is facing 
scrutiny for having helped Bombarbier win a $1.2 billion portion of a locomotive contract and 
thereafter maintaining its relationship with the company, which is also its biggest client.533  
While Canadians are investors in EDC and are the beneficiaries of EDC’s profits 
(whether those profits are “clean” or not), neither ordinary citizens nor most government officials 
have access to EDC’s files. According to the Globe and Mail, EDC treats its investigations and 
loan conclusions “as confidential information belonging to its customers.” In 2014, following 
 
530 Simons & Macklin 2014, supra note 238 at 198-9. 
531 Matthew McClearn & Geoffrey York, “See No Evil” Globe and Mail (1 June 2019) [McClearn & York 2019]. 
532 Ibid. 
533 Ibid. Bombardier has received more than 230 loans from EDC between 2001 and 2018 with a combined value of 
between $20 billion and $46 billion.  
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orders from the Minister of International Trade, EDC hired a consultant to review its risk 
management practices. The consultant provided a 58-page final report, though EDC refused to 
make this report public, thereby shielding its shortcomings and any further response from public 
scrutiny. Further, in June 2019, a federal review was conducted of EDC which found serious 
shortcomings related to disclosure practices and a lack of legal obligation to consider social or 
environmental impacts of proposed projects.534 Notably, EDC’s disclosure practices were found 
to be inferior to those of other credit export agencies, such as in the US or at the World Bank. 
The report was tabled in Parliament on June 20, 2019, and will be submitted to a parliamentary 
committee. The report was met with immediate backlash from the Canadian Chamber of 
Commerce and the Business Council of Canada, among others, who stressed in open letters to 
the federal Trade Minister that no changes resulting in the scaling back of export support – 
particularly to developing countries – should be considered.535 
Despite the depth of crown/crown-corp funding, funding from government sources is not 
the only way CanCorps access capital. While domiciled in Canada, CanCorps have access to 
preferential commercial loans from one of Canada’s big five banks, all of which are ranked 
among the world’s largest 100 banks and remain, even after the 2008 financial crash, some of the 
most highly rated banks in the world. 
Additionally, investment is not limited to banking or project-specific loans. It extends to 
the personal savings of taxpayers. It is not legally necessary that Canadian public pension plans 
break down the companies in which funds are held. Thus, unless that information is made public, 
it can be difficult to determine how much CanCorp stock is held by Canadian pensioners. 
However, two examples are illuminating. In 2018, the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, 
one of the largest pension plans in Canada investing the funds of over 20 million Canadians — 
managing $356.1 billion in public funds536 — held $100 million invested with Teck Resources, 
$77 million with Goldcorp Inc, and $94 million with Barrick Gold.537 As of March 31, 2018, 
BC’s Investment Management Corporation, which invests $145.6 billion of BC’s public sector 
 
534 Matthew McClearn, “EDC disclosure practices fall short, federal review finds” Globe and Mail (2 July 2019). 
535 Ibid.  
536 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, “F2018 Annual Report” (2018) online: 
<http://www.cppib.com/en/ar2018>. 
537 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, “Canadian Public Disclosure,” (31 March 2018) online: 
<http://www.cppib.com/documents/1804/cdn_publicequityholdings_Mar2018_en.htm>. 
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pensions, had the following invested: $56.5 million with Barrick Gold, $68.5 million with 
Goldcorp Inc, $5.5 million with Tahoe Resources (recently acquired by Pan-American Silver, 
also a BC-based extraction company), and $2.7 million with Nevsun Resources.538 Recall, two of 
these companies are currently resisting the jurisdiction of BC courts. 
Beyond access to financial capital, a CanCorp headquartered in Canada also has access to 
knowledge capital: significant expertise in mining in, for instance, Toronto or Vancouver. First, 
the CanCorp can be locally listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), along with 57% of the 
world’s public mining companies,539 which can provide certain benefits. For instance, listing on 
the TSX means the issues are “eligible to be included in the S&P/TSX Composite Index as well 
as assignment to S&P/TSX sector indices.”540 Such inclusion provides listed companies with 
increased access to investment funds through large-scale institutional investment (from, for 
example, pension funds) in such index funds.541 In 2018, the TSX and TSV venture exchange 
were responsible for 49% of mining investment in the world.542 Further, CanCorps in Toronto or 
Vancouver will have access to accountants, lawyers, and myriad corporate entities who, by virtue 
of Canada’s significant global presence in mining,543 have the necessary expertise to assist the 
CanCorp in its corporate structuring, politicking, and expansion.544  
Last, locating the CanCorp in Canada provides access to various private associations that 
support a mining corporation. Examples include the Prospectors & Developers Association of 
 
538 BCI, “Investment Inventory List: As at March 31, 2018 (unaudited)” online: <http://bcimc-
ar.uberflip.com/i/1043396-2018-investment-inventory>. 
539 The TSX and the TSX-Venture Exchanges together account for 40% of the equity capital raised globally for 
mining in 2016: The Mining Association of Canada, “Facts and Figures 2017,” online: 
<http://mining.ca/sites/default/files/documents/Facts-and-Figures-2017.pdf> [Mining Facts and Figures]. 
540 “Why list on the TSX” The Canadian Business Journal (11 February 2019) online: 
<http://www.cbj.ca/the_advantages_of_resource-based_exchanges_the_tsx_and_tsx-ventu/>. 
541 Institutional investors are some of the largest investors in stock exchange index funds. An index fund is meant to 
capture a particular “market” and often does so by grouping the top x% of companies within a particular exchange. 
For a company to be included in an index means investors do not have to invest individually in that particular 
company, but can invest generally while still investing in that company: James Chen, “Index Fund” Investopedia (19 
April 2019) online: <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/indexfund.asp>. 
542 Paul Christopher Webster, “A Long Road,” Globe and Mail Report on Business (February 2019) 20. 
543 Canada is home to approximately half of the world’s publicly listed mining and exploration firms and Canada’s 
mining companies were present in 101 foreign countries in 2016. Canadian mining assets held abroad accounted for 
two thirds of total Canadian mining assets, suggesting Canadian companies are doing more business abroad than in 
Canada: Natural Resources Canada, “Canadian Mining Assets”, (31 January 2017), online: 
<https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/mining-materials/publications/19323>. 
544 Sara L Seck, “Home State Responsibility and Local Communities: The Case of Global Mining” (2008) 11 Yale 
Hum Rts & Dev LJ 177 at 191. 
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Canada, the Mining Association of Canada, various provincial mining associations, and the 
Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum. Such associations employ registered 
lobbyists to lobby every level of government on behalf of mining CanCorps. As but one example 
of the scale of lobbying activity, the nine in-house lobbyists for the Mining Association of 
Canada (there are five external firms that also lobby on behalf of the Mining Association) were 
involved in 319 communications with federal government employees on the subject of mining in 
the 12 months between April 17, 2018 and April 17, 2019. These lobbying efforts do not include 
the efforts of other lobbyists on behalf of the Mining association, nor lobbyists hired by the other 
entities and those hired by individual companies. For instance, Goldcorp Inc itself has five active 
lobbyists registered with the Federal government; Barrick Gold pays three.545   
Insurance 
Beyond capital, the EDC also offers CanCorps credit insurance at up to 90% of losses. 
Coverage under EDC Portfolio Credit Insurance includes the risks of customers (foreign states or 
corporations) failing to pay due to bankruptcy, termination of contract, or hostilities in a 
particular market that prevent the customer from paying. The EDC also offers “Political Risk 
Insurance” and “Performance Security Insurance” that protect CanCorps from losses resulting 
from expropriation, political violence, war and related disturbance, conversion, transfer 
repossession, non-payment by government, and acts of God. In other words, where a CanCorp’s 
mining project is at risk because of, say, local indigenous opposition, EDC insurance will protect 
the CanCorp’s investment. While the EDC is “self-funded,” its insurance policies are 
underwritten by the Government of Canada (tax payers), who, through the Export Development 
Act — the legislation that created the EDC — allows EDC to take on liability up to $45 billion.546   
For clarity, the EDC provides a mining CanCorp with funding to do business abroad — 
and under FinDev, specifically to do so in developing nations — and then insures the CanCorp at 
up to 90% of losses — underwritten by taxpayers —  should that CanCorp face “hostilities” from 
locals who jeopardize their profit margins, thereby shielding the CanCorp from most risk.   
 
545 Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying in Canada, “12-month lobbying Activity,” online: 
<www.lobbycanada.gc.ca>. 
546 EDA, supra note 513 at s 10(3). 
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Securities 
Publicly traded companies in Canada are subject to the provincial securities regimes, 
which require regular reporting in the form of (1) annual reports, (2) management discussion and 
analysis statements, and (3) annual information forms.547 Mining companies are also required to 
report information pertaining to their mining projects that may result in a change to the market 
value of their shares. As of 2015, the previous 15 years had seen 23 countries enact legislation to 
require public companies to issue reports including social/environmental information.548 In 
parallel, seven stock exchanges have required social/environmental reporting. Neither Canada 
nor the TSX are included in these groups.549  
While provincial securities requirements arguably require reporting of environmental, 
social, and political issues that may materially impact a company’s financial position, some 
studies have found disclosure such information wanting. In 2008, the Ontario Securities 
Commission assessed the financial statements of 35 reporting issuers and found that many had 
simply used boilerplate description of environmental liabilities;550 the same deficiencies were 
found in Alberta one year earlier.551 Such issues remained nearly 10 years later.  
 
547 Management Discussion and Analysis reports does not specifically require the issuer to report on social or human 
rights issues but requires reporting on “significant factors that cause changes in net sales.” Annual information forms 
require disclosure of risk factors related to business, however there is no legal obligation to disclose such forms to 
shareholders: Simons & Macklin 2014, supra note 238 at 218. 
548 Though “social” responsibility is a relatively vague concept, the ISO 26000, the International Standards 
Organization’s standard for corporate responsibility released in 2010 offers some guidance. The ISO 26000 was 
developed with representation from 90 countries and 40 organizations representing consumer, government, industry, 
labor, NGO, and academic representatives. While (ironically) access to the principles must be purchased, an outline 
is available. Pursuant to the standards the principle of “social” includes accountability, transparency, ethical 
behaviour, respect for stakeholder interest, respect for the rule of law, respect for international norms, and respect 
for human rights. The standards then lay out guidance for specific practices, including: organizational governance, 
human rights, labour, fair operating, environment, consumer issues and community involvement. From this list, it 
can be deduced that “social” as distinct from “environmental” includes at the very least labour, human rights, and 
stakeholder engagement issues: Williams 2018, supra note 529; International Standards Organization, “ISO 26,000-
Social Responsibility,” online: <https://www.iso.org/iso-26000-social-responsibility.html>. 
549 Williams 2018, supra note 529. Stock exchanges that have participated include: Australia’s ASX, Brazil’s 
Bovespa, India’s Securities and Exchange Board, the Bursa Malasia, Oslo’s Børs, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 
and the London Stock Exchange. 
550 See for example the discussion of the Ontario Securities Commission and Alberta Securities Commission studies 
in 2008 and 2007, respectively, regarding simplified, boilerplate, and non-reporting of social factors: Aaron A Dhir, 
“Shadows and Light: Addressing Information Asymmetries through Enhanced Social Disclosure in Canadian 
Securities Law” (2008) 47 Can Bus LJ 435 at 448. 
551 Ibid at 450. 
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In a 2016 report conducted by JCAP, a review of disclosure made by CanCorps in a five-
year period on the SEDAR filing system of the Canadian Securities Administrators found 
Canadian company disclosure rates of incidents that meet legislated definitions to be only 
24%.552 Additionally, the quality of disclosure was poor and, often, misleading.553 For instance, 
some companies reported the number of incidents rather than the number of victims, or reported 
an event such as a protest while failing to note the violence associated with the protest.554 Such 
findings suggest Canada’s securities systems lack robust requirements and enforcement 
mechanisms beyond those associated with pure financial data. Further, by tying disclosure to 
events that may impact market share, the burden to do so is felt unequally between companies; 
bigger companies with many operation sites are less likely to see a dip in market share resulting 
from an event at one site, even one involving violence, whereas the same is not necessarily true 
with respect to companies that operate one mine.555  
While the rate of compliance in continual reporting with respect to environmental and 
social issues remains questionable, it further appears CanCorps may also benefit from cost 
discrepancies between Canada and, for example, the United States — a fact some companies 
discuss openly. In Tahoe Resources’s Short Form Prospectus in 2015, it stated: “The regulatory 
and compliance costs to us under U.S. securities laws as a U.S. domestic issuer will be 
significantly more than the costs incurred as a Canadian foreign private issuer.”556  
The self-reporting requirement of Canada’s provincial securities regimes appear to favour 
self-bias and underreporting to the benefit of CanCorps. While securities standards could 
arguably be said to require disclosure of environmental, social, and political issues lest a 
securities reporter face commission sanctions — an obvious deterrent to Canadian incorporation 
— relaxed monitoring of such requirements allows public corporations to gain benefits as listed 
above without facing real risk of punishment for downplaying their actions abroad. It is 
important to remember, however, that such oversight — effective or not — applies only to 
 
552 JCAP Report, supra note 7 at 24. 
553 Ibid at 24-25. 
554 Ibid at 24.  
555 Ibid at 26.  
556 Tahoe Resources Inc, Short Form Prospectus (2015) at 27. 
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publicly listed corporations; there is no need for a private CanCorp to report on its non-monetary 
business dealings, thus leaving the public generally veiled from its operations.557  
International agreements 
Canada’s various international agreements provide CanCorps with attractive tax benefits, 
trade options, and investment security. Further to the tax benefits that flow from tax treaty states 
(explained above regarding the foreign surplus rule), Canada boasts free trade agreements with 
more than 40 countries, providing CanCorps with preferential market access around the world. 
The Canadian Mining Association lists specifically the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with the European Union 
(CETA), and the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) as enabling strong economic growth for mining 
companies by eliminating tariffs, specifically those related to aluminum, nickel, non-ferrous 
metal, and iron and steel.558 Furthermore, Canada maintains dozens of bilateral trade accords 
with foreign states for the protection and promotion of Canadian investments. Such accords often 
require host states to encourage favourable investment conditions for Canadian corporate 
investors, to withhold from expropriation, and to compensate for losses suffered as a result of 
civil strife, armed conflict, or natural disasters.559   
*** 
Tax benefits, loans, grants, insurance, favourable securities regimes, and international 
connection provide a confluence of financial benefit for CanCorps. Interestingly, that the 
economic benefits CanCorps receive are numerous is a sensitive fact for mining companies. In 
2010, Vancouver-based Talonbooks published Imperial Canada Inc: Legal Haven of Choice for 
 
557 Pursuant to the Extractive Sectors Transparency Measures Act, SC 2014, c 39, s 376, and for the purpose of 
fighting corruption, listed or unlisted Canadian extractive companies of a certain size must report payments greater 
or equal to $100,000 made to access extraction activities including through taxes, royalties, dividends, bonuses, fees, 
and infrastructure improvements. Non-monetary activities need not be reported.  
558 Mining Facts and Figures, supra note 539 at 73. 
559 See for example: the Agreement Between Canada and Mongolia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
(24 February 2017) Treaty No E105484; Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
Republic of Côte d’Ivoire for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, (14 December 2015) Treaty Series No 
2015/19; Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for 
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, (9 December 2013) Treaty No E105391; Agreement 
Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Ecuador for the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, (6 June 1997) Treaty No E101522-CTS 1997 No 25.  
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the World’s Mining Industries written by Québec academic researchers Alain Denault and 
William Sacher. The book examines the economic and political factors that contribute to why 
Canada was then home to 70% of the world’s mining companies. Before publication, Barrick 
Gold demanded copies of the manuscript and proceeded to launch a multi-million dollar 
defamation action against the publishers, postponing the translation of the book into English.560 
The action postponed the publishing of the book for two years, though it was eventually released. 
Though important, financial benefits are not the only benefits provided a CanCorp; 
limited regulatory oversight also makes for a welcome home base. 
2. Beneficial regulatory oversight  
Weakened criminal sanctions 
On June 21, 2018, the federal government budget omnibus Bill C-74 entitled “An Act to 
implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on February 27, 2018 and other 
measures,”561 received royal assent. At Division 20 of that Bill, the government amended the 
Criminal Code to include provision for “remediation agreements” (at new sections 715.3-715.43) 
for certain offences.562 Remediation agreements, also known as deferred prosecution agreements 
(DPAs), provide prosecutors the power to suspend charges and negotiate sanctions against an 
organization allowing an organization to avoid a public criminal prosecution. The purpose of the 
provisions is allegedly to “hold an organization accountable” and “denounce wrongdoing” while, 
among other things, reducing negative consequences of the wrongdoing for “persons — 
employees, customers, pensioners and others — who did not engage in the wrongdoing.”563 
 
560 “Barrick Gold moves to block mining book” CBC News (12 May 2010); “Imperial Canada Inc.: ‘two major 
Canadian mining corporations have been trying to prevent Canadians from ever seeing this book,’” Talonbooks 
online news (18 July 2013) online: <www.talonbooks.com>. 
561 Bill C-74, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on February 27, 2018 and 
other measures, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2018 (as passed by the House of Commons June 21, 2018). 
562 Offences listed in Schedule to Part XXII.1 of the Criminal Code supra note 125, includes Criminal Code 
violations, among others: fraud (s 380), frauds on government (s 121), bribery of officers (ss 119/120) and bribery of 
a foreign public official (s 3 of Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act). 
563 Criminal Code, supra note 125 at s 715.31. Note, this is only one purpose among others. The list of purposes is: 
(a) to denounce an organization’s wrongdoing and the harm that the wrongdoing has caused to victims or to the 
community; (b) to hold the organization accountable for its wrongdoing through effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive penalties; (c) to contribute to respect for the law by imposing an obligation on the organization to put in 
place corrective measures and promote a compliance culture; (d) to encourage voluntary disclosure of the 
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While DPAs may arguably lead to greater enforcement of and compliance with anti-corruption 
laws, without meaningful consequences for the corporations involved, a good case can be made 
that DPAs simply transform criminal sanctions into the “cost of doing business.”564 
Though there is arguably a trend towards DPA schemes among some developed states,565 
few schemes are operational. The notes provided by the federal government explaining the DPA 
amendments cited the existence of the American DPA provisions introduced in the 1990s,566 and 
the UK provisions introduced in 2013.567 Unfortunately, some examples from the American and 
UK experience have been less than promising.  
In the UK, the 2017 DPA negotiated for Rolls-Royce, and judicially approved by the 
Right Honourable Sir Brian Leveson,568 was received with mixed opinion. Following a four-year 
investigation by the UK’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) into systemic corruption at Rolls-Royce 
that spanned a quarter-century, seven countries, and 30 million documents, Rolls-Royce’s size 
and economic clout appear to have played a significant part in its DPA;569 indeed the collateral 
damage of serious threats to the viability of the company that would result from prosecution 
would have been too far-reaching. The Rolls-Royce DPA included disgorgement and penalties of 
 
wrongdoing; (e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (f) to reduce the negative 
consequences of the wrongdoing for persons — employees, customers, pensioners and others — who did not engage 
in the wrongdoing, while holding responsible those individuals who did engage in that wrongdoing. It is important 
to note that the purpose of avoiding negative consequences for “innocent” people is expressly not considered at s 
715.32(2), the factors to consider in entering into a negotiation for a DPA. It is only in the “umbrella” subsection of s 
715.32(2)(i) — any other factor the prosecutor considers relevant — that the “innocent persons” purpose may be 
considered. 
564 Transparency International, “Another Arrow in the Quiver? Consideration of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
Scheme in Canada” (July 2017) online: http://www.transparencycanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/DPA-
Report-Final.pdf [Transparency 2017]. 
565 While the US has used DPAs since the 1990s, recent players have included Japan (2018), France (2018), UK 
(2013), Singapore (2018), Australia (pending): Rahman Ravelli, “The international rise of deferred prosecution 
agreements - and how to obtain one,” Lexology (15 August 2018). 
566 Canada, Parliament, Economics, Resources and International Affairs Division and Legal and Social Affairs 
Division, Legislative Summary of Bill C-74: An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in 
Parliament on February 27, 2018 and other measures, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess (20 April 2018); DPAs in the United 
States are not grounded in any specific legal framework but are based on policies issued by the Department of 
Justice and guidelines set out in memos issued by the Deputy Attorney General. As such, American DPAs are subject 
to the discretion of prosecutors and thus vary a great deal from case to case: Transparency 2017, supra note 564 at 
10.  
567 Crime and Courts Act (UK) 2013, c 22, Schedule 17 [Crime and Courts Act]. 
568 Serious Fraud Office v Rolls Royce plc, [2017] No U20170036 (QB) [Rolls-Royce].  
569 Jennifer Wells, “The U.K.’s deferred prosecution agreements are instructive for the SNC-Lavalin drama” The 
Toronto Star (15 February 2019). 
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more than £670 million and independent monitoring of an ongoing compliance program.570 
Transparency International responded to the DPA by noting that Rolls-Royce got off lightly and 
that the fine was relatively painless for such a powerful company, particularly given no 
individual actors were prosecuted. There is yet no evidence with respect to the effectiveness of 
the negotiated compliance program in terms of reducing corruption within Rolls-Royce.  
In the US, scholars note that American judicial scrutiny over the terms of DPAs has been 
non-existent.571 In the recent decision of United States v Fokker Services BV,572 the DC Circuit 
curtailed recent efforts of reviewing judges who had tried to declare that an “Article III judge” is 
not a “potted plant”573 or “rubber stamp”574 when reviewing DPAs. The appellate court held that 
a court is not authorized to reject a DPA based on finding the charging decisions and the 
conditions agreed to are inadequate; to do so would be to interfere with the “Executive’s long-
settled primacy over charging.”575 In 2010, Fokker — a Dutch company that sells products to the 
aerospace industry — approached the US government to self-report that it may have violated US 
sanctions and export laws by selling product in Iran, Sudan, and Burma. Following a four-year 
investigation, American authorities discovered Fokker had unlawfully earned $21 million from 
1147 transactions. The DPA arranged with Fokker required it to pay fines and penalties totalling 
$21 million — effectively to pay back the income it had unlawfully generated and no more — 
and to implement new compliance policies.576 Indeed, the District Court judge found the DPA 
was too lenient and criticized the Department of Justice for prosecuting “so anemically” a 
company that had assisted some of the nation’s “worst enemies.”577 Specifically, like in Rolls-
Royce, the DPA failed to require prosecution of individual actors. The “unnecessary broad 
conclusion” of the appellate court that the “Judiciary's lack of competence to review the 
prosecution's initiation and dismissal of charges equally applies to review of … the choices 
reflected in the [DPA]'s terms” has worried some American criminal justice scholars.578 
 
570 Rolls-Royce, supra note 568 at Appendix B. 
571 Mike Koehler, “Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement,” (2015) 49 UC Davis L R 497 at 505. 
572 United States v Fokker Services BV, 818 F3d 733 (DC Cir 2016) [Fokker]. 
573 United States v HSBC Bank USA, NA, No 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161 (EDNY July 1, 2013) at 5.  
574 United States v Fokker Services BV, 79 F Supp 3d 16o, 164 (DDC 2015) [Fokker DC]. 
575 Fokker, supra note 567 at 743. 
576 Ibid at 739. 
577 Fokker DC, supra note 574 at 167. 
578 “Criminal Law - Separation of Powers - D.C. Circuit Holds That Courts May Not Reject Deferred Prosecution 
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Despite such examples, the Canadian government incorporated a significantly similar 
system in Canada. Of particular import are the provisions related to publication of information. 
For instance, the new Canadian model, following that of the UK requires judicial oversight for 
acceptance of an agreement. However, like the UK, further monitoring is not circumscribed. 
Critics have argued independent monitoring should be required of DPA schemes and that 
monitor reports should be made public. In the United States, monitor reports are not publicized 
and the Department of Justice has repeatedly objected to public review of such reports, which 
has resulted in little public oversight of the effectiveness of DPA agreements on the subsequent 
operation of affected corporations.579 Similarly, while the public release of monitor reports is not 
addressed in the UK’s Schedule 17, the UK’s DPA Code of Practice notes that monitor reports 
are deemed confidential.580 Not only has the new Canadian scheme not addressed the disclosure 
of monitor reports, like the UK scheme, the assignment of independent monitors is not required. 
Additionally, publication of an approved DPA is not always mandatory. In the UK, while 
there is requirement to publish a positive decision,581 a judge may order postponement of 
publication, where it is “necessary to avoid substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of 
justice in any legal proceedings.”582 The Canadian model similarly provides the court with the 
discretion not to publish the DPA, but on a less rigorous standard: “if it is satisfied that the non-
publication is necessary for the proper administration of justice.”583 Notably, the Canadian 
Senate’s Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs expressed concern, noting a 
court’s decision not to publish a remediation agreement may mean victims and other members of 
the public may never be informed of outcomes. The Standing Committee recommended 
remediation agreements “always be published at the earliest opportunity;”584 this change was not 
made to Bill C-74. 
 
Agreements Based on the Inadequacy of Charging Decisions or Agreement Conditions,” (2017) 130 Harv L Rev 
1048 at 1051 and see footnote 42. 
579 Transparency 2017, supra note 564 at 30-31. 
580 Ibid at 30. 
581 The prosecutor must publish the DPA, the declaration of the court and its preliminary reasoning per section 8, 
Crime and Courts Act, supra note 567. 
582 Ibid at s 12.  
583 Criminal Code, supra note 125 at s 715.42(2). Pursuant to subsection 3, the court must consider factors in 
making this decision, though some arguably support the corporation’s interests ((e) the salutary and deleterious 
effects of making the decision). 
584 Canada, Parliament, Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Twenty Fifth Report: The 
subject matter of those elements contained in Divisions 15 and 20 of Part 6 of Bill C-74, An Act to implement certain 
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As the content of the Canadian scheme has received criticism, the timing of its 
implementation has been similarly questioned given that it was brought about amid a significant 
looming criminal prosecution against one of Canada’s biggest developers, SNC-Lavalin. Further 
criticism has addressed SNC’s involvement in the drafting of the scheme.585 
The SNC affair has already cast the future effectiveness of the DPA scheme in doubt.  
Before the scheme’s implementation, Transparency International Canada recommended 
that a DPA be a discretionary tool with only the prosecutor permitted to invite the defendant to 
enter into negotiations; the accused should have no right to demand that DPA negotiations 
commence.586 Notably, nothing in the language of the new DPA scheme suggests otherwise. 
However, following the Director of Public Prosecution’s decision not to engaged in DPA 
negotiations with SNC, SNC — being advised by former justice of the SCC, Frank Iaccobuci — 
applied for a judicial review of the prosecutor’s discretionary decision.587 In doing so, it appears 
it had the support of at least some members of the governing party. Liberal MP Steven 
MacKinnon went so far as to explain to the CBC that SNC was “entitled to a deferred 
prosecution agreement.”588 Such legal challenge was not surprising given the extended media 
campaign SNC launched in Québec to raise support in its push for a DPA. In one advertisement 
it stated, “The Government of Canada passed legislation in 2018 to allow companies to settle 
charges via a remediation agreement, and yet the new law is not being made available to SNC-
Lavalin for unknown reasons.”589 SNC’s sense of entitlement is particularly noteworthy given 
that it is questionable whether its alleged criminal wrongdoing could ever be subject to a DPA. 
In Canada, as in the USA and the UK, DPAs are available for monetary crimes, but not those 
that involve bodily harm or death. SNC is charged with bribing Libyan dictator Muammar 
Gaddafi with more than $50 million in exchange for billions of dollars in contracts — including 
 
provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on February 27, 2018 and other measures, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess (27 
February 2018); note, the Senate Standing Committee also expressed their concern regarding a lack of information 
provided by the Minister of Justice, the fact that the changes were introduced through a budget omnibus bill, and an 
apparent lack of consultation by government with victims of corporate harm in designing the new scheme (the last 
observation was proposed by a minority of Senators). 
585 Paul Wells, “Canada, the show,” Maclean’s (12 February 2019) [Wells 2019]. 
586 Transparency 2017, supra note 564. 
587 Counsel for the Public Prosecution Service brought a motion to strike for no cause of action and were successful: 
SNC-Lavalin Group Inc v Canada (Public Prosecution Service), 2019 FC 282.  
588 Catharine Tunney, “Liberal MP says SNC-Lavalin ‘entitled’ to agreement to avoid criminal trial,” CBC News (4 
March 2019). 
589 Paul Wells, “SNC-Lavalin needed what Jody Wilson-Raybould wouldn’t give it,” Maclean’s (8 February 2019). 
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infrastructure contracts to build prisons — over the course of 16 years. SNC did so while almost 
certainly aware of the reality of Gaddafi’s direction of and role in widespread human rights 
abuses including torture, murder, abductions, and rape.590 For instance, SNC helped finance 
Gaddafi’s son’s soccer team after his bodyguards opened fire on fans — resulting in the killing 
of between 20-50 people — for booing a referee seen to favour the son.591   
The timing of the DPA amendments and support of SNC’s position by Canada’s 
governing party592 suggests the new DPA scheme was indeed meant to save precisely this kind 
of company from prosecution, despite any link between the company’s actions and subsequent 
human rights abuses. Such support potentially foreshadows the way in which such agreements 
may be interpreted in the future, possibly by a more corporate-friendly public prosecutor. Even at 
their best, DPAs represent a collective “giving up” in the serious investigation and prosecution of 
corporations; they are the admission on the part of government that some companies are simply 
too big, too powerful, too complicated, and too involved in politics and the community to be 
treated like everyone else. This, despite the government’s own role in allowing such companies 
to self-complicate, to grow unwieldy, and to amass such power. The recent boom in DPA 
schemes, including that in Canada, will provide an “option C” for CanCorps that engage in 
illegal practices: pay the price to do business, and move on. 
The advent of DPAs as a corporate-friendly oversight tool is unsurprising given the 
general lack of legislated corporate oversight in Canada.  
Legislated corporate oversight 
No legislation has been implemented in Canada — either federally or in any province or 
territory — to ensure victims of extractive harms abroad have access to damages in Canada, nor 
to prosecute CanCorps for poor behaviour abroad. This reality is not for lack of opportunity.  
 
590 Sandy Garossino, “The hidden key to the SNC-Lavalin scandal,” National Observer (8 March 2019).  
591 Ibid. 
592 I have not touched on the parallel controversy respecting the Prime Minister’s alleged interference with the 
Attorney General and her subsequent demotion following her refusal to pressure the Director of Public Prosecutions 
into offering SNC a DPA. However, the controversy has clearly shown the current leadership’s continued support of 
SNC. See the following pieces for a review of that issue: Craig Scott, “If the Liberals succeed in normalizing their 
behaviour in the SNC-Lavalin affair, it will have a lasting negative impact on our institutions,” Policy Options (5 
March 2019); Wells 2019, supra note 585. 
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In 2005, following hearings on the abusive activities of the mining company TVI Pacific 
Inc in the Philippines, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade (SCFAIT) presented Parliament with the Fourteenth Report of the 38th 
Parliament: “Mining in Developing Countries - Corporate Social Responsibility.”593 The 
SCFAIT had established a subcommittee tasked with the responsibility of inquiring “into matters 
relating to the promotion of respect for international human rights and the achievement of 
sustainable human development.” The Report made eight general recommendations including 
“establish[ing] clear legal norms in Canada to ensure that Canadian companies and residents are 
held accountable when there is evidence of environmental and/or human rights violations 
associated with the activities of Canadian mining companies.” The government committed to 
further examining some issues, but ultimately rejected any recommendations that would require 
binding commitments by government or corporations.594 
In an attempt to revive the concerns raised by the SCFAIT, in 2007 NDP MP Peter Julian 
introduced a private members bill that would allow foreign plaintiffs to sue in Canada for claims 
based on violations of international law or treaties to which Canada is a party.595 The Bill 
proposed adding a provision to the Federal Courts Act596 providing the Federal Courts with 
original jurisdiction in civil cases in which “the claim for relief or remedy arises from a violation 
of international law or a treaty to which Canada is a party and commenced by a person who is 
not a Canadian citizen…” Among acts over which the Federal Court would have jurisdiction 
were breaches of customary and treaty-based international law such as genocide, slavery, torture, 
and war crimes. The Bill further proposed to limit the flexibility of the common law test for 
forum non conveniens in such cases by requiring the court not stay a proceeding unless the 
defendant could establish, not only that another forum was available and appropriate but, that 
that other forum would “fairly and effectively provide a final and binding decision,” that the 
other forum would do so “in a timely and efficient manner,” that the interests of justice 
 
593 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs & International Trade, Fourteenth Report: Mining 
in Developing Countries, 1st Sess, 38th Parl (2005). 
594 Department of Foreign Affairs & International Trade, Mining in Developing Countries - Corporate Social 
Responsibility: The Government’s Response to the Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade (2005) online: <http://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/38-1/FAAE/report-
14/response-8512-381-179>. 
595 Bill C-492, An Act to amend the Federal Courts Act (international promotion and protection of human rights), 
2nd Sess, 39th Parl, 2007. 
596 Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7. 
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“adamantly” require that a stay be granted and — notably adding the Australian and American 
inwardly-focused approach — “that Canada is not a suitable forum in which to decide the case.” 
The Bill has not progressed past its first reading in any of its iterations from Parliament to 
Parliament. 
In 2009 the Liberal MP, John McKay, introduced Bill C-300, “An Act respecting 
Corporate Accountability for the Activities of Mining, Oil or Gas in Developing Countries.”597 
The purpose of the proposed act was “to ensure that corporations engaged in mining, oil or gas 
activities and receiving support from the Government of Canada act in a manner consistent with 
international environmental best practices and with Canada’s commitments to international 
human rights standards.”598 The Bill would create reporting requirements for Ministers and the 
ability to receive complaints and then, through amendments to the Canada Pension Plan 
Investment Board Act,599 the Special Economic Measures Act,600 the Export Development Act,601 
and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act,602 would create Ministerial 
power to limit federal support of CanCorps. The Bill passed a first and second reading and was 
referred to SCFAIT. In June 2010, SCFAIT returned the Bill without amendment. However, 
following a significant lobbying effort by CanCorps and mining associations,603 the Bill was 
defeated at the reporting stage by six votes.604 The failure of this bill — the clear opposition to 
the Minister’s proposed ability to cut funding to a corporation — further calls into question the 
effectiveness of, for instance, EDC’s environmental and social responsibility mechanisms. 
Notably, the EDC joined opponents of the bill in lobbying against it.605  
Today, two federal government bodies are responsible for “monitoring” corporate social 
responsibility in Canada: (1) the office of the Extractive Corporate Social Responsibility 
Counsellor (CSR Counsellor) and (2) the National Contact Point (NCP) under the OECD 
 
597 Bill C-300, An Act respecting Corporate Accountability for the Activities of Mining, Oil or Gas in Developing 
Countries, 3rd Sess, 40th Parl, 2010 [Bill C-300]. 
598 Ibid at s 3. 
599 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act, SC 1997, c 40. 
600 Special Economic Measures Act, SC 1992, c 17. 
601 EDA, supra note 513. 
602 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act, RSC 1985, c E-22. 
603 Opponents of the bill — mining companies — argued it would kill Canadian mining and those companies that 
remained would move elsewhere: Simons & Macklin 2014, supra note 238 at 264. 
604 Canada, Parliament, House of Common Debates (Hansard), 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, No 88, Vol 145 (27 October 
2010) at 1840. 
605 Simons & Macklin 2014, supra note 238 at 264. 
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Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.606 Neither office has the power to conduct 
investigations, sanction companies directly, or compensate victims. 
The office of the CSR Counsellor was established in 2009 following the release of the 
federal policy called “Building the Canadian Advantage: A CSR Strategy for the International 
Extractive Sector,” with the power to receive complaints and invite CanCorps to participate in a 
mediation with complainants, though the corporations may refuse or withdraw at any stage of the 
process for any reason. The CSR Counsellor cannot act unless there has been a complaint, cannot 
investigate complaints, and cannot issue binding decisions to the corporations.607 Since its 
inception, the CSR Counsellor has not developed a process for withdrawing support or 
withholding funding from companies engaged in nefarious practices and as of the end of 2017, 
the office of the CSR Counsellor had not indicated it had acted with the Canadian Government or 
Canadian embassies to withhold funding or assistance from any company.608 In its 10 years of 
operation, the office has reported only six requests for review. One of the more recent examples, 
a complaint against Silver Standard (a CanCorp) operating in Argentina, concluded when Silver 
Standard withdrew from the voluntary process. Similarly, Excellon Resources, operating in 
Mexico, withdrew from the mediation process prior to commencement, noting: “it did not 
consider the dialogue process facilitated by the office to provide value to the company or the 
company’s shareholders.”609 
 
606 OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2000 [OECD Guidelines]. 
607 Shin Imai et al, “Access to Justice and Corporate Accountability: A Legal Case Study of HudBay in Guatemala” 
(2014) 35:2 Can J of Dev Stud 286 [Imai et al 2014]. 
608 On its website the CSR Counsellor references Canada’s CSR strategy for the extractive sector, “Doing Business 
the Canadian Way: A Strategy to Advance Corporate Social Responsibility in Canada’s Extractive Sector Abroad,” 
as establishing “consequences” for companies that do not embody CSR best practices or refuse to engage in good 
faith with the CSR Counsellor’s dialogue facilitation process: Global Affairs Canada, “Reviewing Corporate Social 
Responsibility Practices,” online: <https://www.international.gc.ca/csr_counsellor-
conseiller_rse/Reviewing_CSR_Practices-Examen_Pratiques_RSE.aspx?lang=eng>. The CSR Strategy states 
“Companies are expected to align with widely recognized CSR-related guidance and will be recognized by the CSR 
Counsellor`s Office as eligible for enhanced Government of Canada economic diplomacy. Companies will also face 
withdrawal of TCS and other Government of Canada advocacy support abroad for non-participation in the dialogue 
facilitation processes of Canada’s NCP and Office of the Extractive Sector CSR Counsellor…Canadian companies 
found not to be embodying CSR best practices and who refuse to participate in dispute resolution processes 
contained in the CSR Strategy, will no longer benefit from economic diplomacy of this nature:” Global Affairs 
Canada, “Doing Business the Canadian Way: A Strategy to Advance Corporate Social Responsibility in Canada’s 
Extractive Sector Abroad” online: <https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Enhanced_CS_Strategy_ENG.pdf> at 12. 
609 Simons & Macklin 2014, supra note 238 at 261. 
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In 2018, the federal government created the new position of “Canadian Ombudsperson 
for Responsible Enterprise” (CORE) to replace the CSR Counsellor; in May 2019, the CSR 
Counsellor’s position will be folded into the ombudsperson’s role. The CORE’s mandate will 
include addressing complaints related to allegations of human rights abuses arising from a 
CanCorps activity abroad, making recommendations, monitoring implementation of those 
recommendations, and reporting publicly.610 The CORE is not yet operational and is set to be in 
place “as soon as possible.”611 The government indicated this position will differ from that of the 
CSR Counsellor in that it will have the ability to investigate independently and that it will 
monitor more sectors of Canadian business, beyond extractive companies. It remains unclear 
whether the CORE will have any real ability to sanction or limit the activities of CanCorps 
abroad, beyond making recommendations to government.612 
The OECD NCP is similarly limited. In 1976, the OECD released its Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines),613 voluntary principles and standards for 
responsible business conduct. The OECD Guidelines encourage enterprises to follow a number 
of positive steps, including for our purposes, to: respect the human rights of those affected by 
their activities;614 develop systems that foster relationships of confidence and mutual trust 
between enterprises and the societies in which they operate;615 respect trade unions;616 contribute 
to the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;617 and maintain plans to prevent 
serious environmental and health damage from their operations.618 The OECD Guidelines are the 
only international guidelines that recommend risk-based due diligence619 and provide tailored 
 
610 Global Affairs Canada, “Responsible business conduct abroad – Questions and answers”, online: 
<https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/other-
autre/faq.aspx?lang=eng> [Responsible Conduct Abroad]. 
611 On April 8, 2019, Global Affairs Canada announced the appointment of Sheri Meyerhoffer as the first Canadian 
Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise: Global Affairs Canada, News Release, “Minister Carr announces 
appointment of first Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise” (8 April 2019) online: 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2019/04/minister-carr-announces-appointment-of-first-canadian-
ombudsperson-for-responsible-enterprise.html>. 
612 As yet, the new Ombudsperson’s powers remain undefined: “New corporate-ethics embed named but powers 
remain unclear,” The Canadian Press (8 April 2019).  
613 OECD Guidelines, supra note 606; Canada as a member of the OECD is an “adhering government.” 
614 Ibid at II(2). 
615 Ibid at II (7). 
616 Ibid at IV(1)(a). 
617 Ibid at IV(1)(c). 
618 Ibid at V(5). 
619 OECD, OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, 2018. 
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sector-specific guidance for multinational enterprises.620 As recently as May 30, 2018, Canada 
and other OECD countries agreed to step up responsibility and commitment to the OECD 
Guidelines through their support and monitoring of the implementation of the new OECD Due 
Diligence Guidance for responsible business conduct at the OECD’s annual meeting.621 While 
the OECD Guidelines are voluntary, Canada promotes its support of the OECD Guidelines 
through its NCP.622 
However, similar to the CSR Counsellor, the NCP is limited in its jurisdiction;623 any 
resolution between parties is non-enforceable and the NCP has no power to award 
compensation.624 Since 2001 (17 years), only 19 “specific instances” (read, complaints) were 
forwarded to the NCP. In June 2017, the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights 
noted in its end-of-visit statement that the Canadian NCP was ill-equipped to deal with human 
rights concerns and that it ought to be made more independent, vested with adequate resources, 
and be made more transparent in its process.625 In January 2018, MiningWatch, in partnership 
with OECD Watch, filed a statement outlining specific concerns with the way in which the NCP 
had handled complaints raised against the Sakto Group (a CanCorp) alleging the NCP failed to 
follow enumerated OECD processes and provided no clear basis for failing to do so.626 
Specifically, although finding allegations made regarding Sakto’s alleged involvement in 
laundering the proceeds of corruption from Malaysia were “material” and “substantiated,” five 
 
620 The OECD has developed sector-specific due diligence guidance and good practice documents for several sectors 
including minerals and extractive sectors: Ibid; Also see OECD, OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Meaningful 
Stakeholder Engagement in the Extractive Sector, 2017, which is supposed to provide companies with a practical 
framework for identifying and mangling risks with regard to stakeholder engagement activities to ensure companies 
play a role in avoiding and addressing adverse impacts as defined in OECD Guidelines, supra note 606. 
621 OECD, “Countries commit to step up efforts to drive more responsibility business conduct through new OECD 
instrument,” (30 May 2018) online: <http://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/countries-commit-to-step-up-efforts-to-
drive-more-responsible-business-conduct-through-new-oecd-instrument.htm>. 
622 The role of the NCP is to promote awareness of the OECD Guidelines; dialogue is a voluntary, non-judicial 
grievance mechanism aimed at working towards mutual agreement. 
623 Canada’s NCP is a committee formed by seven member departments and chaired by Global Affairs Canada with 
Natural Resources Canada as the vice-chair: Global Affairs Canada, “Canada's National Contact Point for the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,” online: 
<https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/ncp-
pcn/index.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=1&menu=R>. 
624 Imai et al 2014, supra note 607 at 16. 
625 OHCHR, “Statement at the end of visit to Canada by the United Nations Working Group on Business and Human 
Rights” (June 2017) online: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID 
=21680&LangID=E>.  
626 See: MiningWatch Canada & OECD Watch, “Statement from OECD Watch and MiningWatch Canada regarding 
the Canadian NCP’s improper handling of the OECD Guidelines specific instance Bruno Manser Fonds vs Sakto 
Group” (2018) online: <https://miningwatch.ca>. 
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months later, the NCP dismissed the case without providing clarification for its reversal in 
position. MiningWatch highlighted that, later that year, the NCP issued an eight-page final 
statement627 in which it revealed it had experienced significant pressure from a member of 
parliament and from Sakto’s legal counsel challenging the NCP’s legal jurisdiction and findings. 
This “final statement” was later retracted and replaced with a new final statement, removing all 
mention of concerns regarding Sakto’s conduct and instead suggesting Bruno Manser Fonds (the 
not-for-profit representing the complainants) was at fault and would have to demonstrate its 
commitment to “good faith” should it request any further review in the future.628  
I am aware of no official change to the NCP’s role or powers since the UN Working 
Group or MiningWatch’s complaints were made public. Indeed, over the last 15 years, rather 
than legislating power to monitor and punish CanCorps in Canada, the federal government has 
preferred the creation of non-binding policy and monitoring schemes. The federal government 
published guidelines available to CanCorps entitled “Voices at Risk: Canada’s Guidelines on 
Supporting Human Rights Defenders” in which the government explains that CanCorps are 
“encouraged to operate lawfully, transparently and in consultation with host governments and 
local communities and to conduct their activities in a socially and environmentally responsible 
manner.”629 
Similarly, in 2009, Global Affairs Canada launched Canada’s official policy on corporate 
social responsibility called “Doing Business the Canadian Way: A Strategy to Advance 
Corporate Social Responsibility in Canada’s Extractive Sector Abroad.”630 The policy relies on 
education and promotion of “effective” (not binding) CSR, and specifically notes the policy 
builds on Canada’s “steadfast engagement” with Canada’s commitments under the UN Guiding 
 
627 No longer available online.  
628 Canada’s National Contact Point, “Canada’s National Contact Point - Final Statement Bruno Manser Fonds 
(BMF) and Sakto Corporation et. al. (Sakto)” (11 July 2017) online: <https://miningwatch.ca/sites/default/files/ 
canada_ncp_final_statement_on_sakto.pdf>.  
629 Global Affairs Canada, “Voices at risk: Canada’s Guidelines on Supporting Human Rights Defenders,” online: 
<https://international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-
droits_homme/rights_defenders_guide_defenseurs_droits.aspx?lang=eng#a4> at s 4.2. 
630 Responsible Conduct Abroad, supra note 610. 
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Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP)631 and the OECD Guidelines (read, reliance 
on the NCP). 
CanCorps derive not only significant financial benefit from incorporation or doing 
business in Canada, they are also able to do so in an environment where official monitoring of 
their behaviour is limited and there are no effective means by which the government can or will 
choose to limit their profitability or access to such financial benefit. By choice, the federal 
government has not provided itself with the tools with which it could control or aggressively 
guide the behaviour of CanCorps operating abroad. This limitation results in a safe and 
financially comfortable home base for CanCorps. From this home base, CanCorps can further 
their profitability through the promotion of its reputation, borrowed from its national host.  
3. Canada’s reputation as a shroud of human rights support 
It is increasingly common for a corporation to adopt CSR policies to assist with the 
promotion of its corporate reputation,632 and respond to “issues beyond the...economic, technical, 
and legal requirements of the firm to accomplish social benefits along with the traditional 
economic gains which the firm seeks.”633 In developing CSR policies, MNEs often cite 
adherence to voluntary international instruments. For instance, Barrick Gold promotes its 
commitment to “working constructively” with governments and other partners to meet the UN 
 
631 UNGA, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect 
and Remedy” Framework, 2011, HR/PUB/11/04 [UNGP]. 
632 While traditional CSR saw corporations donating to causes unrelated to their business activities, modern CSR 
sees corporations addressing ways in which to adapt current business practices or to engage in measures to offset 
current business practice. One of the most common types of CSR is the “information-based approach,” also known 
as reporting: Graeme Auld et al, “The New Corporate Social Responsibility” (2008) 33 Annu Rev Environ Res 413 
[Auld et al 2008] at 415; The most comprehensive source of data on environmental and social governance (ESG) 
reporting is done by KPMG in the Netherlands. In 1993 ESG reporting of the top 100 companies in OECD countries 
was 12%, in 2013 that percentage rose to 76%. Of the largest 250 companies worldwide, the percentage that engage 
in ESG reporting is 93%: Williams 2018, supra note 529. 
633 Keith Davis, “The Case For and Against Business Assumption of Social Responsibilities,” (1973) 16 Am Mngmt 
J 312 at 312. While reporting may be one of the most preferred CSR approaches, the Business and Human Rights 
Centre, an NGO supported by the UK and German governments, found reporting does not necessarily lead to 
changes in the field. For instance, despite Barrick Gold’s 100% reporting rate on the UN Compact, Barrick’s 
operations at its Porgera mine in Papua New Guinea have come under fire for the “mine's impact on the local 
community found 920 alleged violations including rape, sexual assault, drownings and shootings”: Business and 
Human Rights Resource Centre, “Papua New Guinea: Report highlights abuses at Porgera gold mine; urges co. to 
address harm & strengthen remedy mechanism” (6 February 2019) online: <https://www.business-
humanrights.org/en/papua-new-guinea-report-highlights-abuses-at-porgera-gold-mine-urges-co-to-address-harm-
strengthen-remedy-mechanism>. 
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Sustainable Development Goals by 2030,634 while Goldcorp promotes its implementation of the 
UN Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights.635 Some MNEs further promote their CSR initiatives through engagement in NGO 
partnerships, borrowing the goodwill associated with, for instance, the World Wildlife Fund, to 
sell the company’s commitment to CSR.636 However, an MNE’s opportunity to engage with or 
merely cite international CSR standards or partner with NGOs can be done from anywhere. In 
contrast, the ability for MNEs to borrow a home country’s reputation is tied to nationality and 
cannot be underestimated. Indeed, a CanCorp is marked by Canada’s reputation when operating 
abroad.  
And, while the reality of its actual commitment is hotly debated, Canada certainly 
promotes itself as a guardian and promoter of human rights, at home and abroad. Since its 
participation and promotion of the UDHR in 1948,637 Canada has since committed to and voiced 
support for a large number of human rights instruments —the provisions of which have direct 
reference to the activities of CanCorps — such as: the codification in 1966 of the UDHR rights 
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights638 and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;639 the 1976 OECD Guidelines;640 the 1977 International 
Labour Organization’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises 
and Social Policy;641 the 1999 UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders;642 the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP);643 and the more recent 2015 UN Sustainable 
 
634 Barrick, “U.N. Sustainable Development Goals,” online: <https://www.barrick.com/English/sustainability/ 
approach/UN-sustainable-development-goals/default.aspx>. 
635 Goldcorp, “2017 Sustainability Report: Human Rights,” (2017) online: <http://csr.goldcorp.com/2017/ 
communities/human-rights>. 
636 See World Wildlife Fund’s partnership with Unilever and Domtar: Auld et al 2008, supra note 627 at 420. 
637 UDHR, supra note 179. 
638 ICCPR, supra note 364. 
639 ICESCR, supra note 364.  
640 OECD Guidelines, supra note 601. The guidelines encourage multinational enterprises to respect the human 
rights of those affected by their activities including the prevention of serious health and environmental damage and 
the promotion of trade unions: see Arts II(2), II(7), IV(1)(a), V(5).  
641 ILO, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 5th Ed, 204th 
Sess (1977). Unlike other such declarations, the ILO declaration specifically applies not only to states but also to 
multinational enterprises (Art 6). 
642 UNGA, Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote 
and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, A/RES/53/144, 1999. 
643 UNGP, supra note 626. The Guiding Principles were established in 2011 by the United Nations General 
Assembly. After a stalemate at the UN Human Rights Commission following an attempt at drafting the Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporation and Other Business Enterprises in 2004, American scholar John 
Ruggie was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary General with a mandate to identify standards of 
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Development Goals644 and its follow-up, the UN Global Compact.645 Notably, after years of 
resistance,646 in May 2016 the Canadian federal government declared its “full support”647 for the 
2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).648  
Despite Canada’s relatively small population size, Canada has consistently participated in 
the governance of world affairs. For instance, since 1976 it has been a member of the Group of 
Seven (G7) Industrialized Nations — described as the “steering group for the West”649 — and 
has served as a non-permanent member on the United Nations Security Council for six terms, 
thus ranking in the top 10 of non-permanent members. Further, despite ranking as 38th in 
population size, Canada’s GDP as measured by the World Bank ranks 10th in the world.650 The 
Reputation Institute — an American corporate consulting agency which has listed the most 
reputable countries since 2005 — has ranked Canada (as measured by the reputation of Canadian 
 
corporate responsibility, to focus on human rights impact assessments and comprise best practices of states and 
corporations, and provide concrete guidance regarding the obligations and responsibilities of states and businesses, 
among other things. In 2008, Ruggie presented the “Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework.” After further study, 
in 2011 Ruggie concluded his work by issuing the Guiding Principles, a set of 31 recommendations containing 
operational principles to support the initial Framework. The principles call on states to protect human rights and 
ensure remedies are provided for victims of human rights abuses. Additionally, the framework calls on multinational 
enterprises to respect human rights by resisting interference with such rights. Notably, Ruggie concluded the state’s 
duty to protect human rights extraterritorially, while encouraged, is not mandated: see Radu Mares, “Business and 
Human Rights After Ruggie: Foundations, the Art of Simplification and the Imperative of Cumulative Progress,” in 
Radu Mares, ed, The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2012) at 3. John Knox, “The Ruggie Rules: Applying Human Rights Law to Corporations,” in Radu Mares, ed, The 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) at 79. 
644 UNGA, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 21 October 2015, A/RES/70/1. 
645 UNGC, UN Global Compact: The Ten Principles, 2015. 
646 While the Conservative Government of Stephen Harper removed Canada’s permanent objector status in 2010, 
that government nonetheless dismissed UNDRIP at merely aspirational and non-binding: Indigenous and Northern 
Affairs Canada, News Release “Canada's Statement of Support on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples” (12 November 2010) online: <https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1309374239861 
/1309374546142>. 
647 Tim Fontaine, “Canada officially adopts UN declaration on rights of Indigenous Peoples” CBC (10 May 2016); 
On April 21, 2016, NDP MP Romeo Saganash introduced Bill C-262: Bill C-262, An Act to ensure that the laws of 
Canada are in harmony with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 1st Sess, 42nd 
Parl, 2016. The Bill would require: “The Government of Canada, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous 
peoples in Canada, must take all measures necessary to ensure that the laws of Canada are consistent with the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”: Section 4. With a vote of 206-79, the Bill was sent to the 
Senate. At the time of writing, the Bill, having not been passed before the end of June 2019 when the Senate stood 
down, died on the Senate floor. The Liberal government has, however, stated it would re-introduce the bill should it 
be re-elected in fall 2019: John Paul Tasker, “Rona Ambrose’s sex assault bill is dead – and so is the UNDRIP bill” 
CBC (21 June 2019).   
648 UNGA, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295. 
649 Council on Foreign Relations, “The Group of Eight (G8) Industrialized Nations” (3 March 2014) online: 
<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/group-eight-g8-industrialized-nations>. 
650 World Bank, “GDP (current US$): World Development Indicators” (2018) online: <https://data.worldbank.org/ 
indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?year_high_desc=true>. 
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companies) in the top seven countries since at least 2011.651 By such measures, Canada appears 
to be punching above its weight as an influential leader, one that promotes and supports human 
rights globally. 
Not surprisingly, the federal government and associated crown corporations have 
promoted this reputation. In selling Canada as a place to headquarter business, the EDC boasts 
that “Canadian companies are increasingly commanding respect on the global stage, for reasons 
ranging from our Canadian values to our capabilities and expertise in various industry 
sectors…The Canada brand is incredibly hip — and right now, it’s the envy of the world.”652 In 
concert, the TCS advertises that Canada ranks among the top countries in 2017 for business, as 
being one of the easiest places to start a business, and first in the G7 for overall living conditions, 
quality of life, democracy, economic freedom, social progress and, importantly, overall 
reputation.653 
It is clear global mining companies agree Canada is a favourable state in which to 
headquarter their businesses. Mining CanCorps represent nearly half of publicly held global 
mining businesses, and while they control $88.3 billion in assets at home in Canada, this only 
accounts for one third of the value of assets held abroad by mining CanCorps: $170.8 billion.654 
A significant location of these foreign assets are in South America ($53.4 billion) and Africa 
($31.3 billion), while Asia experienced the greatest gain in Canadian investment (up 18.2%, 
$11.1 billion in 2015); in other words, much of the business of mining is done in Canada and the 
majority of mining is done abroad from the comfort of “home.” Canada’s reputation abroad 
provides CanCorps with the means to effectively and unfairly “bait and switch;” such 
corporations presenting themselves cloaked in the social and environmental “values” of the 
Canadian state only to flee liability – and, in turn, the critical ethical values-driven juridical gaze 
– in that same state.  
Canada is a stable democracy in which a CanCorp may have access to significant 
financial and expert capital, insurance, international access, and tax breaks, much of which 
 
651 Reputation Institute, “The World’s Most Reputable Countries” (2018) online: <https:/www.reputationinstitute 
.com/sites/default/files/pdfs/2018-Country-RepTrak.pdf>. 
652 Canada Brand, supra note 514.  
653 Canadian Trade Commission Service, “Invest in Canada,” (Winter 2018) online: <https://www.international.gc.ca 
/investors-investisseurs/assets/pdfs/download/Infographics.pdf>. 
654 Mining Facts and Figures, supra note 539 at 70. 
 155 
 
comes at the expense of the Canadian taxpayer. The financial and human capital benefits of 
headquartering a corporation in Canada lead to significant advantages for a CanCorp. Such 
advantages are supported by a strong national reputation with which a CanCorp can promote 
itself abroad while being subject to a consistently non-interventionist regulatory system.   
However, the necessary consequence of being domiciled in a stable developed state with 
an (arguably) strong democracy is the existence of a strong judiciary. Fairness — in its operation 
as between the Field and the CanCorp — dictates that the multitude of benefits reaped by a 
CanCorp ought to be met by real responsibility before the same country’s judiciary. As John 
Dewey explained, the corporation is a right-and-duty-bearing unit;655 it is now a matter of 
determining whether society will impose fairness, or an equality as between rights (benefits) and 
duties, to its corporate nationals. This basic duty of democratic fairness — that all Canadians are 
subject to the law and to Canada’s courts — begs for a reality frame in the judicial examination 
of a CanCorp’s impacts abroad. As Trevor Farrow noted, Canada’s acceptance of a capitalist-
style economic and trade development means it should also incorporate responsibilities that 
attend to those policy decisions; to the extent the “fruit” of our domestic policy choices — such 
as financial and regulatory support for CanCorps — leads to serious human rights violations, our 
courts need to be made available as a resource for remedies.656 
 
 
  
 
655 John Dewey, “The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality” (1926) 35 Yale LJ 655. 
656 Farrow 2003, supra note 474 at 704. 
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Conclusion 
At the front end of transnational tort litigation, it is jurisdiction that must be overcome by 
putative foreign plaintiffs. However, over the last 30 years, the development of conflict of laws 
legislation, common law, and Civil Code provisions has created a legal framework that, in theory 
(and sometimes in practice), supports the assertion of jurisdiction, specifically in cases involving 
breaches of human rights by Canadian persons. Even the traditional international norm of state 
comity, in its flexibility and modern adaptation, supports such an assertive approach to 
jurisdiction.  
In other words, it is not the tests for forum non conveniens and forum of necessity that 
require change to see transnational cases heard in Canada. The tests already allow for plaintiffs 
to choose their preferred forum, are imbued with a plaintiff-friendly burden (even an 
“exceptional” burden in Québec), and require Canadian courts to consider justice in their 
balancing of factors. In fact, even imagining further liberalization of the test for jurisdiction may 
not make any difference to the tendency of the judiciary to avoid assertion of jurisdiction in the 
first place. This is so as it is not the test itself but the habitus of judges as agents of the judicial 
Field that impresses a state-centred traditionalist approach and leads to Canadian judges shunting 
foreign plaintiffs away from Canadian jurisdictions and back to foreign jurisdictions that are 
unlikely to provide justice.  
While some in the Field appear to be able to shake their traditionalist habitus — at least 
in some cases — the ongoing tendency of the Field (from the superior courts to the SCC) to rely 
on traditional norms of sovereignty and territorialist comity leads to the conclusion that a shift in 
framing is required. To force the Field to see the forest for the trees, or to frame transnational 
actions in a reality of global corporate power dynamics, may be impossible (or at least very 
challenging) in the light of the current Field habitus. Thus, I have argued that one approach to 
ignite a shift towards a global justice reality frame is for practitioners to lean into traditional 
Field doxa – or tenets – whose reference may help to steer the Field habitus towards a more 
liberal — arguably, accurate — interpretation of the tests for jurisdiction. The doxa that I argue 
may be most effective is that of fairness.    
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In the transnational tort arena, many commentators rely on fairness to argue that, for 
instance, corporations must not be able to profit while taking no responsibility for their having 
taken advantage of vulnerable populations. In other words, it is unfair for giants to take 
advantage of the little guy. This conception of fairness pits two or more different parties against 
each other and argues that fairness must be understood in a grounded manner, aware of the 
potential inequality of treating differently positioned parties equally (read, the same). While this 
argument is attractive and can be morally effective in some contexts, it requires Canadian Field 
agents (judges) to accept they have a duty to foreign parties, an already challenging task to those 
grounded in territoriality. Thus, in order to steer even the most traditional Field agents towards a 
liberal interpretation of jurisdiction, I argue that a traditional, equality-based conception of 
fairness may be effective when used in relation to treatment of a single actor. Rather than 
comparing a corporate party to a vulnerable group of foreign plaintiffs, it is more effective to 
apply a Rawls-based fairness approach to that Canadian corporate party alone. In this way, we 
may avoid having to rely on globalized (liberal and uncomfortable) interpretations of justice in 
the construction of our doxic fairness lens. 
In providing Canadian courts with this lens, one that asks whether the corporate party is 
being treated equally by the Canadian state in benefit and burden, the question of whether 
fairness dictates an assertion of jurisdiction is answered by the extent to which Canadian 
corporations take benefit from Canada while avoiding responsibility. As demonstrated in Chapter 
3, in Canada it is clear that CanCorps doing business abroad, particularly those in mining, 
receive considerable benefit while avoiding burdens. CanCorps receive significant financial 
benefits through government funding, public investment, tax avoidance, and insurance. They do 
so while under no obligation to provide business opportunity, jobs, or benefit back to the state. In 
exchange, the Canadian government has repeatedly avoided instituting any effective corporate 
oversight mechanism and has instead preferred the creation of a scheme to assist large 
corporations avoid prosecution. In further benefit, CanCorps borrow the reputation and goodwill 
of the Canadian state while operating abroad. In doing so CanCorps revel in the benefits of 
Canadian “citizenship” while avoiding any accountability burdens associated with such 
citizenship; in other words when CanCorps actively avoid being held liable in a Canadian 
jurisdiction for their wrongdoing, knowing that many Field agents will allow them to do so, they 
are taking advantage of the Canadian state.  
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In bringing to light this version of unfairness, it may be possible to lead — by an 
alternative route — traditionalist Field agents to the primary goal: a modern and justice-based 
interpretation (or reality frame) and approach to the tests for jurisdiction. Not only does this 
approach address La Forest’s push for “fairness” in Tolofson, but also his desire for “order” in 
private international law. Indeed, “order” in the common law is created, in part, through 
predictability. As has been explained, a source of the confusion around private international law 
in Canada is the disconnect between the wording of the jurisdiction tests and the way in which 
they are applied. To actively and predictably hold CanCorp’s to account for human rights and 
environmental torts committed abroad – i.e. by acknowledging and promoting the actual 
wording/burdens of the jurisdictional tests – creates no more disorder in Canadian law than to 
hold CanCorps accountable for domestic torts committed in Canada; I don’t believe anyone 
suggests there is unacceptable uncertainty in domestic civil litigation. Order, in this case, is 
created through certainty of being held to account.  
For further support, Field agents may be comforted to know that a more aggressive 
approach to asserting jurisdiction aligns with the approaches increasingly taken by Canada’s 
international brethren (including the US and the UK),657 and with retaliatory legislation enacted 
by developing states designed to force developed common law states to assert jurisdiction.658 
Further, such an approach aligns with the commitments Canada has long made on the 
international stage through, for instance, Canada’s endorsement of an injured party’s right to an 
effective legal remedy as outlined in the “international bill of rights.”659 
Without addressing barriers to jurisdiction, along with other procedural barriers, foreign 
plaintiffs will continue to struggle to achieve justice in cases involving human rights and 
environmental abuse. Further, beyond such project-specific cases, a failure to shift the Field’s 
approach to jurisdiction within Canada will more than likely mean that larger climate change-
related litigation brought from the international sphere will see no success in this country, 
 
657 See discussion of three American cases, Jota v Texaco, Inc, Along v Freeport-McMoran Inc, and Unocal No 1: 
Scott (MNE) 2001 at 590; see also Alvarez v Johns Hopkins University, US District Court, District of Maryland, No 
15-00950, from the US where recently a Federal Court ruled the University and two associated corporations must 
face an action over a 1940’s experiment in Guatemala that infected hundreds of locals with syphilis; see also 
Lungowe v Vedanta, [2017] EWCA Civ 1528, in UK where the Court of Appeal upheld a High Court ruling allowing 
a case brought by Zambian villagers against the UK mining company Vedanta to continue to be heard in UK courts.  
658 Joseph 2004, supra note 10 at 96. 
659 UDHR, supra note 179 at Art 8; ICCPR, supra note 365 at Art 2(3); Farrow 2003, supra note 474 at 679-680. 
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forever susceptible to being dismissed on preliminary grounds. The Canadian judiciary (Field) 
and litigation practitioners are on the front lines of this issue and may have a dramatic effect on 
the development of Canadian law to the potential benefit of international plaintiffs. Through a 
simple yet fundamental shift in framing, potentially achieved by practitioners introducing 
evidence of the benefits enjoyed by a particular defendant corporation, such practitioners may be 
able to create the right environment within the courtroom to encourage logical, modern, reality-
based, appropriately weighted, and thoughtful decisions on jurisdiction, thus reserving hope for 
the next step in climate change action. Indeed, where the tests for jurisdiction attain greater 
predictability through a more globalized application – consistent with their current frameworks – 
actions in liability launched by non-Canadian parties against CanCorps may have the opportunity 
to be considered on their merits, rather than dismissed on procedural grounds. And hopefully, the 
ever-increasing risk that CanCorps (particularly in oil and gas) that share in the responsibility of 
climate change may actually be held responsible by a strong judiciary will lead to a sharp change 
in business direction and practice, to a global benefit.  
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